Family support for the elderly in rural China : an illustration from Shaanxi by Yan, Hao
Family Support for the Elderly in Rural China:
An Illustration from Shaanxi
by
Yan Hao
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at the Demography Program, 
Research School of Social Sciences, 
The Australian National University, 
Canberra, Australia
February, 1999
DECLARATION
Except where otherwise acknowledged in the text, this 
thesis represents my own work.
Yan Hao
February, 1999
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This study would not have been possible without the guidance, support and 
assistance I received over the last few years from many individuals and institutions in 
both Australia and China. It is a great pleasure for me to take this opportunity to 
extend my heartfelt acknowledgment and appreciation to the following:
In Australia:
First of all, I would like to thank the Australian National University for 
providing me with the necessary financial assistance, including the scholarship and 
fieldwork allowance. My special gratitude goes to Professor Peter McDonald, Head of 
the Demography Program, and the members of my advisory panel: Professor Gavin 
Jones, Dr. Zhongwei Zhao and Dr. Donald Rowland. Being the Chairman of the Panel 
and one of my old teachers, Professor Jones not only gave me the overall guidance and 
support throughout the course of this study, but also patiently corrected my thesis in 
detail. More thanks are due to Dr. Terry Hull, Dr. Adrian Hayes, Dr. Chris Wilson, 
and Dr Gordon Carmichael who offered me valuable comments and suggestions 
during various parts of the thesis process. I am particularly indebted to Mrs. Wendy 
Cosford who carefully proof-read every chapter of this thesis, and always encouraged 
me to improve my knowledge in writing English. My sincere thank also goes to Ms. 
Diana Crow, the programmer of the Program, who was always ready to solve my 
computer problems. In addition, I would like to thank Ms. Milisa Haberschusz, Ms. 
Marian May, Ms. Jenny White and Ms. Vera Joveska for their logistical support 
during my stay in Canberra.
In China:
I would like to thank my employer, the Research Institute of Economics of the 
State Development Planning Commission, for allowing me to complete my study in 
Australia on a special leave. Further thanks goes to Professor Tian Xueyuan, Director 
of the Population Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
Professor Xiao Zhenyu, Deputy Director of the China Research Centre on Ageing, and 
Professor Zhu Chuzhu of the Population Institute of Jiaotong University for their 
advice and suggestions. I am also indebted to Mr. Guo Xiyun, Director of the Qindu 
District Committee on Ageing, and Mr. Liu Jianhai and Ms. Bian Mingxia, my hosts 
during the fieldwork in Nanshangzhao.
Finally, I would express my heartfelt thanks to my wife Li Xi, my parents and 
other members of my family whose continued love and support are indispensable in 
completing this study.
i i i
ABSTRACT
Much of the recent interest in the consequences of population ageing focuses on 
the security and support for the elderly. In China, the family remains the principal 
provider of old-age support and care. This study aims at examining on a community basis 
the status and well-being of the elderly, the familial support system for the elderly, and 
the old-age security strategies of rural people in response to the two major government 
policies in rural areas: birth control and family support for the elderly, in the context of a 
functional return to family farming. In order to attain the proposed objects within limited 
time and financial budget, this study employed the micro-demographic community-study 
approach that combines a formal, structured survey operation with a number of intensive 
quantitative techniques.
This study was conducted in a rural community in central Shaanxi, China. Like 
other places in China, the study area has witnessed tremendous changes over the last few 
decades. However, unlike most other developing countries on a similar modernisation 
course, these changes are initiated primarily by the government’s direct intervention 
based on ideological concepts or macro socio-economic rationales. The present elderly 
generation is therefore a unique group in the population because of the dramatic 
experience in their life.
It is evident that the living standard of the elderly in the study area has greatly 
improved since the reform. However, this does not necessarily mean that old people 
enjoyed the same level of well-being and quality of life as younger generations. On the 
other hand, modernisation and the government’s campaigns against ‘feudalist and 
superstitious’ practices have greatly eroded the power and influence of old people at 
home and in the community. In the study area, only a small number of old people still 
played an active role in the family.
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In the study area, despite rapid and substantial socio-economic changes, the 
family system of support appears still to be largely intact. This is evidenced by both the 
high levels of coresidence and the common receipt of material support from non-resident 
children. Still, a sizeable proportion of old persons relied on their own resources, or were 
partly assisted by children, for living expenses. The level of support the elderly received 
was not very high, and it was not necessarily closely related to the number and sex of 
children they have or children’s financial capacity. Rather, it was influenced primarily by 
the willingness of children to provide support.
Under the joint influence of modernisation and programmatic efforts, the small- 
family norm has been widely accepted in the study area. However, coresidence in a 
multi-generation household is still considered ideal. The most common reason is inter- 
generational support and care, followed by family traditions. The inconsistency between 
the ideal number of persons and the ideal number of generations in a family household 
surprisingly mirrors the inconsistency of government policies between birth control and 
family support.
The present working-age adults have fewer children but more opportunities to 
obtain their own old-age security in a market-oriented economy. For economic 
support, the majority followed the traditional pattern and expected children to be their 
main providers in old age. Nevertheless, such expectations did not lead to a noticeable 
preference for large families. Most couples believed that two children are enough, 
providing that one is a son. As a trade-off for quantity, parents now put special 
emphasis on the education of children. Still, a sizeable proportion of people wanted an 
increasing contribution from the community, or believed that they could arrange their 
old-age security with own efforts. Very few people participated in the insurance 
programs designed by the government to serve rural residents. It takes time for such 
programs to be trusted by their target clients.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The research issue in context
In recent years, population ageing as a result of demographic transition and its 
effect on old-age support in developing countries have begun to attract the attention of 
demographers and policy-makers throughout the world (UN, 1982, 1994; Andrews, 
1992). Different countries and regions have different characteristics of population 
dynamics. Understandably, population ageing is manifest in some places and incipient in 
others. It is evident that population ageing is well under way in most developed countries 
where demographic transition is almost completed at very low levels of fertility and 
mortality. Most developing countries, on the other hand, are undergoing various stages of 
demographic transition. Their populations are still quite young because fertility in these 
countries started to decline only recently. Nevertheless, according to UN projections, 
population ageing will proceed in future much more rapidly in developing countries than 
it did in developed ones (UN, 1994).
It is widely believed that in the West ageing took place in the context of 
industrialisation and urbanisation. In developing countries, however, this nexus between 
the development of an urban-industrial economy and population ageing may not be as 
close. Therefore, ageing in developing countries will occur not only in a different cultural 
context but also in a different socio-economic context (Jones, 1993). Much of the interest 
in the consequences of population ageing in developing countries focuses on the security 
and support for the aged as individuals and as a generation. Old-age security is defined 
here as the financial and material resources available to the elderly after they withdraw 
from productive activities. Understandably, old-age security is closely linked to the status 
and economic well-being of the elderly, and changes constantly in line with social and 
economic development.
At the moment, a Western-style social security system is not widely established in
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most developing countries. The family remains the principal provider of old-age support. 
However, families are expected to deal with the challenges of ageing precisely at the 
moment when they are under severe and virtually implacable pressures. Even if social 
and cultural norms of providing for the elderly remain strong, the physical capability of 
the family to cope with the rising needs of the elderly will be weakened because the 
survival of parents will increase and the number of children, and their availability, will 
decline as results of rapid fertility decline and drastic socio-economic transformations. 
The elderly are facing difficulty or uncertainty in securing an assured source of support in 
old age. Governments are expected to adopt an integrated approach towards old-age 
support, in which family support is supplemented by public services (UN, 1994).
China is the most populous country in the world with a total population of over 
1.2 billion in 1995. It has long been a consensus among Chinese scholars and policy­
makers that rapid population growth has an adverse effect on China's socio-economic 
development. Over the last few decades, remarkable achievements have been made to 
reduce fertility through massive family planning programs. Since the early 1970s China's 
total fertility rate dropped from 5.8 in 1970 to 2.14 in 1990. With sustained fertility 
decline and extended life expectancy, the process of population ageing begins. Cowgill 
and Holmes (1970) have proposed that a population should be considered as 'aged' when 
the proportion of people aged 65 and over reaches 10 per cent. Judged by this definition, 
China's population is still youthful with the aged accounting for 5.6 per cent in 1990. 
However, as today's huge cohorts of young adults grow old after about 2010, China will 
have an enormous aged population (Table 1.1).
The process of ageing can hardly be changed because of the underlying age 
structure of the population. What remains to be answered is how the numerous elderly 
can be adequately provided for under the prevailing socio-economic circumstances. 
Family support for the elderly is deeply rooted in the traditional Chinese society. 
Although an old-age pension scheme was introduced as early as in the 1950s, its 
coverage is limited to public servants and employees of state-owned enterprises in cities. 
For the majority of the elderly living in rural areas, the family is still the core of their
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support. Since the late 1970s, rural China has experienced two drastic reforms: economic 
reform characterised by the Household Responsibility System that replaced communal 
farming with family farming, and population reform characterised by coercive birth 
control campaigns, including the controversial One-Child Policy. Imposed directly by the 
Government, both reforms have significant consequences for the elderly, their families 
and the existing old-age support system.
Government policies in two relevant areas require that the family’s role in old-age 
support be continuously preserved and strengthened in rural China. On the one hand, the 
Government is unable under the current socio-economic circumstances to establish a 
Western style social security system in rural areas. As the government's 10-year reform 
guideline requires, the support of the aged in rural areas should be shouldered chiefiy by 
their families and supplemented by community assistance (CCP Central Committee, 
1993). Strong family support in old-age security is essential for maintaining the general 
well-being of the elderly, so that they can share with others the full benefit of 
modernisation. On the other hand, the government adheres firmly to its commitment to 
birth control policies. Given the evident old-age support motives of high fertility 
(Kagitcibasi, 1982; Nugent, 1985, 1990), strong family support in old-age security is also 
crucial to the success of family planning programs.
A number of studies have been conducted by demographers in China in recent 
years on population ageing and its effect on old-age security. However, detailed 
information about the mechanism of old-age support at micro level is still far from 
adequate. This thesis tries to fill this gap of knowledge based on a micro-demographic 
community study in a Shaanxi village. Broadly, the three main research issues are: the 
current status and well-being of the elderly, the familial support system for the elderly, 
and the expectations and strategies of old-age security of rural people in response to the 
current low level of fertility and a functional return to family farming in rural China.
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1.2. A brief review of literature on family support for the elderly
1.2.1. The central role of the family in old-age support
It is widely agreed that family is the basic unit in human society. ‘Family’ and 
‘household’ are two terms that can be found frequently in the literature; theoretically, 
however, there are certain differences between them. The family can be viewed as a 
product of purely demographic factors such as fertility, mortality and nuptiality, whereas 
a household is more or less a socio-economic entity. A family consists of two or more 
members who are related, while a household can include unrelated persons. Although it is 
argued that household affiliations are key factors affecting old people (UN, 1994), this 
study chooses to use the more conventional term of family support, rather than household 
support, in the discussion of old-age security.
Older persons are often subject to special needs for support as they withdraw from 
productive activities because of age and frailty. Kane and Kane (1981) have identified 
four areas in which the elderly have special needs for assistance both as individuals and 
as a population group: physical, mental, social and economic. As the 1982 World 
Assembly on Ageing pointed out in its final report, families play a central role in the 
support of old people throughout the world (UN, 1982). Recent studies on population 
ageing and its socio-economic implications in developing countries also reveal that in 
virtually all countries discussed, the family is regarded as the principal supporter, carer 
and home-provider for old people (Andrews, 1992). Hashimoto and Kendig (1992) 
concluded from a cross-nation study that wherever the family persists, family support 
persists - even if it is not always fully adequate and available to all older people. The 
concepts of family support vary according to the ways in which particular cultures, 
societies, and individuals perceive and define the boundaries and responsibilities of the 
family. In societies where the nuclear family is the norm, support is provided primarily 
by spouses or children. In societies where extended families are the norm, family 
members of other generations or collateral kin are sometimes involved as well. Family
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support and co-residence with family are not always identical. Support from non-resident 
family members should also be taken into account. Mason (1992) argued that it is 
important to distinguish between economic support and physical care. The former can be 
accomplished impersonally, while the latter requires the personal ministrations of a care 
giver. Since this study is concerned primarily with old-age security, the focus here is the 
economic aspect of family support. Family care and its relation with institutional care are 
not discussed in detail in this section.
In industrialised countries, the elderly prefer to live in their own dwellings while 
maintaining close contact with other generations located nearby (Sussman, 1985). The 
family still plays an indispensable role in providing social and emotional support for the 
elderly. The state, on the other hand, has assumed major responsibilities for income 
support, in addition to various self-financing programs. In most developing countries 
where the monetised economy is yet to be fully established, family support takes diverse 
forms (Caldwell, 1976). Most frequently the support is provided in the form of shared 
housing, food and other necessities through co-residence. Martin (1990) described co­
residence as a part of a retirement contract in more agrarian developing societies. Under 
these conditions, one or more children move in with parents, gradually assume 
responsibility for the household and eventually take over headship. Occasionally, non­
resident children also send gifts or other in-kind benefits, or offer labour service. Direct 
monetary assistance, including regular paid living allowances, remittances and pocket 
money, usually plays a lesser role. These transfers are more likely to be paid by those 
children who live apart from their parents or who have migrated (Knodel and Debavalya, 
1992). Meanwhile, the younger members of the family almost exclusively provide 
support and care in times of illness and disability.
1.2.2. Factors influencing the family support
Hashimoto and Kendig (1992) have identified four main factors at macro level 
that can influence family support for the aged in each society: demographic, economic, 
political and cultural. They influence not only the type and quality of support, but also the
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relative balance between care provided by families and that provided by the state. 
Demographic factors, such as population ageing, migration, and family composition, set 
limits for the potential availability of family support. Modernisation, industrialisation and 
urbanisation have major effect on the status of the aged and family organisation. A 
transition from an agrarian economy to an industrial and moneyed economy reduces the 
control by older people over key resources, affecting eventually their status and well­
being. Government policies will also influence the redistribution of resources between 
families and the state. Cultural norms and values shape the course of family ties which 
structure reciprocal support patterns. This is particularly true in East Asian countries 
where the Confucian values of filial piety and ancestor worship have a strong influence. 
Children are under heavy obligations towards their parents, and to support their parents in 
old age is seen as a sacred duty (Cowgill, 1986). Also at macro level, McDonald (1989) 
thought the extent to which families provide support will depend upon five factors: 
cultural or legal prescriptions and the level of adherence to those prescriptions, the 
demographic availability of family members, the geographic availability of family 
members, the economic capacity of family members to provide support and the 
willingness of family members to provide support. Changes in these factors will 
eventually bring about changes in the family support system.
Mason (1992) has developed a model to illustrate from five aspects the effects of 
macro-economic and social changes on family support and care of the elderly. First, a 
shift from familial production to wage employment will erode parental power and control 
over the younger generation, and reduce the likelihood of co-residence of the elderly with 
their children. Second, increased labour participation of women as a result of 
industrialisation is likely to reduce the availability of care givers at home. Third, 
increased schooling, accompanied by the spread of Western ideas, may break down 
traditional values and norms, such as those favouring high fertility and filial piety. The 
elderly may be faced with a shortage of willing providers in the younger generation. 
Fourth, increased migration may result in physical separation of the senior and younger 
generations and a decrease in multi-generational households. However, there is one 
important process in development, that is, the rising per capita income that may improve
6
the welfare of the elderly, who may achieve greater financial independence through 
personal wealth accumulation or state transfers, or receive more financial assistance from 
their wealthier children.
Myers (1992) believed family-related issues should be dealt with from an 
intergenerational perspective, which is far more complex than aggregative analyses of 
population structure and dynamics. The macro effects can only be materialised through a 
number of intermediate factors at micro levels, such as age and sex, marital status of the 
aged, number of children, kin availability, household structures, and living arrangements:
1. It is understandable that age is closely linked to an older person’s physical 
ability. The more advanced the age, the greater the need for support as well as for care. 
Sex may also make a difference. In traditional patriarchal families, it is the senior males 
who have control of family resources and power over women and young men. Females, 
marginalised and powerless, are at particular risk of non-support and non-care in old ages 
(Mason, 1992; Rudkin, 1993).
2. The concern over the marital status is based on the fact that spouses provide a 
main share of support and care for older persons in need. Single, widowed, and divorced 
or separated persons at older ages are the most vulnerable and needy. It is worth noting 
that widowed women make up a large proportion of the aged population in developing 
countries because of two factors. First, early widowhood is common in both sexes 
because the death rate has been high until quite recently. However, females have a higher 
survival chance than males due to differential mortality. Second, the remarriage rate of 
females is much lower than that of males. In many traditional cultures, the remarriage of 
widows is strongly discouraged, or even forbidden. Unable to get access to family 
resources or accrue financial security from paid employment during their lifetimes, 
elderly widows tend to depend entirely on family support and assistance (Cowgill, 1986; 
Chen and Jones, 1989).
3. Since children are a major source of support, their number always plays a crucial
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role, if their ability and willingness are not taken into account. There is considerable 
evidence to show that old-age security is still a primary motive for high fertility in 
developing countries (Kagitcibasi, 1982; Nugent, 1985; De Vos, 1985; Cain, 1986). In 
many Asian countries there is a strong preference of sons, because sons have more 
responsibility for financial support, while daughters have more responsibility for 
instrumental and emotional support. Not surprisingly, childless older persons are usually 
trapped in a difficult position.
4. The question of household structures is also of direct relevance. Chen (1992) 
asserted that there is a negative correlation between parents’ financial independence and 
the probability of co-residence. In developing countries, the extended family is still the 
prevailing norm, where older parents co-reside with their adult children and depend on 
their support. By contrast, most old people in Western countries are financially 
independent and live alone or only with a spouse.
1.2.3. Family support as intergenerational transfers
Family support for the aged can be seen as part of intergenerational transfers of 
income and services between the aged and adult children. There have been for decades 
two fundamentally different theories existing side by side about intergenerational 
transfers: the 'role reversal' model and the 'role continuity' model. The former suggests 
that intergenerational family transfers are related to the life cycle in a curvilinear fashion, 
with the middle aged being net providers for the young and elderly (Sussman, 1965). The 
latter holds that each generation in the family continuously redistributes resources to its 
successors. Parents continue benefiting their children even into advanced old age, except 
in the cases of extreme hardship (Moore, 1966). Both theories can find substantial 
supporting evidence in empirical studies. The 'role reverse' model is more or less 
applicable to the situation in developing countries, whereas the 'role continuity' model is 
more or less applicable to the situation in industrialised countries. To reconcile the 
controversy between the two schools, Covey (1983) has developed a structural model 
suggesting that the relative strength of obligation to transfer resources and the relative
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capacity to fulfil the obligation between generations are primary determinants of the 
direction of intergenerational wealth flow. In comparison, Laitner (1997) proposed two 
theoretical models from a purely economic point of view, based largely on observations 
in the Western societies. The altruistic preference approach deals with the parent 
household transferring resources to the child household instead of selling them, while the 
transactions cost approach looks at the benefits of inter-household transactions outside 
the normal market channels.
According to the wealth flow theory proposed by Caldwell (1976), however, the 
direction of intergenerational wealth flow can be altered. In primitive and traditional 
societies the net flow is from children to parents, whereas in industrial societies wealth 
generally flows in the opposite direction. The decisive factors here are modernisation and 
Westernisation. Although it is designed primarily to explain the changes in fertility, the 
wealth flow theory also sheds some light on reasons why family support for the aged is 
still prevailing in most areas of developing countries (Hugo, 1995). It is worth noting that 
a shift in intergenerational flow resulting from modernisation might put the welfare of the 
aged in jeopardy, since resources previously channelled to them are redirected to the 
younger generation. Therefore, it is easy to understand why the elderly in developing 
countries are more dependent at present on control of resources for old-age security, in 
order to ensure that one of their children or relatives will care for them if and when they 
become unable to provide for themselves.
Hashimoto and Kendig (1992) noticed in a number of empirical studies a pattern 
of ‘two-way’ interdependency between elderly parents and adult children rather than a 
one way dependency of parents on children. While being provided for by their children, 
parents still remain as direct contributors in the productive and domestic economies. This 
is particularly true in developing countries where older persons, unlike their counterparts 
in industrialised countries who usually retire after reaching retirement age, tend to remain 
economically active till very advanced ages (Chang, 1992). The contributions of the 
elderly are usually sex-segregated. Old men tend to assist in agricultural work such as 
ploughing, harvesting, and watering the fields, while old women lend a hand in daily
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housework like cooking, housekeeping and care of grandchildren (Kim and Choe, 1992; 
Andrews and Hennink, 1992 Dharmalingam, 1994). Even in more developed countries, 
intergenerational transfers from older persons to their children or other young relatives 
are not uncommon. The problem is that, as Kotlikoff (1988) observed, such transfers are 
usually unmeasured, since they may take the form of ‘implicit gifts’. Therefore, the 
contribution of older people should be appreciated in the context of interdependencies 
between family members of all ages.
1.2.4. Family support and state support, or integration of the two
Family support is often discussed in relation to state or public support, within a 
general division between informal and formal support systems. The combination and 
complementarity of the two vary widely from one society to another owing to factors like 
economic conditions, political and social structure, and cultural tradition. In between, 
there are various kinds of community and neighbourhood supports, viewed as 
supplements or alternatives to family and state support systems. In industrial countries, 
income support and aged care have long been institutionalised. In developing countries, 
by contrast, old-age support is largely still provided by families. The most crucial aspect 
of this family support system is co-residence with adult children. The availability of 
formal support sponsored by the state is limited in terms of duration, size and coverage 
(Hashimoto and Kendig, 1992; Chang, 1992; Jones, 1993). Chen and Jones (1989) 
observed that in most low-income countries in Asia, the current formal pension schemes 
only cover a small proportion of the population, such as civil servants and employees of 
state-owned enterprises. The financing of these schemes is usually compulsory income- 
contributory rather than taxation based.
Therefore, Cowgill and Holmes (1972) argued that, as economic development 
proceeds, the source of old-age security is likely to be switched from the family support 
system to the public support system, or from family-based mutual aid to social security 
programs. Based on data of 52 countries in both developed and developing regions 
around 1980, Ogawa (1994) concluded that the share of gross domestic product (GDP)
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allocated to the provision of social security benefits rises with per capita gross national 
product (GNP) measured in US dollars. However, there are substantial differences among 
different countries even if their levels of economic development are comparable. Ogawa 
suggests that cultural, political, and demographic factors should be examined in further 
detail. Worach-Kardas (1983) suggested that family responsibility for the elderly, as 
opposed to public responsibility, is often a function of economic conditions even in the 
same economy. The state's responsibility looks different in times of prosperity than in 
times of crisis.
The insufficient state support for the aged in developing countries is attributed to 
limited resources at the government's disposal. Poor economies simply cannot afford a 
system of social security that could provide even a minimally adequate safety net for their 
aged population. In this context, family support is the only alternative. This does not 
necessarily mean that families will be always willing to give support when there are other 
viable options (Jones, 1993). Lack of government commitment is another reason why 
state support programs progress so slowly. To most governments in developing countries, 
the fundamental dilemma is whether or not scarce resources should be devoted to a group 
which is not considered as an investment in human capital for development, especially 
when the overall level of resource availability is subject to external factors like foreign 
trade. Some policy-makers tend to have negative and stereotypical views about the 
experiences of Western countries (Martin, 1988). They are not only aware of a variety of 
dilemmas in maintaining social security programs, but also fear that a creeping 
Westernisation will erode the old family values and traditions appreciated as a stabiliser 
in the face of the forces of economic and social change (El-Badry, 1986). As a result, in 
recent years some governments have adopted intervention measures to strengthen the 
traditional familial system, including legislation to require children to look after their 
parents (Knodel, Chayovan, and Siriboon, 1992; McDonald and Soriano, 1994).
It is widely believed that the traditional familial system of old-age support is 
under constant pressure of accelerated population ageing and rapid socio-economic 
changes. On the basis of the experiences of the West, Petri (1982) assumed that
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conditions in developing countries will eventually change to such an extent that the 
modern systems of pension, insurance and markets for care of the aged may become 
viable and appropriate. In recent empirical studies, expectations of help from children are 
also found to be declining among married couples, particularly those living in cities. 
There is an increasing demand for formal support services (Chen and Jones, 1989; 
Martin, 1990; Meada and Shimizu, 1992; Kim and Choe, 1992). Chang (1992) and 
Knodel, Chayovan and Siriboon (1992) predicted that in the future the characteristics and 
expectations of the elderly will be different from those of today. The future elderly will 
be generally better educated, more urbanised and financially more independent. They 
may well choose to purchase greater privacy and autonomy in living arrangements. One 
might tentatively conclude that developing countries will probably follow Western 
patterns whereby, with economic development, many parents neither expect nor receive 
economic or other forms of assistance from their children in old age.
However, other scholars doubt the necessity for developing countries to follow 
eventually the Western practice of introducing a formal old-age support system, owing to 
differences in social, economic and cultural background (McCallum, 1988). It is in both 
the government's and the future old people’s interest to preserve the familial system of 
support. Rather than trying to design a new formal system that is likely to be excessively 
expensive, it may be worthwhile to consider ways in which the traditional system may be 
made both more flexible and more robust to survive the stresses of modernisation (Tout, 
1989; Jones, 1993). A variety of policy recommendations have been put forward. At the 
macro-level, some suggest strengthening government intervention to reinforce traditional 
values (McCallum, 1988). Others suggest maintaining the prevailing social norm that 
requires parents to invest in their children and children to repay those investments by 
caring for their parents in old age (Nugent, 1990) At micro-level, some suggest fostering 
the forces of co-operation within the family by keeping key family resources always in 
the hands of family heads, so that they can control disobedient children (Nugent, 1990). 
Others suggest using birth-spacing to achieve small family size without jeopardising 
parents' old-age security (Enke and Brown, 1972). Trading off quantity for quality is 
considered another effective option. If parents expect to rely on children for security
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later, the best strategy could be to produce one or two successful children who will have 
adequate means of support (De Vos, 1985).
To ensure that the elderly population in developing countries will lead a happy 
and secure life in old age, perhaps a pragmatic strategy is to integrate the two support 
systems, so that the best of traditional and modem approaches can be fully employed. 
The ESCAP Population Division (1994) recommended an integrated approach towards 
the support of the elderly, including a balanced development of cash assistance, in-kind 
services, and a combination of public and family efforts. The Japanese experience is 
frequently cited as an example. Palmore (1975) pointed out that while the economic 
system in Japan has become similar to that of other industrialised nations, Japan's 
distinctive social system and cultural traditions have nevertheless maintained a high 
degree of integration for the aged. These values and practices may be worthy of 
preserving and transplanting. For example, 64.6 per cent of Japanese aged 65 and over 
lived with their children in 1985. Over 40 per cent of married middle-aged sons still 
provided financial support to their ageing parents (Meada and Shimizu, 1992). 
Meanwhile, the government has been implementing a host of old-age support programs 
ranging from home helpers to tax-exempt schemes. Ogawa (1992) thinks the Japanese 
experience for old-age support through traditional familial and public systems may be 
relevant to policy makers in developing countries in future.
1.3. Changing age structure of the Chinese population, 1953-2050
Any study on ageing related topics is incomplete without a brief review of the 
trend and pattern of the population ageing in China, for two obvious reasons: one is the 
sheer magnitude of the problem or the absolute number of people involved, and the other 
is the accelerated momentum for population ageing that is already built into age structure 
as a result of the tortuous course of demographic transition over the last few decades. 
Based on selected indicators from census data and projection results, Table 1.1 illustrates 
the trend and pattern of population ageing in China during the period from 1953 to 2050.
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For measuring population ageing, one of the most frequently used indicators is the 
proportion of the aged in the total population. Cowgill and Holmes (1970) have proposed 
that populations should be considered as ‘young’ when the proportion of the population 
aged 65 and over remains under 5 per cent, and should be considered 'aged' when the 
proportion of the elderly reaches 10 per cent. It is believed that 65 is an age when a large 
segment of the population has significant physical, economic and social needs. However, 
the document of the 1982 World Assembly on Ageing suggests that it is practical to take 
60 years and over as the criterion of the elderly in developing countries where elderly 
mortality is still high (UN, 1982). In China, the cut-off age for the elderly is set at 60 in 
most official publications.
Table 1.1: Changes in population age structure, China, 1953-2050
Year Total % Population aged Total elderly Ageing Median
population population index age
(million) 0-14 15-64 65+ (million) (65+/0-14)*100
1953 587.9 36.3 59.3 4.4 25.9 12.1 21.7
1964 705.0 40.7 55.8 3.5 24.7 8.6 19.2
1982 1016.5 33.6 61.5 4.9 49.8 14.6 22.9
1990 1143.3 27.7 66.7 5.6 64.0 20.1 25.3
2000a 1282.0 25.7 67.2 7.1 91.0 27.6 28.9
2010a 1372.8 20.5 71.3 8.2 112.6 40.0 33.2
2020a 1460.3 19.8 68.9 11.3 165.0 57.1 35.4
2030a 1500.0 18.5 66.5 15.0 225.0 81.1 38.5
2040a 1499.6 17.1 63.5 19.4 290.9 113.4 40.6
2050a 1468.8 17.4 63.1 19.4 284.9 112.1 40.3
Source: Reconstructed from Sun, 1994.
Note:a The medium variant projected by the Population Statistics Department, SBS.
Between 1953 and 1964 the number of people aged 65 and over did not vary 
much, remaining about 25 million. Since the total population of China increased from 
587.9 million to 705.0 million during this period, the corresponding proportion of the 
elderly in fact decreased from 4.4 per cent to 3.5 per cent. This trend toward a younger 
population occurred primarily because of high birth rates and rapidly declining infant and 
child mortality rates, resulting in the proportion of children aged 0-14 rising from 36.3 to 
40.7 per cent.
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Shryock and Siegel (1971) suggested that the aged-child ratio (also referred to as 
ageing index) may be the best measure of population ageing because this measure 
includes the two population subgroups which change the most during the demographic 
transition. Accordingly, China’s ageing ratio fell during this period from 12.1 to 8.6 per 
cent.
The median age is an indicator frequently used to analyse the central tendency of 
age distribution of a population. According to Shryock and Siegel (1971), populations 
with medians under 20 may be described as ‘young’, those with medians 30 or over as 
‘old’, and those with medians 20 to 29 as of ‘intermediate’ age. When the median age 
rises, the population may be said to be ‘ageing’, and when it falls, the population may be 
said to be growing younger. From 1953 to 1964, China’s population was in fact 
‘juvenescing’ rather than ageing, with the median age falling from 22.7 to 20.2.
Regular measures for examining population ageing also include age dependency 
ratio and familial support ratio. The age dependency ratio is derived from the young 
(aged 0-14) and old (aged 65 and over) populations divided by the working-age (aged 15- 
65) population. The numerator is supposed to approximate the economically dependent 
population while the denominator represents the economically active population. In 
practice, this measure should be used with special caution, particularly when increases in 
the proportion of older persons occur along with decreases in the proportion of young 
persons as displayed in Table 1.1. The familial support ratio is of great value in the 
discussion of old-age support. By measuring the relative size of two cohorts, commonly 
the age group 45-49 relative to those 65-79, this measure can provide a rough 
approximation of the availability of children to older persons for assistance.
Between 1964 and 1982, China’s total population increased from 705.0 to 1,016.5 
million. While China’s population growth was still dominated by the increase in young 
people, there were also indications of the elderly catching up in number and proportion. 
During this period the total elderly doubled from 24.3 to 49.4 million, and their 
corresponding proportion rose from 3.5 per cent to 4.9 per cent. As a result, the ageing
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index rose from 8.8 to 14.6 per cent. The increase of median age from 20.2 to 22.9 also 
indicates that Chinese population started getting mature, if not old.
When the fourth National Census was conducted in 1990 China’s population 
stood at 1,143.3 million. During eight years from 1982, the number of the elderly 
increased from 49.4 million to 63.4 million. With the proportion of the elderly exceeding 
5 per cent (5.6 per cent), the Chinese population as a whole could no longer be 
considered as ‘young’. Meanwhile, the ageing index went up from 22.7 to 31.0 per cent, 
and the median age from 22.9 to 25.3.
Figure 1.1: Population age-sex structure, China, 1990
Female
Percentage
Source: Reconstructed from Population Statistics Department, SBS, 1993.
As a result of the continuous demographic transition, China’s population as a 
whole is now gradually moving from a young population to the early stage of an adult 
population However, the drastic course the demographic transition took over the last few
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decades in China has had a great impact on the shape of the current population age 
structure, as illustrated by the population pyramid in Figure 1.1. The current age 
structure, in turn, will influence China’s future trends and pattens of population growth in 
general, and population ageing in particular.
As can be seen, the shape of China’s population pyramid is unique, with two 
apparent bulges followed by a shrinking base. The first bulge reflects the baby-boom 
period of the early 1950s, and the second that of the 1960s. The narrow contraction in 
between is caused by the 1959-1962 famine. Generally speaking, China’s population 
pyramid among people aged 20 and above in 1990 is in the shape of an obtuse triangle 
with a very wide base, typical for a population during the expansion phase of population 
transition. In contrast, the number of people in younger age groups under 20 decreased 
drastically, as a direct result of the massive birth control programs since the 1970s, 
including the controversial One-Child policy. The growth of population aged 0-4 in the 
five-year period before the 1990 census can largely be attributed to the effect of growth 
momentum with the large baby-boomer cohorts now entering reproductive ages. At 
present, the process of demographic transition in China is far from complete. Even if 
fertility can be controlled at a low level in future through the joint effect of government 
intervention and socio-economic development, the total population will still keep 
growing. The drastic fluctuation will also keep repeating itself before finally being ironed 
out by time.
Both the Third National Census of 1982 and the Fourth National Census of 1990 
have produced quite reliable statistics for demographic analysis. In recent years numerous 
population projections have been made for China based on the census data by 
demographers at home and abroad (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh, 1985; Ogawa, 1988; 
Banister, 1992; Sun, 1994). From these projections, it is easy to understand the future 
magnitude, trends and patterns of population ageing in China. Understandably, projection 
results differ from one source to another since different assumptions are used. Most 
commonly three fertility assumptions (high, medium and low) and one mortality 
assumption are used to illustrate a range of outcomes. One mortality assumption is used
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largely because China already has a mortality schedule and a life expectancy at birth 
comparable to that of many developed nations. Further improvements may occur more 
slowly in the future (Banister, 1992).
Results of the population projection made by the State Bureau of Statistics (SBS) 
in 1994 are widely cited in government publications (Sun, 1994). Based on the 1990 
census data, total population and other relevant indicators have been estimated for the 
period 1990-2050 in high, medium and low variants. The fertility level as represented by 
the TFR is assumed for the medium variant to drop from 2.1 in 1990 to 1.9 in 2000, and 
bounce back to 2.0 after 2010. The average life expectancy, on the other hand, will rise 
from 68.4 in 1990 to 71.2 in 2000, and further to 79.1 in 2050.
From 1990 to 2020, China’s total population will increase from 1,143.3 million to 
1,460.3 million, and the number of the elderly will rise from 64.0 million to 165.0 
million. With the proportion of the elderly surpassing the 10 per cent benchmark (11.3 
per cent), China’s population as a whole can be labelled as aged. During this period, the 
annual increase rate of the elderly population is about 3.3 per cent, over three times 
higher than the national average of 0.9 per cent. It is largely attributable to the fact that 
people bom during the baby-boom periods in the 1950s and 1960s begin to enter 
retirement age. Meanwhile, the proportion of children under 15 will decline further from 
27.7 to 19.8 per cent, assuming the fertility is kept at a relatively low level. During this 
30-year period, the ageing index will increase by almost three times from 20.1 to 57.1 per 
cent, and the median age will go up by 10 years from 25.3 to 35.4.
The process of population ageing will continue over the subsequent years. After 
reaching the historic peak of 1,500 million in 2030, China’s total population is expected 
to decline, as the annual increase rate starts to turn negative. By 2050, the total population 
will stand at 1,468.8 million. In contrast, the number of the elderly will keep growing 
from 165.0 million in 2020 to 286.4 million in 2050. Most remarkably, the proportion of 
the elderly will almost double from 11.3 per cent to 19.5 per cent. Compared with the 
previous period from 1990 to 2020, however, the growth rate of the aged population will
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slow down, with the annual growth rate cut by half from 3.3 to 1.6 per cent. This is 
simply because the effect of baby booms is gradually fading out. Since fertility still 
remains at a low level, the proportion of children aged 0-14 will fall further from 19.8 per 
cent in 2020 to 17.4 in 2050. For the first time in history, the elderly will outnumber 
children under 15 in China’s total population, as shown in the ageing index exceeding 
100 per cent (112.1 per cent in 2050). Meanwhile, the median age will reach 40.3 with 
another five years added on.
Generally speaking, during the first three decades of the projection period from 
1990 to 2020, population ageing in China will be characterised predominantly by 
acceleration. During the second three decades from 2020 to 2050, it is the sheer size and 
proportion of the aged population that deserve major concern. In studies on the future 
trend of population ageing in China, these two features should not be confused with each 
other.
1.4. The family and old-age support in China
1.4.1. Changing structure of Chinese families
Family support for the aged is rooted deeply in the old Chinese traditions. It is 
interesting to notice that many sociology textbooks in the West include a chapter or two 
describing the structure and role of the Chinese family, because the traditional or 
Confucian family in Chinese society is often considered as a sharp contrast to that in 
Western societies (Cowgill, 1986; Whyte, 1997). The fact is that, even if such a 
stereotype did exist in the past, families in contemporary China are experiencing 
tremendous changes, particularly in the new institutional and moral environment since 
1949.
A ‘normative’ Chinese family is characterised as a patrilineal, patriarchal and 
extended system, where several generations live together under the male head of the 
family. Cohen (1976) described the Chinese family first as a collective economic unit
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having a common budget and common property. There was an active management of the 
family economy, often, but not necessarily, by the oldest male of the senior generation. 
The Chinese family was secondly a religious unit responsible for performing the rites 
required for the well-being of both living and deceased members of the family. Finally, 
the Chinese family was a social security organisation that provided for the care of its 
needy and ageing members. In contrast to Western societies, the Confucian traditions 
gave top importance to family values, family loyalty and family obligations, apart from 
the large extended family norm. Every member of the family was held in check by duty 
and obedience, and the family head usually enjoyed absolute authority. Filial piety was so 
highly valued that grown children were expected to show deference and respect to the 
elderly, follow parental decisions, and care for the elderly. Filial children would be 
rewarded with access to the resources of the senior generation, such as land in rural areas. 
Caring for the elderly parents and the inheritance of property were the basic concerns of 
sons. Sons-in-law were only counted upon when there were no male heirs in the family. 
Any violation of filial obligations, not surprisingly, would be censured by public opinion 
or punished by law (Cowgill, 1986; Yuan, Wang and Song, 1992; Ikels, 1993).
An ideal Chinese family, according to the ancient belief, consisted of up to five 
generations, and for the elderly, being able to live in such a family was an ultimate 
happiness. The truth is, however, that the five-generation family was a rarity, and the 
nuclear family (up to two generations) and the stem family (commonly three generations) 
accounted for a very high percentage of Chinese families. According to a survey on 
family structure in rural China in the 1930s, the nuclear (one- and two-generation) 
families made up 51.4 per cent, and three-generation families 40.2 per cent (Zhang, 
1990). When children grew up, daughters almost inevitably left the parental home on 
marriage, whereas sons often brought their wives into the family and continued to live 
with their parents. Nevertheless, the most common instance was that only one son would 
live eventually with the parents, and others moved out to set up new homes of their own.
Family size is dependent not only on family structure, but also on the number of 
surviving children or adopted children. The Chinese traditionally preferred a large family
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with many children, particularly many sons. Sons were especially desired as necessary 
labour because of the heavy manual nature of farming. They were also expected to 
provide for the parents in old age, and bear responsibility in the practice of ancestor 
worship. A family would do its best to beget more sons, thus multiplying the blessings 
and insuring against accident. The common expression of good wishes ‘more sons, more 
happiness’ represented exactly the prevailing feelings about the importance of male 
descendants. It is widely believed that fertility in traditional China was very high. 
Banister (1992) asserted that a total fertility rate of 5-6 births per woman, corresponding 
to a crude birth rate of about 40 per thousand, is a reasonable fertility estimate. However, 
because of widespread poverty and a high level of mortality, only a small number of 
children could survive to adulthood in each family. The actual size of the Chinese family 
was, therefore, quite moderate. From 1911 to 1947, the average family size in China 
remained more or less stable at about 5.2-5.4 persons (Zhang, 1990).
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, tremendous 
changes have taken place in every aspect of social life as a result of newly established 
political and economic orders. In spite of the numerous political and social upheavals in 
China over the last few decades, remarkable progress has been made in promoting 
economic growth and raising people’s living standard. As predicted by the classic study 
on families by Goode (1963), socio-economic development encouraged nuclear families 
more focused on conjugal loyalties. Chinese families have now become increasingly 
nuclearised and diminished. According to the 1990 census results, nearly three quarters 
(72.3 per cent) of all families were nuclear with one or two generations. Three-generation 
stem families only accounted for 17.1 per cent. Very few families (1.3 per cent) still 
remained extended in structure. The regional difference in family structure is quite small. 
The proportion of three-generation families in rural areas was just 1.6 percentage points 
higher than that in urban areas. On the other hand, the average family size decreased 
gradually from 4.3 persons in the early 1950s to 3.9 persons in 1990. Rural families, 4.1 
persons on average, were slightly larger than urban ones with 3.8 persons (Sun, 1994). 
Unlike in the traditional China where poverty was the major factor limiting family size, 
the current norm of the small family is largely a joint product of modernisation and
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government birth control policies.
1.4.2. Old-age support as a component of the social security system in China
At present, China can be divided economically and socially roughly into two 
systems: a relatively advanced, industrialised and modern urban system and a relatively 
backward, agricultural and traditional rural system. Government policies applied to urban 
areas usually differ substantially from those applied to rural areas, including various 
social welfare programs and policies.
In theory, social welfare programs are designed to perform three major functions: 
to meet the basic needs of disadvantaged people through the provision of a safety net; to 
reduce inequality resulting from extreme disparities between the wealthy and the poor; 
and to serve as a mechanism for social integration (Leung and Nann, 1995). In China 
three factors have played a special role in the development of its social security programs 
and policies. First, China is a country upholding a state socialist ideology. A socialist 
country, according to the prevailing Marxist doctrine, is characterised by a centrally 
planned, egalitarian, and universal social policy. The government is supposed to promote 
social welfare by directly or indirectly subsidising the provision of basic social needs 
such as food, health care, and education. It also commits itself to devoting more resources 
to the poor to reduce inequality and promoting national solidarity. Second, China is a 
developing country with a huge population, just embarking on the course of 
modernisation and industrialisation. Unlike in most developed countries, the resources at 
the government’s disposal in China are limited, and the economy cannot afford to 
introduce a complete social security system at the present stage. Third, China is a country 
where the influence of cultural traditions is still quite strong, particularly in rural areas. 
Some traditional values are not only tolerated, but also encouraged by the government.
Currently, the social security system in China consists of four major programs: (a) 
Social insurance: occupational and state social security programs covering the loss of 
income in contingencies, such as old age, unemployment, and health; (b) Social welfare:
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collective welfare and community services, such as benefits provided by work units to 
their employees; (c) Social relief: services for the destitute, the poor and victims of 
natural disasters; (d) Preferential treatment: services for veterans and their families. In 
practice, however, these programs are carried out in different forms and with different 
emphases in urban and rural areas.
In urban areas, an old-age pension scheme was introduced as part of the Labour 
Insurance Regulations as far back as the 1950s, but it benefits only part of the urban 
population, mainly public servants and employees of state-owned enterprises. Nationally, 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Security is the highest government body of policy­
making. At provincial and municipal levels, pension funds are managed by local labour 
and social security bureaus. Under the current scheme the legal age at retirement is 60 for 
men and 55 for women. Retirement pensions are generally set at 60-100 per cent of the 
final wage level depending on the occupation and the length of service. Old people who 
are outside the coverage can still benefit financially from other general social welfare 
programs, such as price subsidies and poverty relief programs. Since last two years, as a 
result of intensified reform measures to downsize redundancies, a large number of 
workers from the state-owned factories have been asked to take early retirement. 
Retirement age commonly dropped by five to seven years.
In 1992 the China Research Centre on Ageing conducted a survey on the aged 
population in 12 provinces and municipalities in China. Targeting old people aged 60 and 
over, the survey obtained a total of 20,083 responses, 9,889 from urban areas and 10,194 
from rural areas (China Research Centre on Ageing, 1994). The findings may provide a 
rough idea how the pension programs worked in the early 1990. In urban areas, as shown 
in Table 1.2, over 90 percent (92.6) of old men and over 50 per cent (54.5) of old women 
were covered by the pension program. The higher coverage among the males is largely 
attributable to their higher rate of labour force participation, because the current pension 
system is employment-based. Females in China usually have fewer chances to find jobs 
in formal sectors, and, hence, are less likely to be eligible for pension benefits after 
retirement.
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Table 1.2: Distribution of the elderly population aged 60 and over by pension 
coverage, sex and residence, China, 1992_______________________________
Males Females
C overed N ot
covered
O th ers3 T otal C overed N ot
covered
O th ers3 T otal
A.Urban
Percent 92.6 5.9 1.5 1 0 0 .0 54.5 45.2 0 .2 1 0 0 .0
No. 4,414 359 71 4,766 2,794 2,317 12 5,123
B. Rural
Percent 11.3 88.4 0 .2 1 0 0 .0 0.7 99.3 0 .1 1 0 0 .0
No. 547 4,263 12 4,822 37 5,332 3 5,372
Source: Reconstructed from China Research Centre on Ageing, 1994.
Note:a Not retired from formal sector jobs.
In the countryside where the majority of China’s elderly population live, a formal 
pension scheme is yet to be introduced. At present, it is a government policy that 
financial support of the aged should be shouldered by their families and supplemented by 
community assistance (CCP Central Committee, 1993). The drastic structural changes 
that took place in recent history have strongly influenced the type and quality of the 
familial support system in rural China. In the Land Reform in the early 1950s, every rural 
family was assigned a piece of land. This traditional pattern of land security with no 
landless poor afforded rural families their first opportunity to achieve the Confucian 
ideals such as care of the aged. In the late 1950s, a commune system was imposed in 
rural areas after a number of collectivisation efforts. Families, no longer a production 
unit, still played a central role in old-age support. The commune also provided an 
independent safety net for the elderly: like all villagers they were guaranteed a basic grain 
ration; and childless old people were entitled to the Five Guarantees that provide food, 
clothing, fuel, housing and funeral expenses. The commune system was then abolished in 
1982 as part of rural economic reform, and in its place a household responsibility system 
was introduced by the government as a major reform measure. Farm land was leased out 
to individual households on contracts, and there was a functional return to family 
farming.
In the early 1990s, as Table 1.2 shows, rural elderly were considerably
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disadvantaged in terms of pension coverage, in comparison to their urban counterparts. 
The proportion covered was only 11.3 per cent among old men and 0.7 per cent among 
old women. Without secured income, rural elderly were more likely to be dependent 
financially on assistance from others. In recent years, the gap between urban and rural 
areas in social security programs in general, and old-age pension schemes in particular, 
have attracted serious concerns among policy-makers and academics. In 1991 the State 
Council assigned the Ministry of Civil Affairs to work out a pilot program of old-age 
insurance for peasants, including workers in township enterprises. The program, formally 
the Basic Plan for Rural Social Pension Insurance (nongcun shehui yanglao baoxian), is 
based on three major principles: personal contribution, collective assistance, and state 
policy support. Insurance policy-holders are flexible to choose the level of premium and 
benefit in accordance to their own conditions. Supervised by the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
and managed by special organs under county governments, the program enjoys a broad 
range of preferential treatments, such as tax exemption. Still largely on a user-pays basis, 
the program offers rural residents for the first time a basic form of old-age insurance to 
supplement the existing system of family support. Recent experience indicates that the 
program is widely welcome in rural areas. By the end of 1995, 1,500 counties in 30 
provinces had introduced the program, which covered a total of 50 million rural 
population and accumulated more than five billion Yuan of pension funds (Ministry of 
Civil Affairs, 1995).
Regardless of the pension system, families still play an important role in 
providing for the elderly in both urban and rural areas. In fact, the Government has made 
clear that old-age support is primarily a family responsibility. For example, both the 
Marriage Law and the Constitution stipulate that adult children have a duty to support 
and assist their parents. Similar requirements have been embodied in more detailed 
clauses in the Law concerning the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly, 
approved by the National Congress in August 1996. Chapter II is devoted specially to 
familial support for the elderly. Adult children, as stated in Clause 11, have the legal 
obligation to provide for the elderly parents with economic assistance, physical care and 
emotional support. Children are also required to provide housing, health care, and, in
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rural areas, labour on contracted land plot. As for the old people who are childless or 
whose children are unable to fulfil their obligation, according to Chapter III, local 
governments should take the responsibility of care.
1.4.3. Recent research on old-age support in rural China
To identify emerging problems relating to old-age support, leading population 
research institutes have conducted a number of large-scale surveys of the aged population 
in China in recent years. The results are of special value for research and policymaking at 
both national and local levels. According to a 1987 survey by the Population Centre of 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), co-residence was the main form of 
family support in rural areas: 58.0 per cent of the elderly reviewed lived in three- 
generation households and 26.9 per cent in two-generation households. As for the source 
of income, 52.6 per cent of elderly men and 80.7 per cent of elderly women were 
supported by their children (Tian, 1988). The above discussed 1992 survey by the China 
Research Centre on Ageing found that, in rural areas, over 87 per cent of the elderly lived 
with children, and 73 per cent received economic support of various kind from children 
(China Research Centre on Ageing, 1994). In 1996 the China Research Centre on Ageing 
and the University of Michigan Population Studies Centre launched a joint project in 
Baoding, Hebei as an extension of the Comparative Studies on Support Systems for the 
Aged in Asia.
Since the major concern of this study is family support in rural China, studies that 
focus on urban elderly are not reviewed in details here, although many of them produced
valuable findings for comparison, such as Liang, Gu and Krause’ study in Wuhan (1992)
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and Whyte’s work in Baoding (1997). Evidence from rural areas differ^ p#f remarkably 
from the national pattern. A 1986 survey of 33 villages outside Beijing, for example, 
reported that 78 per cent of the aged did not live on their own resources, and that 67 per 
cent had to rely on their children to meet their basic needs (Yuan, Wang and Song, 1992). 
A village survey in Zhejiang found that 86 per cent of the aged lived with one of their 
children and were supported by them (Goldstein, Ku and Ikels, 1990). A survey in rural
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Hebei in 1987 reported that 57 per cent of those over 60 relied on others, and 44 per cent 
stated that they had no control over the spending of family income (Davis-Friedmann
1991) . A 1987 survey in Yanqing indicates further that responsibility for family support 
of older parents did not necessarily fall entirely on the eldest child. Parents' choice of co­
residence was usually influenced by the way in which family properties are shared. It was 
the youngest son who was most likely to live with his parents (Yuan, Wang and Song,
1992) . The general impression is that the family is the main source of support and care 
for the current rural elderly. Filial piety is still alive and well, and the old continue to play 
a central role in the household economy. The general consequence of reforms for the 
rural aged is a decline in self-sufficiency but no obvious or pervasive loss of security.
Goldstein and Ku (1993) argued that aggregated information showing the 
percentage of old people living with sons tells little about who is in control in these 
households and how the elderly are treated. From an in-depth anthropological study of 
the aged in two villages in Yuyao, they found that the situation diverged markedly from 
the traditional pattern of family support. The old people’s income derived primarily from 
their own work and only secondly from children. Daughters' contribution was as 
important as that of sons. More than half (52 per cent) of the aged lived in single­
generation households, either alone, or with a spouse, or in 'by turn' arrangements. Those 
who lived with married sons had limited access to the household's cash income. 
Therefore, the ideal extended family was not necessarily a sign of economic well-being 
or good treatment, and having more living sons did not result in receiving more income 
or support. The aged were aware of this and 61 per cent responded that they were in 
favour of having only one son. The authors conclude that family support was still very 
important, despite the old people's feeling that there has been a decline in support and 
respect from children. The family provided income and assistance to parents throughout 
old age and also acted as final security for the aged when they became unable to survive 
on their own.
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1.5. Rationale and conceptual framework
The studies mentioned above have offered rich insights into the status of the 
elderly and family support in rural China. However, more detailed information on old-age 
security is still lacking about the differences between males and females, young-old and 
old-old, healthy and frail, and those with and without sons. Most studies examined the 
living conditions of the aged, but failed to identify the key factors that influence their 
economic well-being. Most studies focused on the present cohorts of the aged whose 
security situation is quite favourable because they already have a larger number of living 
children to rely upon. Left out are those cohorts now in their adult years who have fewer 
children to count on for assistance in old age. Little is known about their attitudes, 
expectations and strategies toward their own old-age security in response to the current 
low level of fertility and radical social and economic changes.
The response and adjustment of younger generations to the current low fertility 
level are of special significance for the success of family planning programs. Numerous 
studies on fertility determinants in developing countries find that old-age support 
considerations exercise a strong influence in favour of high fertility. Yang er fang lao 
(rearing children for old-age security) is also a primary motive in traditional Chinese 
society for having large families. Since the rapid fertility decline in China is to a certain 
extent policy-induced, it is not certain whether the present low level will be sustained, or 
whether there will be a rebound. Therefore, family planning is still a long-term and 
difficult task. In China, the current young adult cohorts are unique in history for several 
reasons. First, the total number of this generation is the largest, constituting the base of 
the last high-fertility age pyramid. Second, this is also the first generation whose fertility 
behaviour has been directly influenced or manipulated by government birth control 
policies. Therefore, the number of children on whom they can rely for their own old age 
is very small. Third, people of this generation, now in their prime ages, are the backbone 
of their own families as well as the society as a whole. Their ideas, values and conduct 
will have extensive effects not only for the moment but also in years to come. If they
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have eventually accepted the idea of family planning and, hence, readjusted their 
strategies so that their own old-age security is separated from having large families, the 
government goal of population control will be achieved in a much easier and smoother 
way.
In this context, this study will provide relevant programs with an empirical 
understanding of the effect of rapid fertility decline on the pattern of old-age support, as 
well as rural couples' strategies for adapting to the current low fertility level. Such 
understandings may be used in the future to design family-oriented old-age assistance 
programs in rural areas or to tailor family planning programs to meet rural people's needs. 
Beyond that, the findings may also be compared with those from other developing 
countries that are confronted with similar challenges.
Most previous studies on family support for the elderly in developing countries 
are empirical. Few have extended further to examine the old-age security strategies of 
young adults in the face of swift demographic, social and economic changes. A 
theoretical framework for analysis is yet to be fully established. Figure 1.2 shows a path 
diagram presenting the major conceptual links at macro level between fertility decline, 
socio-economic development, population ageing, the family old-age support system, and 
assumptions of families old-age security strategies.
1. According to the classical theory of demographic transition, both the mortality 
and fertility of a population will decline from high to low levels as a result of socio­
economic development. A significant by-product of the demographic transition at the late 
phase is the ageing of the population and the extension of life. Recent experiences in 
developing countries show that lower mortality and fertility can be achieved without 
substantial improvements in socio-economic conditions, and fertility decline, not 
increased life expectancy, plays the initial major role in population ageing (Jones, 1993). 
It is particularly true in China that the current low level of fertility is achieved primarily 
through massive, and sometimes coercive, family planning programs.
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2. Fertility decline contributes not only to population ageing, but also to changes 
in family structure, leading to ever-shrinking family size.
3. Modernisation is a global phenomenon characterised by increased 
industrialisation, urbanisation, migration, female labour force participation, and progress 
in education and science and technology. In developing countries, modernisation is 
almost a synonym for Westernisation. Western values that favour individualism and 
small family also have an effect on changes in family structure. The nuclear family is 
replacing the traditional extended family to become the prevailing norm.
4. In industrialised countries, the source of old-age security for the elderly has 
principally shifted from the family support system to the public support system. 
However, in less developed regions like rural China, such a formal old-age security 
program is largely non-exist. 5. Without public assistance, the traditional system of 
family support is under severe pressure to cope with the situation.
6. The economic security of the elderly becomes increasingly uncertain during 
this period of demographic and socio-economic changes. Generally speaking, the present 
cohorts of the aged are in a favourable position because they already have a larger 
number of living children to rely upon. (Of course, the number of children is not the only 
contributing factor to old-age security). However, the young adults whose fertility 
behaviour is controlled by government policies must face the uncertainty of their own 
security in old age, and adjust their own strategies for the future.
7. Certain people continue to expect their children to provide old-age support, 
given the strong encouragement from the Government and the existing old social norm. 
Some might take the risk of violating government regulations at any price to achieve their 
desired family size. Others might choose a trade-off of quantity for quality by investment 
:n education to bring up one or two successful children who will have adequate means of 
support in future.
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8. Uncertain about children's willingness, availability or ability to provide, certain 
people intend to ensure their own old-age security in advance by taking advantage of 
recent market-oriented reforms through measures like wealth accumulation, social 
mobility and participating in community old-age insurance programs.
Figure 1.3 presents an analytical framework for assessing the likelihood and 
extent of family support for the elderly in China in general, and the study area in 
particular, based largely on the assumptions of McDonald (1989) and Mason (1992). At 
macro level, there are four major factors: the demographic factor as shown in the trend of 
population ageing as a whole, the socio-economic factor as shown in the large-scale 
social engineering programs over the last few decades, the political factor as shown in 
state policies and government sponsored programs, and the cultural factor as shown in the 
influence of traditional Confucian values and norms. The effect of these macro factors on 
the economic well-being and social status of the elderly can only be materialised through 
the mechanism of the existing system of family support. At the intermediate level, there 
are also a number of factors that will affect the outcome of family support: age and sex, 
marital status, health status, living arrangements, kin availability, employment status, 
financial capacity, demand for and willingness to provide support. In most cases, these 
factors involve an intergenerational relationship between the elderly and other young 
adult family members. Under current circumstances, state and/or community support for 
the elderly only plays a limited role in rural China.
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Figure 1.3: Analytical framework for assessing the likelihood and extent of 
family support for the elderly
Cultural factor
Political factor
Socio-economic
factor
Demographic
factor
Well-being 
and status of 
the elderly
State/community support
Family support:
Age and sex 
Marital status 
Health status 
Living arrangements 
Kin availability 
Employment status 
Financial capacity 
Demand and willingness
1.6. Organisation of the thesis
Chapter 2 explains the methodological perspectives of this study. In order to 
attaining the proposed objects within limited time and budget, an integrated approach, the 
so-called micro-demographic community-study approach is employed, that combines a 
formal, structured survey operation with a number of intensive quantitative techniques. A 
household survey was conducted to cover a larger area to identify general patterns and 
trends, while observation, personal interview and focus-group discussion were used to 
inquire about attitudes, opinions and behaviours.
Chapter 3 presents the study area of Pingling Township and Nanshangzhao 
village with a detailed description of the location, size, facilities available and the socio­
economic history and structure. Efforts are made to explain the drastic social and 
economic changes over the last few decades as results of various social engineering
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experiments imposed by the government.
Chapter 4 illustrates the economic well-being and social status of the rural elderly, 
after a brief review of the relationship between modernisation and the status of the 
elderly. The economic well-being of the elderly is discussed in comparison between the 
past during the commune period and the present, and between the elderly and younger 
generations, while the social status is discussed in terms of household headship and the 
role in household decision-making. Special attention is paid to the elderly’s influence in 
children’s marriage arrangements.
Chapter 5 investigates the family support received by the rural elderly, with a 
special emphasis on economic support. Family support is examined in terms of living 
arrangements, kin availability, and the form and level of economic support. A number of 
case studies are presented as vivid examples how the elderly coped with different family 
situations. Two other factors relevant to the likelihood and extent of family support in the 
context of rural China are discussed in further details: the willingness of children to 
provide support and the legislation and policies that require children to fulfil their support 
obligations.
Chapter 6 addresses the attitude towards and strategy of old-age security among 
working age villagers in the study area, starting from a brief review of the old-age 
security-fertility hypothesis. Discussions are divided into three major issues: the expected 
living arrangements in terms of ideal family size and ideal family structure, attitude 
towards coresidence, and desired forms of economic support in old age.
Chapter 7 sums up the major findings of this study, and in conclusion explores 
implications for policy-making in four areas: demographic, socio-cultural, socio­
economic and political. A brief discussion is devoted to questions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES OF THE STUDY 
2.1. Research methods and research design: an integrated approach
Social research is considered as a systematic process where various methods are 
used for information collection, classification and analysis, in order to achieve the planned 
objectives of a research project. Thanks to the previous efforts of numerous scientists and 
scholars, a great variety of research methods are now available to choose from by 
researchers according to their specific objectives. Qualitative and quantitative approaches 
are the two major forms of social research (Boonchalaksi, 1990).
Generally speaking, the processes used in qualitative and quantitative studies are 
initially quite similar, from problem selection, objective setting, theoretical framework 
construction, research design, data collection, analysis to report writing. The major 
difference lies in the techniques used for data collection and analysis. While the 
quantitative approach focuses primarily on objective numerical data collected by 
systematically based methods like censuses and surveys, the qualitative approach 
emphasises detailed, descriptive, and usually subjective data gathered by non- 
systematically based methods such as observations, researcher participation, group 
discussions, and in-depth interviewing. In fact, the two approaches are often employed in 
combination so that they can complement each other. Quantitative methods like 
conventional surveys are able to cover larger areas in a shorter period, making it possible 
to identify a general phenomenon not confined to a single locality. However, it is 
considered inappropriate to measure certain attitudes, opinions and behaviours that are 
ambiguous and unquantifiable by nature. As Mitchel (1983) states, quantitative analysis 
also has difficulty in studying relationships and their effect on people involved. On the 
other hand, field data gathered by qualitative methods are occasionally questioned for their 
reliability and validity. Therefore, it is important not only to maintain a high degree of 
consistency in data collection, but also to employ multiple methods to cross-check the
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reliability and validity of the data gathered. In this context, qualitative analysis is helpful 
for achieving better interpretation of statistical tables, while quantitative analysis is useful 
for verifying descriptive data.
Understandably, the selection of an appropriate method should be determined by 
the research question rather than the mere availability of standard techniques and 
procedures. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study examines the economic 
security of the elderly and its relation to family support in rural China. Because of time and 
financial constraints, the study is confined to a village and its surrounding areas in central 
Shaanxi. In order to acquire in-depth understanding of the question in discussion, it was 
decided to take an integrated approach, the so-called micro-demographic community- 
study approach, which is considered useful for studies of social and family change in 
community settings (Axinn, Fricke and Thornton, 1991). This integrated approach usually 
combines a formal, structured survey operation with a number of intensive quantitative 
techniques.
At village level, three forms of qualitative technique for information collection 
were used: direct observation, focus discussion and in-depth interview. Personal 
observation notes and tape recorder transcripts were categorised, classified and analysed. 
A survey was conducted in a broader area at township level. A household questionnaire, 
consisting mainly of close-ended questions, was designed for collecting information about 
the old people's living arrangements, economic well-being and financial support. The raw 
data are then put into a databank for computerised analysis with MS Excel and SPSS at a 
later stage. The first step is univariate analysis, to obtain information about the frequency 
and distribution of selected variables, such as respondents’ demographic and socio­
economic characteristics. The next step is bivariate analysis, to assess the relationship 
between selected variables, including the direction (positive or negative) and magnitude 
(weak, moderate, strong). The survey results are compared with findings from the 
information gathered through qualitative techniques. Secondary data about the socio-
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economic development and family planning programs are collected from government 
officials, village heads and program workers.
2.2. Source of data
2.2.1. Household survey
As in most social science studies, conducting sample surveys is still a standard 
method of data collection in demographic research. This method is indispensable because 
of its great strength in that surveys can cover a comparatively large population to discover 
trends and patterns, particularly when relationships between variables are in discussion. 
Surveys can also help achieve objectives in a less time-consuming and more cost-effective 
way, thanks to recent development in computerised analysis techniques. However, 
because of the special consideration of statistical significance, there are usually 
requirements for sample size and sampling procedure satisfying certain criteria.
Most field work of this study was carried out in a village, primarily through a 
number of qualitative techniques. To capture more information from a broader area, 
nevertheless, it was still considered necessary and, not the least, feasible to conduct a 
sample survey at township level. Based on survey manuals of previous studies conducted 
in rural China, a household questionnaire was first drafted before the field work. Samples 
were set to be selected from households with living elderly parents aged 60 and over, no 
matter whether the elderly are co-resident or non-resident. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, studies on the aged population in China usually take 60 years as the cut-off age 
for the elderly, such as the 1987 National Survey on Aged Population.
The questionnaire consists of three main components. The first module collects 
information about all members in the household, including demographic and socio­
economic characteristics, living arrangements and contributions to providing for the 
elderly. It is divided further into two parts. One collects the general information of all co-
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resident members of the household, and the other collects that of all non-resident members 
of the family. Only immediate family members are involved in the non-resident category, 
such as siblings, parents or children. For each of the co-resident members, questions are 
asked about their relationship to the household head, sex, age, marital status, education, 
employment status (occupation), role in economic support for the elderly, role in physical 
assistance to the elderly, and role in major decision making of household economy. For 
each of the non-resident members, questions are asked about the relationship to the 
informant, sex, age, marital status, employment status, current residence, living 
arrangements, frequency of visits, and economic relations. The second module focuses on 
economic conditions of the household, including income, source of income, expenditure, 
and sum and areas used to provide for the elderly. The third module is concerned about 
old-age support expectations, including preferred family size and structure, preferred 
living arrangements and preferred forms of old-age support (Appendix 1).
Questions, or variables, in each module are selected with special care so that they 
are not only compatible to the requirements of research objectives but also consistent with 
the reality of rural Shaanxi. For example, questions about villagers’ ethnic identity and 
religious belief are omitted. At national level, these two variables may be of great 
relevance to the topic in discussion, but they are not readily applicable in the study village 
where residents are 100 per cent Han Chinese and do not follow any religions recognised 
by the government1. The categories used in major variables are basically identical to 
official publications, such as the 1990 National Census, so that survey results could be 
comparable with the findings of other studies. For example, the level of education is 
divided into five categories according to China’s formal schooling system: illiterate, 
primary school, junior high school, senior high school and college. Classifying a person as 
illiterate does not necessarily mean that he can neither read nor write at all. It only 
indicates in this study that he has not finished formal primary education. However, semi-
1 In China there are 56 officially identified ethnic groups, with the Han Chinese being the majority (92 per 
cent according to the 1990 National Census). The five officially recognised religions are Buddhism, 
Taoism, Islam, Catholic and Protestant churches.
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literate should not be confused with fully illiterate. Some basic knowledge in reading and 
writing can make a big difference in a person’s everyday life.
Data entry on the spot has been treated differently according to the nature of 
information. Some interval data, such as age, are recorded as they are during the 
interview, so that they can be regrouped repeatedly for different analytical purposes at 
later stages. On the other hand, some interval data are divided into a few ordinal 
categories. For example, household income is divided into four levels: poor (per head 
monthly income lower than 50 Yuan), average (50-99 Yuan), well-to-do (100-199 Yuan) 
and wealthy (200 Yuan and over). The range of average income level is based on the fact 
that the per head monthly income in the study township, Pingling, was about 85 Yuan in 
1995, the year before the survey. In previous literature, particularly that from 
industrialised countries, personal monetary income is often used as a major indicator to 
assess the economic status and well-being of the aged. However, this indicator alone is 
inadequate in the context of rural China. At present most rural people are not engaged in 
wage employment, and rural families commonly do not keep a strict financial account. It is 
easier for the respondents to choose an income level roughly accordant with their actual 
situation, rather than to laboriously make up a number that is not necessarily accurate. For 
questions mainly concerning people’s knowledge or attitude, simple yes-or-no answers 
will do; these are classified as dummy variables for later analysis.
Considering the fact that the survey was conducted in a rural environment where 
the elderly are likely to be illiterate, it was decided to make the questions as simple and 
easily understood as possible. Most questions are close-ended, and can be answered by 
ticking from a list of multiple choices. Therefore, it is important what answers can be 
chosen for the list. Originally, the 1987 Survey of the CASS Population Institute was 
taken as a reference. After the first visit to the study village for pre-test, it was found that 
some of the answers do not readily apply to local conditions. Certain modifications were 
later made accordingly on the questionnaire. For example, the occupation category of the 
original version included employment in collectively owned rural enterprises (also referred
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to as township enterprises), which has played an essential part in revitalising the rural 
economy in China in recent years. In some provinces the majority of non-agricultural 
workers in rural areas are employed by rural enterprises run by local township or village 
governments. However, in Pingling there were also a number of privately owned small 
enterprises, such as construction companies and motor vehicle repair shops. As a result, 
the category of rural industry includes both the collectively owned and the privately 
owned. Another example concerns old-age insurance programs. It is understand that 
currently only a limited number of rural communities have their own old-age pension 
programs. Nevertheless, there are common welfare programs that do have old-age support 
implications, such as the two-daughter insurance programs designed to provide some 
financial security for permanent contraceptive users with two daughters. The original 
questionnaire has taken into account such common insurance programs. From a visit to 
the study village, it was found out, surprisingly, that commercial insurance companies have 
already extended their business down to the village level. As part of their life insurance 
policies, the commercial old-age insurance program has been vigorously promoted. 
Therefore, commercial programs have also been included as an old-age support option in 
the revised questionnaire.
Although the pre-test of the questionnaire could be done by myself personally, it 
was impossible for me to finish all the interviews in a short period without the help of 
other interviewers. As discussed above, the questionnaire used for the survey is short and 
simple. To be qualified for the task, an interviewer should at least be literate and able to 
work independently. Understanding local conditions and local dialect are of course an 
advantage. It is certainly possible nowadays to recruit interviewers from local residents, 
because most young adults in rural areas are primary or high school graduates, especially 
in the study area where the formal education system is well established. However, they are 
not necessarily available at the time of survey because of other obligations. Also recruiting 
people from one village to another is time-consuming. From my previous experience, I 
decided that students of local high schools are the most suitable people for this purpose in 
rural Shaanxi. Compared with other rural residents, high school students usually have
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sufficient education, are familiar with classroom training and obedient to supervisors, 
come from a wide area to a relatively concentrated place, and bear few family or social 
responsibilities while studying. The only drawback of high school students is that they may 
have little specific knowledge and experience, and they are not mature or flexible enough 
to deal with unexpected situations. I believe, however, such problems can be overcome by 
systematic training and supervision during the field work.
The household survey of this study was conducted in the last two weeks of May 
1996, and interviewers were trained from students of the Pingling High School. Under the 
current education system in rural Shaanxi, each village has its own primary school, but 
each township has only one high school. The school is located in the township site of 
Pingling, about 15 kilometres to the west of the study village of Nanshangzhao. At the 
time of the survey, the school consisted of 12 classes in three grades, with a total of 580 
students. Most of the students come from the 18 villages within the township’s 
jurisdiction, ideal for the planned survey to cover the whole township.
Through the introduction of Mr. Liu Qingming, the head of the Villagers’ 
Committee and a former graduate of the Pingling High School, I met first with Mr. Liu 
Lixin, the school principal, and talked about my plan in his office. Mr. Liu was quite happy 
to assist, but was a little worried about the timing of the survey, because the students were 
busy preparing for a mid-term examination before the school closed for two weeks during 
the wheat harvest season in the early June. After I explained the schedule and promised 
that the students’ work would be compensated financially, Mr. Liu approved the program 
and referred me further to teachers-in-charge of two classes in Grade III, Mr. Fan Genyun 
and Ms. Zhang Ping. My meeting with Mr. Fan and Ms. Zhang turned out to be quite 
friendly and informal. I discussed with them my plan and schedule in detail, with a special 
emphasis on the questionnaire, and expected to hear their suggestions. Both teachers were 
confident that their students could do a good job to satisfy my requirements. Considering 
the total number of students in their classes and the financial budget at my disposal, we 
decided to distribute 300 questionnaires to about 60 students, with each visiting five
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households. The interviewers would be selected first on a voluntary basis, but efforts 
should be made that they represented as many villages as possible (some students were 
from neighbouring townships).
While I was busy getting the questionnaires printed on time, the two teachers 
finished the list of students willing to offer help in the household survey. The school took 
one class off for me to give a short training course to the student volunteers. Both the 
teachers-in-charge were also present to answer questions. Students were asked to select 
their interview households randomly in their home village according to the requirements, 
and those from the same village should make sure that no household would be visited 
twice. Interviews could be carried out within one week either after school or during the 
weekend. Each of us, the two teachers and I, chose one village to supervise the whole 
procedure. Questions arising from the interview in other villages were answered the next 
day at school, and students were requested to repeat the interview if possible. In the end, a 
total of 284 questionnaires were completed. Coding and data entry were finished in 
Beijing with the assistance of my colleagues in the Research Institute of Economics.
Table 2.1: Distribution of sample population by selected characteristics,
Pingling Township, mid-1996
Item Percentage (%) No.
A. Sex
Males 49.1 588
Females 50.9 610
B. Age group
0-17 29.6 355
18-59 52.5 629
60+ 17.9 214
C. Household structure
Single-generation 5.3 64
Two-generation 43.7 524
Three-generation 45.5 545
Four-generation 5.4 65
Total 100.0 1,198
Source: Survey data collected by the author during the field work.
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From the 284 questionnaires, information about a total of 1,198 people was 
collected. As displayed in Table 2.1, 49.1 per cent of the sample population were males, 
and 50.9 per cent were females. Children and teenagers (0-17) accounted for 29.6 per 
cent, while the adults in working ages (18-59) for 52.5 per cent. At 17.9 per cent, the 
proportion of the elderly aged 60 and over was slightly higher than the district average of 
9.4 per cent, because the survey only covered families with living elderly parents. The 
majority of the villagers lived in two-generation (43.7 per cent) and three-generation 
households (45.5 per cent). People lived in one-generation and four-generation households 
were almost the same in number, 64 and 65 respectively.
Generally speaking, that the survey could be carried out relatively smoothly can be 
attributed to a number of factors. First, the sample size is small and the questionnaire is 
relatively concise and simple. Problems in management and quality control have thus been 
minimised. Second, the co-operation and support of the school authority was essential. 
The students as interviewers were devout and careful because the survey itself was seen as 
a sort of assignment handed down by teachers. Third, the students were more likely to 
visit relatives or close neighbours in their home village. The students had a better 
understanding of the households visited, and direct access to them; and people being 
interviewed were co-operative and ready to help a student finish his assignment, a practice 
still highly valued in the village. And finally, certain financial compensations also played a 
role in keeping both interviewers and respondents happy.
2.2.2. Direct observation and in-depth interview
To obtain more in-depth information about the topic in discussion, as mentioned 
above, the household survey was associated with a number of qualitative techniques. 
Observation is one of the most frequently used techniques for qualitative studies, since it 
allows the researcher to gather first-hand information about individual and group 
behaviour through direct interaction with the target population in their own community. In 
practice, observation can be divided into two forms: structured and unstructured 
observation (Boonchalaksi, 1990). The former involves the selection and recording of the
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major events in their natural setting according a pre-arranged plan, while the latter is more 
flexible for collecting more information that cannot be identified if the questions are 
framed beforehand. Understandably, most researchers use both observation approaches 
while collecting primary information in the field.
Observation as a research technique has its strengths and weaknesses. It is a very 
simple and natural method for gathering information. The researcher can continue his 
study without disturbing respondents’ daily routines. The researcher usually has control of 
his own schedule, independent of others’ co-operation. Possible reporting errors can thus 
be avoided as well. On the other hand, there are still a number of drawbacks. Information 
collected from an individual or a small group of people is not necessarily representative 
enough. It is prone to distortion because of the researcher’s personal bias, lack of 
knowledge about the context, or ‘artificial behaviour’ of respondents. Sometimes direct 
observation can be obtrusive when respondents think it is an intrusion into their privacy 
and freedom, particularly when no understanding has been agreed upon in advance. 
Therefore, sufficient knowledge of the study area, an unbiased attitude and good relations 
with the local population are preconditions for achieving fruitful results by observation. 
Information collected through other sources can also be used to verify the reliability and 
validity of observation data.
Unlike the sample survey, observation requires more intensive interaction between 
the researcher and respondents. To live in the community for a period is a practical way 
for the researcher to develop such close relations with villagers. In the study village of 
Nanshangzhao, I proposed to Mr. Liu Qingming, the head of the Villagers’ Committee, 
during our first meeting that I would like to live with a village family for about three 
weeks for my study. I was then introduced to the young couple Mr. Liu Jianhai and Ms. 
Bian Mingxia. Mr. Liu works as a part-time construction worker for a small private 
construction company in the village, and Ms. Bian is the only family planning worker in 
the village. The Liu family has two boys and lives in a courtyard with two houses, a new
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one with a living room and two bedrooms and an old one with a large storage area and a 
kitchen. The Lius were very happy to have me as a guest.
For the purpose of direct observation, I would say that the village head’s choice of 
the Liu family for me to stay with was ideal. The young couple are both high school 
graduates and have frequent contacts with people from outside the village, particularly 
officials from the local government. Without any problems of communication between us, 
I could get my intentions understood and requirements fulfilled quickly. More importantly, 
I could readjust the schedule of my field work according to their valuable suggestions. 
Although the Liu family is a nuclear one with no co-resident elderly parents, I was still 
able to collect information to on old-age support in the village with the help of two 
persons: Mr. Liu’s father, Old Liu, and Mr. Liu’s wife, Ms. Bian.
Liu’s parents live with his older brother’s family just across the street in the same 
village. The young couple and their children often have dinner with Mr. Liu’s parents in 
their house. In these cases I was also invited. In the day time when the young Lius were 
busy with their jobs, I usually went across the street to visit Liu’s parents. Sometimes I sat 
chatting with the old man, and sometime I helped the old woman finish household work. 
Old Liu is a quite influential personality in the village, because he used to be in charge of 
water distribution at the village pumping station. In an area where most farming land 
depends on water from the nearby irrigation channel, the importance of Old Liu’s position 
is obvious. Now that he is retired, there are still a lot of old friends dropping in if he is at 
home, particularly after dinner. The old people did not mind that I was present, because I 
was introduced as Junior Liu’s friend. It was a pleasure to mix with these old villagers and 
listen to their stories; at the same time, I could also ask questions relevant to my study.
As mentioned above, Ms. Bian is the only family planning worker in the village, 
appointed by the township government. Apart from the village head, Ms. Bian perhaps has 
the easiest access to village families, because her job has made her familiar to all 
housewives. Ms. Bian keeps a contraceptive use record of all village women in
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reproductive ages, and one of her major responsibilities is to visit these women regularly 
and provide counselling and support. During my stay in the village, Ms. Bian was updating 
her record as instructed by the township government to find out if all contraceptive users 
had their bi-monthly check-up done properly. While visiting from one family to another, 
Ms. Bian took me as company, so that I could have a chance to meet the family heads. 
Based on the preliminary information collected in this way, I selected a few families for 
case study according to the living arrangements of the elderly. As I became acquainted 
with villagers later on, I could wander freely in the village and started to visit one by one 
the families on the list.
Through direct observation, I expected to obtain a general understanding of the 
environment of the rural old people. Village life usually differs markedly from urban life. 
At a time when drastic changes are taking place all over the country, my previous 
experience from a decade ago is obviously not sufficient to grasp the main theme of rural 
living in contemporary China. For the current study on old-age support, I am especially 
concerned about rural development and village managements, people’s living standard and 
consumption patterns as reflected in housing, food, clothing and household appliances, the 
old people’s social, economic and health status compared with younger generations, daily 
routines of the elderly in various groups by age, sex, living arrangements and living 
standard, and the roles of different family members in relation to household economy and 
management in general, and to old-age support in particular. Since these purposes were 
set during the stage of research design, the observation to be conducted can be seen as a 
structured one with a pre-arranged plan. However, unexpected events may occur in such 
community studies, as the definition of unstructured observation suggests. During my stay 
in Nanshangzhao, I was lucky enough to witness two quite unusual events relevant to the 
current study: one was a lavish marriage ceremony, and the other was a grand ritual at the 
three-year anniversary of the death of an elderly family head. Both events gave me a rare 
opportunity to examine how the traditional values survive and the elderly are treated 
nowadays in rural China.
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Direct observation as a data collection technique in this study was further 
supplemented by in-depth interviews. In the literature, there are three types of interviews 
used in qualitative studies. The informal conversational interview refers to the situation 
when no presupposition is taken about what can be learnt by talking to the people under 
study. It is flexible to cover as many answers as possible. The general interview guide 
approach has some basic guidelines, so that the researcher can have a certain control of 
the direction and scope of the conversation. The standardised open-ended interview is 
used mainly in group situations, to save time and minimise biases. Generally speaking, the 
in-depth interview is less structured than other qualitative techniques, and is frequently 
used for a more intensive study of knowledge, attitudes and motivations among people 
who are relevant to the research objectives. Compared with other standardised 
approaches, the response to such informal conversational interviews is more spontaneous, 
specific and self-revealing.
In the study village, in-depth interviews were carried out during family visits. I 
realised that the best time for family visits was day-time when people at home were more 
likely to be the elderly. Young adults usually went to work in the fields and children were 
at school. While still able to continue the observation task, I made full use of these visits 
for intensive interviews to collect information about the old people’s life history, 
assessment of their status at home and in the community, their experience of old-age 
support, and their problems and expectations. Day-time visiting has a number of 
advantages. The elderly, free from most productive obligations, have plenty of time for 
prolonged interviews. There is no need to rush because conversations can be carried out 
even if the elderly are engaged in household jobs. They themselves feel more relaxed to 
talk about things directly related to their well-being, without worrying about disturbance 
or interruption by other family members. It is always possible to check with other family 
members at a later stage about some facts, such as details of household finance, if the old 
people find it difficult to offer a clear answer.
47
Although I was introduced to most villagers by Ms. Bian during our family visits at 
the earlier stage of my stay in the village, it still took two or three follow-up visits to the 
families I selected for in-depth interview for me to come close to the topics that really 
interested me. More often it was elderly males in the family who talked to me, while 
elderly women sat near and listened, only to join in occasionally. This is not surprising, as 
old women in rural areas are still not used to talking openly with outsiders. To get 
acquainted with the elderly, I usually started the conversation with some indirect 
questions. For example, as I found out, old men were willing to respond to questions 
about local history, and some even became very excited while explaining minor details2. It 
is quite natural in a region with a long history and rich heritage. The nearby city of 
Xianyang has been the capital of a number of powerful dynasties in Chinese history, and 
the township, Pingling, is named after the mausoleum of a Han emperor, located just five 
kilometres to the west of the village. From village history it was natural to move to the 
history of the old people’s own life. When I spoke to old women, I tried to start the 
conversation with a few positive comments on the children playing around. In response, it 
seems that old women can talk for ages, with great passion, about their loved 
grandchildren. With little difficulty I could then move further to ask questions about their 
own children. Of course, there were also exceptions. For example, in a family where the 
old man is partly paralysed and bedridden, the old woman answered most of my questions. 
According to Chinese custom, a small present always works to bridge differences, show 
respect or express gratitude. Therefore, another tactic for me to foster a better relationship 
with the families was to bring some small gifts for the old people to whom I talked. For 
old men I prepared tea and cigarettes that are favoured by rural old people for personal 
consumption. Usually, the conversation began with the origin and the taste of the tea, or 
the brand of the cigarettes. For old women I brought some sweets that they could further 
distribute to the children later on.
2 1 was given by a retired school teacher a long lecture why the official name of Nanshangzhao carved on 
the stone tablet in front of the village office is incorrect. The current character Zhao (shining) should be 
Zhao (clearing), according to historical records.
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2.2.3. Focus-group discussion
The focus-group discussion is another qualitative technique frequently used in 
social science studies, although it was developed originally for market research. The focus 
group technique is concerned primarily with the opinions, attitudes, beliefs and norms of a 
group rather than an individual, and the information gathered is not necessarily as 
statistically generalisable as survey results. Therefore, it is best viewed as a complement to 
other quantitative and qualitative research techniques. No matter what technique is used, 
the results can always be compared with each other.
A focus-group session is an interview where a small group of people is guided by a 
moderator to discuss freely and spontaneously a topic relevant to the research objectives. 
The term ‘focus’ is used because the topic or concept being discussed is narrowly focused; 
in this way, in-depth discussions are allowed to develop. The selection of participants is 
also focused by targeting individuals who meet specific criteria. Usually more than one 
group session is held, using different members, to achieve adequate coverage. 
Alternatively, sessions can be refined by selecting specific subgroups within a population 
for comparative analysis. For the sake of a free-flowing discussion, it is desirable that the 
participants for a given session come from a similar background or share a common 
perception of the problem under investigation. Otherwise, people with different 
characteristics may not feel at ease sitting side by side, or conflicting opinions may lead to 
counterproductive arguments or quarrels. In addition, a successful session depends on 
whether the interview guideline is well structured and the moderator well trained.
Unlike the situation in individual in-depth interviews, group dynamics is an 
important feature of focus-group sessions in which interactions among participants 
stimulate further discussion, with one reacting to remarks made by another. Another 
obvious benefit of the technique is that it is both time-saving and cost-effective. However, 
it has been argued that focus-group sessions by their very nature are not very useful in
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obtaining information considered private or about behaviour that might be looked down 
upon by others (Vong-Ek, 1990). Also there is the requirement for the moderator to be as 
neutral as possible, because the way he directs questions may influence how people 
answer.
In recent years, the focus group technique has been frequently used in studies on 
the topic of ageing in developing countries (Knodel, Sittitrai and Brown, 1990; 
Pramualratana, 1990). A typical focus-group study can be divided into three main stages: 
designing, implementing, and data processing and analysis. Steps in the first stage include 
drafting a guideline, targeting the participants and working out a schedule. In the guideline 
used in this study (Appendix 2), there are five groups of questions: the role and status of 
the elderly, living arrangements of the elderly, the experience of old-age support, 
economic activities of the elderly, expectations and strategies for economic security in old 
age. Some questions can also be found in the questionnaire designed for the household 
survey, such as living arrangements. The information gathered from focus-group 
discussions can be used to verify the general pattern revealed in survey results. Other 
questions are only valid for focus-group discussions, such as the meaning of old or 
villagers’ old-age securities. It is hard for a close-ended questionnaire to capture all the 
possible answers, even with multiple choices. Therefore, as the term ‘guideline’ suggests, 
such questions should be very flexible to initiate discussions. I kept the questions relatively 
flexible also because I myself was going to organise and direct the discussion. If necessary, 
I could easily add new questions or by-pass unsuitable ones.
Targeting the participants is considered critical to the success of focus-group 
studies. As mentioned above, for different sessions participants should be selected from 
different backgrounds, and for each session they should be as homogeneous as possible. 
Certainly, the choice of a particular criterion depends on the topics under investigation. In 
studies on the support system for the elderly, Knodel, Sittitrai and Brown (1990) have 
suggested a number of criteria to break down focus groups, such as life-cycle stage, socio­
economic status, rural or urban residence, and marital status. Because of time and financial 
constraints, I used only two sets of characteristics: age (old people, adult children) and
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sex. Together four different participant subgroups were defined for separate discussion 
sessions: old men, old women, young men and young women. Also taken into 
consideration were another two control variables: residence and marital status. All 
participants were rural residents and married (or widowed).
Focus-group sessions were held in mid-May in the study village. During my first 
round of family visits with Ms. Bian, I made a list of people who volunteered to 
participate in the proposed group discussions. Of the 32 would-be participants on my list, 
27 persons eventually turned up for the discussions. The participants were given advance 
notice about the time and venue (a small meeting room in conjunction to the village 
office), but a boy was still hired to remind them to come to the session on schedule. The 
sessions generally started at around 10 o ’clock in the morning, and lasted about two 
hours. As in the household survey, each participant was paid a small sum after the session 
as compensation for lost income. The money was certainly not much, it at least proved my 
sincere gratitude for their help. As the word went around after the first session, 
participants in the subsequent sessions were quite happy to arrive on time.
I myself acted as the moderator in all four sessions, although theoretically an 
independent moderator might be ideal. During the discussion I made efforts not to be 
biased, and adjusted the guidelines slightly to characteristics of the participants. For 
example, more emphasis was given to the experience of old-age support in the elderly 
groups, while in the young adult groups importance was given to expectations. All the 
discussions were recorded on tapes for later transcripts. General speaking, the flow of 
discussion was quite smooth, and the result was satisfactory. My impression is that young 
people were more active than the old, males talked more than females, and people with 
education touched upon broader issues than the illiterate. Nevertheless, I found the session 
with old women somewhat difficult, although I had asked Ms. Bian to attend both 
women’s sessions to assist in communicating with female participants. Old women seemed 
very shy and needed a lot of encouragement and explanation to give an answer. Unlike 
other sessions, there was little group dynamic, making a group discussion session look 
more like a group interview. This disappointment may be attributed to two factors:
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perhaps rural old women are still unable to fully develop personal ideas because of their 
disadvantaged position at home and in the community; or perhaps they are not used to 
talking openly about their personal opinions in a formal environment, particularly on topics 
when family issues are involved. At present, personal interviews may be a more 
appropriate way of collecting information from the elderly women in rural areas.
2.2.4. Secondary data
As mentioned in Chapter I, one of this study’s objectives was to examine the effect 
on old-age support of two drastic policies introduced by the Government in rural areas 
over the last two decades: private farming and family planning. For a better understanding 
of the implementation of these two policies in the study area, two kinds of secondary data 
have been used. Statistics of socio-economic development came mainly from visits to 
government offices, and village data were acquired from the village head and the village 
accountant. If applicable, the reference period is 1995, the year before the field work. 
Family planning data were gathered mainly from the family planning records kept by Ms. 
Bian, the village program worker. Ms. Bian is assigned by the township government to 
promote family planning in the village of Nanshangzhao. One of her responsibilities is to 
keep a record card of contraceptive use for every married woman in reproductive ages (up 
to 40). The card is composed of four panels: information on the wife and the husband, 
information on all living children, records of contraceptive use, and records of pregnancies 
and births. From these records, it is easy to describe family planning programs and fertility 
changes in a rural community in recent years.
2.3. Summary remarks
Research design and the choice of methodology should be compatible with the 
question under investigation. Because of time and financial constraints, this study on old- 
age support is confined to a rural community. Accordingly, I used an integrated approach 
combining both quantitative and qualitative techniques in data collection and analysis. The
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two techniques are expected to be mutually complementary to produce satisfactory 
results.
During the field work, efforts were made to ensure that the data collected are valid 
and reliable. In addition to general technical considerations, three issues deserve special 
attention in the course of data collection. First, China is by and large still an authoritarian 
state, and the Government has firm control over the society, in spite of the recent 
decentralisation reform in rural areas. Therefore, approval from local officials is essential 
for an outsider to conduct fieldwork in their jurisdiction. For example, necessary papers 
should be arranged in advance. Second, although the Villagers’ Committee is not a 
government body and the committee members are elected by fellow villagers, the village 
head is still an influential figure; his cooperation and assistance are desirable. Schedule 
permitting, his advice should be taken into serious account. For the first home visits, it is 
polite, and also productive, to take a local resident as company. Third, as the market- 
oriented reform gradually penetrates into rural areas, villagers nowadays are becoming 
increasingly money-conscious. Although free interviews for survey purposes are still 
possible, some compensation to the respondents in the form of payment or gifts is 
welcome.
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CHAPTER 3
THE STUDY SITES: PINGLING AND NANSHANGZHAO 
3.1. Selection of the study site
As described in Chapter 1, this study aimed to examine how individuals and 
families adjust their expectations and strategies of old-age support in response to the 
vigorous enforcement of government family planning programs and a functional return to 
family farming at village level in rural China. To select a proper study site poses the first 
challenge for accomplishing planned objectives, not only because of the vast options but 
also because of the limited time and financial budget. In any situation, it is hard for a single 
location to permit conclusions about rural China as a whole, although a certain degree of 
representativeness should be present in the selection procedure. At least, single location 
studies can provide rich insights into the mechanisms that are likely to be operating in 
other places as well. At the preliminary stage three factors influenced the selection of the 
current study site, Nanshanzhao village in central Shaanxi Province.
1. China is a large developing country, composed of 32 provinces, municipalities 
and autonomous regions with a total land territory of 9.6 million square kilometres. For a 
series of natural, historical and political reasons, there are marked disparities in social and 
economic development among different regions. Traditionally, inland and frontier 
provinces were less developed than coastal provinces. Over the last two decades of 
economic reforms, regional differences have become increasingly evident, with inland 
provinces lagging further behind the coastal ones. For example, the per capita GDP of 
some inland provinces is only one-third of that of coastal provinces. In terms of population 
distribution, the more industrialised coastal provinces commonly have high population 
density and a large share of urban residents. On the other hand, frontier provinces are 
usually characterised by extremely low density and large shares of ethnic minorities. 
Therefore, Shaanxi, an inland province located in central China (Map 3.1), is considered 
a relatively proper choice for this community-
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based study. As Table 3.1 shows, the selected demographic indicators of the province are 
also close to the national average.
Table 3.1. Selected indicators of population and family planning, 
China and Shaanxi, 1995_________________________________
Item China Shaanxi
Total population (million) 1,211.2 35.1
Proportion rural (%) 71.2 74.2
No. of persons per household 3.7 3.8
Dependency ratio (%) 50.2 52.9
Crude birth rate (per thousand) 17.1 15.9
Crude death rate (per thousand) 6.6 6.6
Growth rate (per thousand) 10.6 9.4
Proportion illiterate (%) 12.0 13.0
Contraceptive use rate (%) 90.4 90.7
Source: Population Statistics Department, SBS (1996).
2. Over the last two decades, the Government has introduced in rural China drastic 
reform measures in two fields: economic decentralisation that replaces communal farming 
with family farming, and family planning programs, including the controversial One-Child 
Policy. Numerous studies have been conducted in recent years on the profound impact of 
these reforms on rural society. In mid-1993, for example, Greenhalgh (1994), together 
with her colleagues of the Population Studies Institute of Xi’an Jiaotong University, 
conducted a microstudy in three villages in central Shaanxi, as a follow-up to their 1988 
project at the same location. Greenhalgh believes Shaanxi is an attractive site for research 
on reproduction because throughout the post-1949 period, fertility in the province has for 
the most part closely tracked the national average. Located near Xianyang, the villages are 
considered ideal for community studies because they have neither been overwhelmed by 
the forces of modernisation nor left untouched as a remote backwater. While examining 
the effect of reform measures on villagers’ everyday life, Greenhalgh found that 
government economic and population policies were no longer working at cross-purposes, 
with substantial demographic changes accompanied by accelerating economic change. The 
joint efforts of programmatic and economic measures have successfully achieved fertility 
decline through altering people’s ideas about home and family life. Therefore, it was
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considered ideal if this study could be conducted in one of Greenhalgh’s three villages to 
make full use of her previous findings.
3. For a micro-demographic community-study, the intensive personal involvement of 
the researcher is indispensable. Understandably, to ensure the success of the study, the 
researcher should be familiar with the local situation and able to communicate directly 
with villagers. Being a Shaanxi native born in Xi’an, the capital city, I speak the local 
dialect and lived for two years in a village after leaving high school about a decade ago. In 
addition to my personal experience, also taken into account is the fact that my parents and 
friends in Xi’an could provide necessary logistic support when I was in the field. As it 
turned out later, personal connections did work in some stages of my study and helped 
overcome a number of unexpected problems. Maybe it is also a part of China’s present 
reality that could be exploited.
Although I had already in mind a rough idea about the field site, to settle on the 
final choice still took a few weeks’ time before and after I returned to China in mid-1996. 
My first task was to complete the proper documentation. According to the current 
government policies, all research projects conducted by foreigners, including overseas 
Chinese students, in China have to be approved and registered in advance by relevant 
government departments. Apart from financial issues, the prime concern of the 
Government is that no classified and sensitive information is allowed to leak, particularly 
political information. To my knowledge, this policy was not carried out with the same 
thoroughness in all places before 1989. However, special efforts were made after the 
Tiananmen Incident’ to tighten up control on foreign-sponsored research projects in 
China. Before I left for the fieldwork, therefore, I sent a letter, together with an outline of 
my research proposal, to my previous employer, the Research Institute of Economics of 
the Chinese State Planning Commission, applying for approval and support. In my letter, I 
raised three points to justify my proposal. First, I am still considered as a full employee on 
leave, and my study overseas was approved by the Institute in the first place. Secondly, 
the study is concerned with old-age support in rural areas, a narrow and specific topic in
57
demography, not as controversial as birth control programs. Moreover, the objectives 
quite agree with the Government’s social security strategies. Finally, as part of my study, 
the fieldwork is limited to a short period and in a small rural community. After receiving 
an affirmative response from the Institute, I contacted Professor Zhu Chuzhu of the 
Population Studies Institute of Xi’an Jiaotong University for advice. I had met Prof. Zhu a 
couple of times before, and more importantly, she was among Greenhalgh’s team during 
the 1994 study in Xian yang. In reply, Prof. Zhu was happy to offer me a favour.
After I returned to China, I talked with Prof. Zhu in her Xi’an office about my 
research proposal in further detail. In general, she thought my study very interesting and 
my planned activities practical. However, to choose the same villages in Xianyang as those 
of Greenhalgh’s previous study looked a little problematic. Being a famous demographer 
with a special interest in China, Greenhalgh has visited the villages several times since the 
early 1980s. Based on her fieldwork there, she has published a number of papers on 
China’s population policy, fertility changes and the effect of economic reform at the local 
level. Greenhalgh’s work is appreciated by both Chinese and foreign demographers as 
informative, unbiased, of high academic standard and of great value. However, Prof. Zhu 
had heard from villagers lately that the village cadres were under certain pressures since 
Greenhalgh left. It was said that, unhappy with her findings, some senior family planning 
officials at provincial level blamed village cadres for leaking too much information to a 
foreigner. Anyway, the cadres now no longer welcomed outsiders to do research in their 
communities. To avoid possible disappointment, Prof. Zhu advised me not to stick to the 
three villages as my study site; there are plenty of villages to choose from the region. 
While accepting Prof. Zhu’s advice, I could not help wondering how Greenhalgh had 
upset the officials in Shaanxi. While reading her latest papers (Greenhalgh, 1993, 1994), I 
guessed that the officials might be not at ease with her discovery of the so-called lde 
fac to ’ population policy. Unable to reconcile state demands with peasant demands, 
according to Greenhalgh’s peasantisation theory, village cadres ‘engineered’ a number of 
pragmatic measures to favour fellow-villagers. For example, most couples are permitted to 
end up with two children, including one son. Such measures, on the contrary, might well
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be seen by officials as a challenge to authority or an indication that the birth control policy 
has failed. It is particularly unacceptable that such unauthorised measures were found out 
by a foreigner and publicised internationally, although people at home usually turned a 
blind eye.
The government office I visited in Shaanxi at the provincial level is the Provincial 
Committee on Ageing, a special organ of the Provincial Government in charge of policy­
making, co-ordination and consultation in issues concerning the well-being of the aged 
population. Functionally, the Provincial Committee is also affiliated to the National 
Committee on Ageing under the State Council in Beijing. I talked with the officials of the 
Committee about my research project, hoping that they could help me identify a rural 
community near Xianyang as my field site. I was told that I had better go first to Qindu 
District, which is on the office’s list of model districts in promoting the well-being of the 
elderly. I was therefore referred to Mr. Guo Xiyun, the Director of the District Committee 
on Ageing in Qindu.
My meeting with Mr. Guo for about two hours turned out to be a very fruitful 
interview. The District Committee on Ageing is subordinated simultaneously to the district 
government of Qindu and the Municipal Committee on Ageing of Xianyang City. Having 
been working at the current position since 1992, Mr. Guo has ample knowledge of 
government policies on ageing and the current situation of the elderly in his area. Thanks 
to his hard work, two villages in the district have been recognised as model units by the 
Provincial Committee on Ageing. According to Mr. Guo, the villages where Greenhalgh 
visited before are experiencing even greater changes. As early as the late 1980s, according 
to Greenhalgh (1993), the villages were well-off by provincial standards, because local 
income was generated predominantly from high-priced cash crops, mainly vegetables and 
flowers. In recent years, numerous small factories and shops have mushroomed after the 
nearby Xi’an-Baoji freeway was completed in 1993. Mr. Guo thought that, even if it is still 
possible to arrange a visit there through other official channels, the villages themselves are 
now too wealthy to represent the average situation in the district. In comparison, he
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recommended a moderately developed township, Pingling, for me to stay during the 
fieldwork. Mr. Guo later gladly arranged for me a reference letter from the district 
government. The village of Nanshangzhao was chosen after consulting with township 
officials because of its easy access to public transport.
3.2. Regional setting of the study site
The township of Pingling is about 60 kilometres north-west of Xi’an, the capital of 
Shaanxi Province. Shaanxi is situated quite centrally on the map of China. In fact, the 
geological centre point of the country is found in Jingyang, central Shaanxi. The province 
is bounded by Shanxi and Henan on the east, Hubei and Sichuan on the south, Gansu and 
Ningxia on the west, and Inner Mongolia on the north (Map 3.1). Stretching 1,000 
kilometres long from north to south, and 360 kilometres wide from east to west, Shaanxi 
covers an area of 205,600 square kilometres, with a total population of 35.1 million in 
1995. Administratively, the province consists of 13 cities, five prefectures, and 84 
counties.
Within the province, three environmental and economically distinct regions may be 
designated: North Shaanxi, the Guanzhong plain and South Shaanxi. Being part of the 
loess plateau, North Shaanxi is considered the most underdeveloped region. The 
persistence of poverty owns much to the natural environment: low temperatures, a short 
growing season, sparse rainfall, and severe soil erosion. Nevertheless, the discovery of 
huge coal and natural gas reserves in the region in recent years will certainly make an 
important contribution to local development in future. South Shaanxi refers to the narrow 
Hanzhong basin and the neighbouring mountainous regions sandwiched by the Qinling 
range and the Daba range. Thanks to the favourable climate, the region abounds in 
agricultural and forestry products, such as rice, tea and timber. The major problem of the 
local economy is transport bottlenecks. In recent years, three railway lines have been 
completed to connect the region with neighbouring provinces. In comparison, the 
Guanzhong plain is not only the most developed, but also the most populous in the three
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regions. With less than one third of the province’s total area, the Guanzhong plain 
accounts for over half of its total population and nearly 80 per cent of its gross domestic 
product (GDP).
The Guanzhong plain almost coincides with the Wei River valley that cuts through 
the centre of the province from west to east. Situated in the warm temperate zone, the 
region is one of China’s major agricultural bases. Wheat, com, cotton, tobacco and fruit 
are among the staple products. Since the 1950s, industrial development has made great 
progress, particularly in the sectors of machine-building, textiles and energy. In recent 
years, there has also been unprecedented growth in high-technology sectors like 
electronics, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals and aviation. Local industries are 
concentrated primarily in three large cities: the capital city of Xi’an, and the two major 
industrial centres of Baoji and Xianyang. Generally speaking, the overall development of 
the Guanzhong plain still lags behind that of the coastal regions. According to the 
Government’s 10-year strategy of economic development till 2010, efforts will be made to 
shift gradually the future centre of gravity from coastal regions to inland and frontier 
regions. In this process, the Guanzhong plain is well positioned as a bridge to connect the 
relatively prosperous East China with the less developed West China.
The Guanzhong plain has long been considered one of the cradles of Chinese 
civilisation. Before the tenth century, it had been the political, economic and cultural 
centre of China for more than 1,100 years. Fourteen dynasties founded their capitals here. 
Even today, visitors to the region are continuously reminded of its glorious past. They 
may visit numerous historical remains such as the neolithic Banpo village (4000 B.C.), the 
chariot-and-horse pits of the Zhou dynasty (1000-800 B.C.), the terra cotta army guarding 
the tomb of China’s first emperor (221-206 B.C.), the Grand Wild Goose Pagoda of the 
Tang dynasty (618-907), or China’s only remaining city wall of Xi’an built in the Ming 
dynasty (1368-1644). Over the last few centuries, the importance of the region declined 
for a number of reasons. The clock of history almost stopped, and the society was mostly
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closed to outside influences. Not surprisingly, the Guanzhong plain is a place where 
historical and cultural heritage is not only richer, but also better preserved than in other 
parts of China.
Pingling is one of the nine townships under the jurisdiction of Qindu District of 
Xianyang City, almost in the centre of the Guanzhong plain. Unlike Fengdong Township 
which Greenhalgh visited, Pingling is not directly on the Wei River, but on a plateau 20 
kilometres to the north of the valley (Map 3.2). The name of the township, Pingling 
( ‘Mausoleum of Peace’), was given after the burial site of Emperor Zhaodi (94-74 B.C., 
reigned 87-74 B.C.) of the Han dynasty, a 30-metre high tomb mound located less than 
two kilometres to the south of the township site. Nearby is the mausoleum of the empress, 
Xiaozhao. In fact, as one comes to the plateau, the first sight must be the amazing 
mausoleums of different sizes rising above the alluvial plain all the way to the horizon. 
Buried under the tombs were emperors, kings, their royal family members and numerous 
ministers and generals. Although many have been badly eroded or damaged over the last 
centuries, these tomb mounds undoubtedly form a unique part of the local landscape, 
awakening in visitors a deep sense of history. It is not uncommon to find in the region a 
township or a village named after the mausoleum close by.
As shown in Table 3.2, Pingling Township consisted of 18 villages, with a total of 
3,430 households and 17,390 residents. Most villagers in Pingling depend on farming for 
their basic livelihood; their chief crops are wheat, com, and fruit. Rural enterprises such as 
those that have sprung up on the outskirts of Xianyang and along the Wei River valley are 
still in their infancy here. In 1995, the per capita annual income was 1,023 Yuan, 60 Yuan 
higher than the provincial average of 963 Yuan. The township government is located in 
Daiwang Village. Together with the government offices are a number of service 
extensions targeting local population, such as a high school, a hospital, a credit co­
operative branch office and an agricultural technology promotion station. Each of these 
organisations is affiliated to a specific higher government department. For example, the 
township high school is administered by the district education bureau, and the agricultural
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technology station is controlled by the district agriculture bureau. The township also runs 
a small home for four childless old people.
Table 3.2. Selected socio-economic indicators, Pingling Township and 
Nanshangzhao Village, mid-1996_______________________________
Item Pingling Nanshangzhao
Total population 17,390 1,174
No. of males 8,280 577
No. of females 9,110 597
No. aged 60+ 1,538 93
No. of labour force 6,782 428
No. of households 3,430 275
Total farmland (ha.) 1,800 130
Proportion irrigated (%) 88.9 84.6
Proportion non-irrigated (%) 11.1 15.4
1995 per capita income (Yuan) 1,023 1,280
No. of affiliated villages 18 0
Source: Secondary data collected by the author during the fieldwork.
Nanshangzhao is one of the 18 villages affiliated to Pingling Township (Map 3.3). 
A 1995 village census recorded 275 formally registered households and 1,174 residents. 
Most families have their own walled courtyard, and all courtyards are arranged along the 
four parallel village lanes. Most families still live in the traditional one-storey houses built 
with bricks and tiles. There are also a few two-storey buildings of cement prefabricated 
components, standing out from the other houses around. The village has been connected 
to the local power network for more than 20 years, and since the late 1980s a running 
water system has been completed. In the middle of the village, the Xi’an-Lanzhou 
Highway cuts through diagonally from south-east to north-west. The highway is the major 
road link between Xi’an and other counties in the north-western part of the province. 
Every day hundreds of trucks, buses and cars travel in both directions. Because of the 
highway, the village acts as a small transport hub for the surrounding area, particularly the 
township site that is located a further five kilometres to the west and only accessible 
through country roads. People travelling in and out of the area have to change at the bus 
stop in Nanshangzhao. It is no wonder that the highway has now become increasingly the
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centre of the village’s daily life. Almost all important village utilities can be found by the 
sides of the highway: a village office, a clinic, a primary school, a storehouse, and a 
number of small private businesses. The District Court has an office here that opens twice 
a week and handles minor legal matters in the region, mainly civil disputes. Lately a state- 
owned insurance company, the Xiangyang Insurance Company, has also moved its branch 
office from the township site to Nanshangzhao owing to its advantageous location.
The total farmland of Nanshangzhao is about 130 hectares, now all leased out to 
families under the household responsibility system. Although the village is set upon a 
plateau much higher than the Wei River valley, nearly 85 per cent of the farmland is 
irrigable thanks to the nearby Weihui Irrigation Canal. The current problem is that water 
supply from the channel is not always sufficient to meet the demand, particularly in dry 
seasons. Strict control over water distribution has to be imposed by the local government. 
The crops cultivated by the villagers include winter wheat, com, cotton and rapeseed, with 
the wheat the most important in terms of total output, subsistence and sale to the state. In 
recent years, small orchards began to appear in the fields. Taking advantage of the 
village’s position as a transport hub, some villagers have opened their own businesses. By 
the end of 1995, there were already four shops engaged in motor and agricultural 
machinery repair, seven in agricultural product processing, five in retail and restaurants, 
and one in civil construction. Although for the majority of families, farming is still the main 
source of income, income from non-agricultural sources has increased sharply since the 
reform. In 1995, the per capita annual income was 1,280 Yuan, nearly 25 per cent higher 
than the township average.
3.3. Institutional changes in the study site
Originally, it was said, there was only one village in the region called Shangzhao. 
Since the Xi’an-Lanzhou highway was completed in the 1930s, people started moving in 
from neighbouring villages to build houses along the highway. In the late 1940s the village
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already had about 50 households. To distinguish it from the old village of Shangzhao to 
the north, the new one was named Nanshangzhao, South Shangzhao. People in the old 
Shangzhao, now Beishangzhao, or North Shangzhao, mainly belonged to the Liu family. 
To this day, Liu is a dominant surname in Nanshangzhao. Also influential in the village are 
the Chen family and the Zhang family. Because the village has a relatively short history, 
and the early residents came from different origins, Nanshangzhao is now a village with 
people of several different clans living together. To the current study, this is a fact of great 
relevance, given its variation from the traditional single-lineage village where all the males 
were descended on their father’s side from a single common ancestor.
Like most rural communities in China, the village of Nanshangzhao has 
experienced drastic changes in its social and economic life since 1949. It is worth noting 
that most of these changes took place as a direct result of government intervention from 
above rather than by gradual evolution from within. It is well known that the Chinese 
government adheres to a state socialist ideology according to Marxist concepts. Socialist 
theory gives high priority to public ownership and economic development in an attempt to 
transform the whole society. In practice, the theory was translated, regrettably, into a 
totalitarian political system based on one-party rule and a command economy based on 
central planning. Ideology in China is not only a vague legitimation of the institutional 
structure of authority, but also an instrument for the exercise of political and 
administrative power and for the implementation of policy. Over the last few decades, the 
government has launched numerous ambitious campaigns of social engineering, with many 
unpractical ideas and reckless power. In spite of possible good intentions, as recent history 
proves, most of these experiments eventually failed, leaving serious consequences. Since 
the late 1970s the market-oriented reform has greatly weakened the mechanism of central 
economic planning, but the highly centralised control system under the one-party rule has 
hardly changed. The state still reserves tremendous power and resources in commanding 
the society and influencing people’s daily life.
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Xianyang City and its surrounding areas, including Nanshangzhao, were officially 
‘liberated’ by the Communists from the Nationalists in the summer of 1949. As part of the 
national efforts of land reform, work-teams were sent in the early 1950s to rural areas to 
redistribute land to the landless from landlords. In comparison with stories of violence and 
bloodshed in other places, land reform in Nanshangzhao proceeded relatively smoothly, 
because there were neither many landless people nor landlords with extensive landholdings 
in the village. However, this period of private farming lasted only a couple of years. By the 
end of 1954, all land was collectivised into co-operatives (hezuoshe) according to 
government instructions upgrading the mutual-aid teams (huzhuzu.). Attributable primarily 
to the socialist ideology of public ownership, the idea is that, rather than helping in each 
other’s fields in busy seasons, villagers would pool their land and animals for the whole 
year. In this way, the villagers’ tiny plots could be combined into larger fields to be 
ploughed and irrigated more efficiently. At the end of the year, villagers would divide up 
the profits. To a certain extent, the co-operatives promised more security, considering the 
risks a single family has to face if it works individually. At the earlier stage, the division of 
profits was based on both labour inputs and the use of land or draught animals. After 
1956, however, the co-operatives were reorganised in such a way that only labour inputs 
would be counted in profit division. Naturally, not all villagers were willing to join such a 
system, especially the small number of wealthy families with larger land plots or more farm 
animals; but they were forced in under government pressure. Before long, all villagers in 
Nanshangzhao were organised into two co-operatives. Having lost its major means of 
production, including land and animals, the household was no longer a production unit, 
although each family could still retain a small plot for growing vegetables.
Private farming has existed in China for thousands of years. People had little 
experience in managing large areas of land or organising large numbers of labourers under 
the collective arrangement. However, before the villagers had time to get used to the new 
system, an even more radical, and disastrous as proved later, social experiment, the 
commune system, was launched in 1958 by the government. Chinese leaders at the time 
falsely believed that the bigger the units of agricultural production, the more advanced in
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socialism they would be. The village collectives were required to combine with 
neighbouring villages to form huge people’s communes (renmin gongshe). Nanshangzhao 
was thus incorporated into Daiwang Commune together with another 17 villages, now 
called production brigades (shengchan dadui). The two previous co-operatives were 
renamed production teams (shengchan xiciodui).
In contrast to private farming and small co-operatives, the commune was in 
principle multifunctional, responsible for local government, Party affairs, social welfare 
(such as secondary education and hospitals), economic planning, culture and 
communications, public security, rural investment projects (such as land improvement and 
irrigation works), local industry and commerce, and technical extension services. The 
production brigade was responsible for small-scale rural infrastructure and social welfare 
(primary schools and clinics). The production team was the basic unit of production, 
distribution and account. As regards production, when, where and who would do what 
were entirely decided by the team heads, usually in line with the annual plans handed down 
from the commune government. The team was expected to absorb all villagers, regardless 
of their labour power, into the collective labour force, so that they all earned workpoints 
(gongfen) corresponding to their input. Usually, there were a number of point categories, 
such as males, females, the elderly and children. If an able-bodied man got ten points per 
day, a woman could only get eight points. The elderly and children could earn five points 
at best. At the end of a year, or a busy season, the team calculated revenues and 
expenditures and distributed income to team members in cash and kind according to their 
contribution enumerated in work points. Theoretically, the income to each member was a 
share of the team’s net income after paying taxes and reserving the accumulated funds for 
productive investment, social welfare and village cadre’s salary. According to the 
recollections of the elderly in Nanshangzhao, the value of ten work points ranged from 0.5 
to 1.5 Yuan in the 1960s and 1970s. No longer playing any part in decision making at the 
team level, the household was only an economic unit in the sense of labour contributions 
to collective production and the production of non-staple foods for self-consumption or 
exchange. In Nanshangzhao, the cultivation of the private vegetable plot and the raising of
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domestic livestock (such as pigs and chickens) had always been a key source of food 
supply and cash income of the household.
Stemming largely from the ideal of a communist Utopia, as can be seen, the 
commune system was far out of touch with rural China’s reality. Although it was 
successful in securing political control by confining rural residents in a hierarchical 
network, it failed to achieve the original target of promoting agricultural production. The 
system was too rigid to organise production efficiently, and it did not provide effective 
incentives for individual effort. Peasants were deprived of every freedom and initiative to 
increase output and generate extra income. In consequence, productivity was dampened 
and the living standard in rural areas had hardly improved over 20 years. In fact, the 
forced implementation of the commune system was blamed by researchers for causing the 
disastrous famine from 1959 to 1961, in which as many as 23 million excess deaths were 
estimated (Peng, 1987)3. As the ‘Cultural Revolution’ came to an end in the late 1970s, 
the Government finally realised that urgent changes were needed in both policies and 
institutions, given the sluggish agricultural production and widespread discontent among 
the rural population.
Nationally, the decollectivisation reform started in 1978 with the introduction of 
the household production responsibility system (jiating shengchan zerenzhi). After the 
commune system was abolished in the early 1980s, the government adopted a new two- 
layer system at township and village levels. The township government retains most 
administrative functions of the commune, such as public security, legal affairs, taxation, 
technical extensions, disaster relief, health, and education. Primarily playing the role of 
guiding and planning the local economy, the township government does not directly 
interfere in the day-to-day production and management activities of individual households. 
Currently, the township government is the lowest unit in the formal government hierarchy,
3 In Nanshangzhao, according to the recollections of local old people, few people died during the so- 
called ‘difficult period’ as a direct result of hunger. Although there were reports of widespread food 
shortage and malnutrition, the traditionally grain-producing Guanzhong plain was only moderately
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and its officials are appointed and paid by the state. At village level, the villagers’ 
committee (cunmin weiyucinhui) is responsible for administration and social welfare 
previously controlled by brigade and team heads. The committee is defined as a ‘mass 
organisation of self-management’, and its members are all part-time workers elected by 
fellow villagers. In the study area, Daiwang Commune was replaced by Pingling Township 
in 1982, and the villagers’ committee in Nanshangzhao was established in the following 
year. In 1995, the committee was made up of five persons, including a head, two deputy 
heads, an accountant, and a woman (my hostess, Ms. Bian) in charge of women’s affairs 
and family planning. Actually, the committee members, also called village cadres, have 
multiple tasks and duties as an indispensable link between the government and villagers, 
including enforcing government policies such as the birth control policy, keeping the 
village accumulation fund, maintaining community services such as the power and water 
supply, taking charge of village construction work such as the roads and irrigation 
channels, overseeing the welfare of villagers such as the primary school and the elderly 
committee, and mediating in possible disputes. The village cadres are paid from the village 
accumulation funds, which are derived from two sources: annual levies on households in 
the village, and rent from the village’s communal properties, such as houses and machines.
In the most common form of the household responsibility system, the villagers’ 
committee contracted out land and production output quotas to each household. Land was 
principally allocated on a per capita basis and for a period of time, taking account of 
quality. Households are now in full control of the means of agricultural production such as 
tools, animals and mechanical equipment, and are responsible for the development of their 
own economy and the management of their own productive operations. The production 
output quotas are the amount of output households are obliged to deliver to the state as 
tax payment or to the village as accumulated fund contribution. The remaining output is 
then at their free disposal to consume, to sell on the free market, or sell to the state at 
higher-than-quota prices. Since the land is still considered collectively owned, the
affected by the famine. Moreover, the famine was caused largely by government failures in distribution 
rather than natural calamities per se.
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household is thus paying a ‘rent’ to the village ‘landlord’. To encourage land improvement 
and long-term investment, the contract period has been extended from 15 years in the 
early 1980s to 30-50 years in the mid-1990s. In practice, the household has already gained 
de facto  permanent control over the land.
In Nanshangzhao, this drastic transformation went through two stages, each 
marking a further step away from collective agriculture. At first in 1980, the contracting 
unit was a small group within the previous production team in a system called ‘contracting 
output to the group’ (lianchan daohu). In 1982, however, official permission was given 
for contracting to individual households (baochan daohu), indicating a full return to 
household agriculture. After the initial division of land, parcels were reshuffled later at 
village level in 1986 and 1990 to adjust to population changes. The 1990 contract 
guarantees each member in a household 1.5 Mu (0.1 hectare) of land for 30 years. The 
landholding of each family ranged from 0.2 hectares to 0.8 hectares. The land distribution 
plan took into consideration to a great extent the original land ownership during the Land 
Reform period. If possible, families were allocated the plots that used to be under their 
name. In this way, a lot of disputes, such as disputes over land quality, the distance from 
the village, or access to irrigation, have been largely avoided. About three hectares of 
communal land remained undivided, mainly for three purposes: reserved housing sites for 
newly married couples, a village threshing ground, and a graveyard on the edge of the 
village. According to instructions of the local government, no further reallocation will be 
carried out in future.
3.4. Economic changes in the study area
In line with the institutional changes, drastic economic changes also took place in 
the study area over the last few decades. Since the reform of the late 1970s, the local 
economy has been experiencing a gradual transformation from a largely self-sufficient 
economy to a commodity economy. Although agriculture was still the dominant sector, 
non-agricultural sectors were playing an important role in absorbing surplus labour and
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generating income. Even in agricultural production, machinery and modem technology 
have become increasingly popular.
3.4.1. An increasingly diversified rural economy
Traditionally, the local economy of Pingling and Nanshangzhao was entirely based 
on agriculture, mainly grain and cotton production. During the commune period, the 
production plan was set strictly by the commune government, including crop mix, sown 
area for crop varieties, time of sowing and output targets. Leaders of the production 
brigades and teams were responsible for fulfilling production plans and tax quotas handed 
down from the commune government. Individual farmers had little say in the decision­
making process. Now that farmers have gained de facto  long-term control over the 
contracted land under the household contract system since the early 1980s, they also have 
to take responsibility for the development of their own economy and the management of 
their own farming operations from sowing to harvesting, in order to bring out sufficient 
products to meet their own consumption, fodder for animals, a surplus for exchange on 
the market, tax quotas set by the state, and contributions to community welfare funds. 
Responsibility for production not only makes greater demands on the family to cultivate 
the land intensively and carefully, it also encourages the family to diversify its activities on 
and off the farm, from grain production to animal husbandry, cash cropping, and other 
non-agricultural activities.
Agricultural production was still the dominant sector of the local economy in the 
study area. As shown in Table 3.3, the majority of household heads (73.6 per cent) 
reported in the household survey that agriculture was their main source of income. People 
relying on non-agricultural activities as their main income source accounted for 26.4 per 
cent. A household head refers here to the person who was so recorded on the official 
household registration card. In most cases, the household head was the main bread-winner 
of a family, but there were also exceptions4. Here two points deserve further explanations.
4 Detailed information on household structure is discussed in Chapter 5.
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First, the main income source of a household head does not necessarily mean his only 
income source. The household head might also earn income from other sources, only of 
less importance. Second, other family members also make their contributions to the family 
economy. The income of the household heads does not necessarily have a dominant 
influence on the family’s overall living standard, which is calculated on a per capita basis.
Table 3.3: Percentage distribution of household heads by monthly income 
and main income source, Pingling, 1996_____________________________
Main income Income group (Yuan) Total All No.
source <199 200-299 300+
Agriculture 53.1 28.7 18.2 100.0 73.6 209
Rural industry 41.7 29.2 29.2 100.0 8.5 24
Private business 36.0 32.0 32.0 100.0 8.8 25
Others 26.9 34.6 38.5 100.0 9.2 26
All 47.9 29.6 17.6 100.0 100.0
No. 136 84 50 284
Source: Household survey data
Household heads reporting agriculture as their main income source tended to have 
a lower income. More than half (53.1 per cent) made less than 200 Yuan per month, the 
highest proportion in this group. In contrast, less than one fifth (18.2 per cent) made more 
than 300 Yuan per month, the lowest in this group. Among the respondents working 
mainly in rural industry, the proportion in the low-income group was also high (41.7 per 
cent), probably because most of them were unskilled workers, and rural industry usually 
could not afford to pay high wages. Respondents in the private business category fell into 
the three income groups almost with equal proportions, 36.0, 32.0 and 32.0 per cent, 
respectively. This reflects to a certain extent the fact that this sector is financially relatively 
diversified and volatile. Comparably speaking, respondents in the last category had a 
higher income, with nearly two fifths (38.5 per cent) earning more than 300 Yuan per 
month. People in this category were mainly government employees or contract workers in 
the city. Their income was normally high and stable. Of all household heads interviewed, 
nearly half (47.9 per cent) fell into the low income group, chiefly because of the dominant 
share (73.6 per cent) of those working in the agricultural sector.
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3.4.2. Agricultural production: toward mechanisation and commodity production
In the study area, agricultural production can be roughly divided into three groups: 
grain production, cash cropping, and animal husbandry. Winter wheat and maize are the 
two staple crops in terms of total output, subsistence and sale to the state. Other side 
crops like millet, beans and sweet potato are also grown by some families, but in limited 
amounts. Thanks to the favourable climate conditions of the Guanzhong plain5, double 
cropping is common in Pingling and Nanshangzhao. That means winter wheat and maize 
can be harvested on the same plot in one year. Winter wheat is normally sown in late 
October or early November, depending on the temperature and the moisture in the soil. 
After the wheat is harvested in early June the next year, the land is quickly prepared for 
planting maize. Understandably, quick land preparation is also required after maize is 
harvested in late autumn. In fact, both the sowing and harvesting must be finished in a 
matter of days to make full use of the frost-free period. Therefore, early June and late 
October are the two busiest seasons for farmers.
The period between planting and harvesting entails a continuous process of field 
management, including watering, fertilising, weeding, and monitoring. As mentioned 
above, the majority of the land in the study area is irrigated: 88.9 per cent in Pingling, and 
84.6 per cent in Nanshangzhao. Apart from isolated wells, water comes mainly from the 
Weihui Irrigation Canal that runs through the region. Irrigation was repeatedly mentioned 
by villagers during my interviews and the focus-group discussions as an important task in 
farm work for two reasons. On the one hand, water is specially needed when crops are 
flowering and heading in late spring (for winter wheat) and early autumn (for maize). 
However, rainfall is usually inadequate during these periods in the region. On the other 
hand, the water from the irrigation channel has to be distributed evenly when the demand 
is high. In each village, a special water manager is appointed to take charge of water 
distribution by time and amount. Families have to wait in turn according to the
5 The average annual temperature is 13.4 degrees Celsius, with a total frost-free period of 218 days.
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prearranged time table to get the water channelled to their contracted plots. Given that the 
whole year’s harvest is at stake, farmers cannot afford to waste any time, when it comes to 
their turn to use the water, no matter if it is in the daytime or in the night. Usually, it is the 
strongest and the most skilful person in the family who takes the job, most likely a young 
man. Such pressing work generally takes place four to five times a year. Families without 
able-bodied labourers have to ask relatives or hire someone else to do the work. 
Therefore, for the farmers in the study area, to have a young man at home capable of 
carrying out essential farming tasks like watering fields is essential to maintaining the 
household economy. During the focus group discussion, for example, when asked why 
they believed each family should be allowed to have at least one son, old people specially 
mentioned the importance of male labourers in completing the irrigation task. In 
comparison, other field management activities, such as fertilising, weeding and monitoring, 
are not as physically demanding. Much of this work is carried out by women or the 
elderly.
During the commune period, the average output of winter wheat was about 200 
kilograms per Mu (one fifteenth of a hectare), much lower that that of maize at 300 
kilograms. Because of the state monopoly in the grain trade, nearly half of the wheat 
produced had to be handed over to the state as tax in-kind. Villagers relied mainly on 
maize as their staple food. In recent years, because of the promotion of high-yield 
varieties, per unit wheat output increased by almost 50 per cent to 300 kilograms. In 
normal conditions, the total grain output per Mu can reach up to 600 kilogram. In the 
meantime, the government has changed the calculation of tax payment. Instead of 100 
kilograms of wheat per Mu in the early 1980s, the tax rate in the mid-1990s was set as 100 
Yuan per Mu for grain production. The special requirement on grain variety was also 
dropped. That means both wheat and maize would be accepted. Maize as a coarse food 
grain is considered inferior to wheat in taste and nutrition. Therefore, farmers commonly 
preferred to pay the tax in-kind with maize, in the equivalent to the tax rate. Given that the 
1996 price of maize stood at 0.8 Yuan per kilogram, for example, a total of 125 kilograms 
maize was enough to pay the unit land tax. Should they choose to pay with wheat, 67
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kilograms was already adequate, because of the higher price of wheat at 1.5 Yuan per 
kilogram. Thanks to increased production and the reduced tax burden, farmers nowadays 
have more left for self-consumption or exchange on the market.
In the study area, agricultural mechanisation and the use of modem technology 
have made noticeable progress in recent years. Nowadays, much of the heavy farm work is 
done by machinery, chemical fertiliser has replaced farmyard manure, and farmers enjoy a 
wide range of services from various technical extensions. During the commune period as 
late as the 1970s, villages had to keep a large number of draught animals for ploughing 
and transport tasks. Harvesting was chiefly completed manually. In recent years, machine 
use became increasingly popular in agricultural production, whereas draught animals were 
almost reduced to a rarity. In Nanshangzhao, as shown in Table 3.4, farmers possessed a 
total of 47 agricultural machines of different types. Some old machines used to belong to 
the previous production team, only to be sold when the team was dismissed in the early 
1980s. Others were mostly bought by villagers in the last few years.
Two major factors have facilitated agricultural mechanisation in the study area. 
From the government side, mechanisation of agriculture is a major component of rural 
reform policies. In the early 1980s when the commune system was abolished, local 
technical extensions formally managed directly by the commune government were 
transferred to company ownership. Agricultural machinery stations, plant protection units 
and seedling units were now operated by a staff as independent economic entities. 
Villagers’ committees make regular contracts with the companies to hire their large 
machinery for busy seasons, and individual households could also ask for their services at 
a fee. In fact, the fees charged were subsidised, largely to cover the running costs such as 
fuel, since extension staff were still on government payrolls. On the other hand, special 
policies have been adopted to encourage factories producing small, practical, and 
affordable equipment and machines to meet the changing needs of family farming. In the 
late 1980s, Qingdu district where the study site is located was chosen for a pilot program 
by the government to promote agricultural mechanisation. According to the 1991 figures,
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the district had a total of 7,672 agricultural machines, including 3,299 tractors and 224 
trucks.
Table 3.4: No. of agricultural machines by type, Nanshangzhao, 1996
Type No.
Tractor, including mini-tractor 15
Truck 1
Other agricultural machine 7
Machine for agricultural product processing 8
Other small motive power machine, including 
water pump, diesel engine and power generator
16
Total 47
Source: Secondary data collected by the author during the fieldwork.
From the farmers’ side, people have become increasingly aware from government 
promotion and their own experience of the benefits of modem technology in raising per- 
unit output and productivity. Thanks to the rising income brought by the reform, villagers 
were also financially able to pay. For a family with an average annual income of 5,000 
Yuan, for instance, a mini-tractor at 2,000-3,000 Yuan is not entirely out of reach. 
Moreover, local agricultural banks and rural credit co-ops (nongcun xinyongshe) offered 
special low-interest loans to farmers to buy machines. In the study area, mini-tractors were 
very popular because they could be used not only for ploughing, but also as a means of 
transport, providing for villagers an additional income source during slack seasons. An 
informant, who was contracted to transport building materials for a private construction 
company, said that he could earn up to 30 Yuan in one day’s work. In this way, the cost of 
the tractor could be paid off very quickly.
Taking grain as the key link’ (yi Hang wei gang) used to be the government policy 
in rural areas during the commune period. As farmers started to manage their own 
household economy after the reform, they realised gradually that the old slogan is not 
necessarily effective in maximising income. Strongly influenced by government policies, 
the grain price in China has been controlled at a low level for decades. Even the market 
price does not differ a lot from the official level. In the study area, for example, the total
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grain production per Mu was valued at only about 570 Yuan (300 kilograms of wheat at 
1.5 Yuan per kilogram and 300 kilograms of maize at 0.8 Yuan per kilogram), allowing for 
tax payment. If half of the grain was reserved for self-consumption, half for sale at market 
price, the per unit cash income was only about 280 Yuan. Because of the low price of 
grain products, farmers are no longer interested in growing grains. In Nanshangzhao, most 
families kept only part of their contracted land for grain production, just enough for self­
consumption, the state tax and animal fodder. More and more farmers turned to cash 
cropping and other sideline production to diversify the household economy and maximise 
income. In fact, the government policy has also been revised in favour of ‘an all-round 
development’ (quanmian fazhan).
The traditional cash crops in the study area are cotton and rape seeds. During the 
commune period, these crops were grown largely according to government production 
plans. Also as required, the products were mostly sold to the state at a fixed low price. To 
farmers’ actual income, there was little difference between growing grains and growing 
cotton. In the first few years since the reform in the early 1980s, growing cotton was very 
popular among local farmers after the government doubled the purchase price. In general, 
the per unit revenue from cotton production was twice or three times as high as that from 
grain production. However, since the early 1990s, farmers’ interest has gradually shifted 
from cotton to more profitable fruit-trees, because of a number of drawbacks of cotton 
farming. For example, cotton is prone to diseases and insect pests, and needs regular 
watering and fertilising. The field management is particularly labour-intensive, requiring 
continuous pruning and flower thinning. Allowing for high labour and financial input such 
as fertilisers and pesticides, the net income is not quite satisfactory.
Shaanxi is one of the main fruit producing provinces in North China. In 1995, the 
total apple output of the province reached 1.8 million tonnes. In Xianyang, the 
government has also made efforts in recent years to promote fruit production as one of the 
major sectors of local agriculture. By the end of 1994, the region already had 4,000 
hectares of orchards. In the study area of Pingling and Nanshangzhao, many farmers
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started developing orchards on their contracted land for growing apples, pears and 
peaches. Apple trees were the most popular, especially the new varieties like Qingguan 
and Red Fuji. At the time of my field work, some orchards were still in their infancy, with 
young trees standing side by side with wheat. The owners were optimistic about the 
harvest in three or four years’ time. Although a lot of work was needed in the initial 
period, the yielding period of fruit trees could be 15-20 years. In the study area, apples 
were sold for about three Yuan per kilogram, and top-quality fruit could reach five Yuan 
per kilogram. For a mature orchard, it was not difficult to draw a net income of 2,000 to 
3,000 Yuan annually, minus input and tax6. Generally speaking, work in orchards is 
physically not demanding, and a lot of old people like working there.
In the study area, as mentioned above, draught animals have almost disappeared in 
recent years. Animal husbandry refers here mainly to raising domestic animals, like pigs, 
milch goats, and chickens. During the commune period, families raised pigs and chickens 
mainly for sale on the market. This had nothing to do with commodity production, but 
simply because it was almost the only source of cash income of farmers, as described in a 
local saying that chickens were the farmers’ small bank. Now, farmers raise pigs and 
chickens mainly for self-consumption. A piglet is usually bought in the spring, and 
butchered in winter before the Chinese New Year. As encouraged by the government 
policy of promoting specialised commodity production, a few families in the study area 
have already started to run small chicken farms in their backyards. Each chicken farm 
normally keeps 100-150 chickens in piled coops, and produce 5-6 kilograms of eggs per 
day. Eggs are sold on the free market in the nearby city of Xianyang. At the price of about 
five Yuan per kilogram, the family’s daily cash income could easily reach 30 Yuan. 
However, to run a chicken farm, even a small one, is different from raising just a few 
chickens at home. Apart from initial investment, a certain knowledge of farm management 
and disease prevention is necessary. In the study area, it is still not a business for everyone.
6 The tax rate for cash crops was 400 Yuan per Mu, and could be paid in cash.
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3.4.3. Non-agricultural sectors: in search of new opportunities
In the study area, the non-agricultural sector of the local economy has experienced 
unprecedentedly high growth in recent years under the government policy of ‘an all-round 
development’. More and more people are now engaged in wage employment. As shown in 
Table 3.3, of 284 household heads interviewed in Pingling, over one fourth (26.4 per cent) 
reported non-agricultural activities as their main income source, 8.5 per cent from rural 
industry, 8.8 per cent from private business, and 9.2 per cent from other non-agricultural 
sector jobs.
During the commune period, rural industry was non-existent in the study area. All 
forms of private ownership were banned, and even lucrative household sidelines, such as 
poultry, pigs and handicrafts, were discouraged. Privately owned business was simply a 
taboo. Rural people were confined to their village by the household registration system 
(hukou), and their major income source was workpoints from participating in group labour 
day in and day out. Without proper documentation, there was little chance for villagers to 
travel to the cities or richer regions in search of jobs. For a rural youth who wanted to 
leave his home village, there were just two possible channels: to pass the state examination 
and be enrolled in a college (sometimes a polytechnical school), or to join the army. In 
principle, only a college graduate or a discharged soldier could be assigned a formal-sector 
job in the city. It was seldom that factories recruited workers directly from rural areas. If 
at all, rural people were hired mainly as manual labourers.
Since the decollectivilisation of the early 1980s, the government has not only 
replaced the commune system with family farming, but also introduced policies to promote 
rural industry and private business. Most restrictions on migration under the hukou system 
have been lifted, and people are free to move and look for jobs in places other than their 
birth-places. Apart from the favourable environment created by the government for 
diversifying the rural economy, there was also a demand from the villagers themselves.
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Since the reform, families are now responsible for the development of their own economy 
and the management of their own farming operations. They do not have to spend all the 
time on the farm as in the commune period, just for earning a few workpoints. Farming on 
the small contracted land requires only half or one third of that time used before. Also, 
farmers are now more flexible in time allocation, and able to work out their own schedule 
according to the actual need. As a result, an unprecedented phenomenon has appeared in 
rural China, often described in Chinese official publications as underemployment7, or 
labour underutilisation, or surplus labour. That means, rural people are now looking for 
more job opportunities and higher income outside the farming sector.
In fact, the ‘floating population’ has become a big headache for the Chinese 
government in recent years. It refers to people staying in places where they do not have a 
permanent local resident status. Reportedly, the ‘floating population’ increased its size 
from 50 million in 1990 to nearly 100 million in 1995. A 1996 survey conducted by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences found that 80-90 per cent of the cross-regional 
migrants were rural labourers looking for jobs in urban areas. The economically advanced 
coastal regions were major recipients of inter-provincial migration. Chan and Yang (1997) 
attributed the major cause to rural decollectivisation, which has set free as many as 200- 
BOO million surplus labour previously locked up in the countryside. The rapid expansion of 
non-public and informal sectors was another contributing factor. Of course, the current 
relaxation of migratory controls has also played a role.
In the study area, as discussed above, non-agricultural activities can be grouped 
into three categories: rural industry, private business, and other activities. Rural industry 
includes both collectively and privately owned factories or companies in the community. 
The respondents were usually full-time or part-time employees in the industry. Private 
business refers to small businesses owned by the respondents. Two groups of people 
reported working in the other-activity category: first, full-time or part-time employees of
Theoretically, farmers are not considered as unemployed in official statistics.
82
the local government and other service branches; and second, migrant workers who found 
full-time or part-time jobs in cities.
In Pingling there were two collectively owned factories: one produces building 
materials, and the other is specialised in tablets and boluses of Chinese herbal medicine. 
The factories were managed by villagers’ committees, and the profit was partly distributed 
among villagers, and partly transferred to welfare funds. There were also a number of 
privately owned small companies. For example, in Nanshangzhao, a private construction 
company was making big profits in recent years by taking advantage of the construction 
boom in both urban and rural areas. As in most parts of China, Xianyang and the 
surrounding region has become a giant construction site in recent years. Even in rural 
areas, farmers were making efforts to improve housing conditions. The company owner, 
Mr. Liu Qifang, used to work in a collectively owned construction company in a 
neighbouring county. He went back home and set up his own business in the late 1980s. 
By making full use of his experience, connections, and not the least, entrepreneurship, Mr. 
Liu never lacked contracts. Sometimes he had to hire up to 20 young people to meet the 
time limit of a project. It was impolite to ask about Mr. Liu’s total income directly, but his 
beautiful family house was evidence of his wealth. More importantly, he has helped create 
jobs for fellow villagers. A casual worker could earn up to 20 Yuan per day while working 
in Liu’s company.
Small private business has become very popular in recent years since the 
government legitimised private ownership as part of the market-oriented reform. Private 
business was considered one of the most expandable areas in the rural economy. It had the 
advantage not only that its labour and capital were chiefly provided by the individual 
family, but that, at little cost to the state or the collective, it provided needed services and 
goods to the community. In the meantime, private business could make quick returns to 
the family and provide employment for surplus labour. In Nanshangzhao, for example, 
there were 17 formally registered small businesses at the time of my fieldwork: six shops 
in the retail and hospitality sectors (three restaurants, two grocery stores, and one barber
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shop), four repair shops for motor vehicle and agricultural machinery, and seven cottage 
workshops for sideline production. Compared with neighbouring villages, Nanshangzhao 
has more small private businesses, because of its well-placed location by a busy highway. 
A family-run business usually employed just a few people, and the profit differed from one 
to another. I was told that motor repair shops made the highest profit, up to 50 Yuan per 
day on average. Since the early 1980s, most village clinics have also been privatised. 
Nanshangzhao had two clinics at the time of my fieldwork: one specialised in Western 
medicine and the other in traditional Chinese medicine. The former was also responsible 
for child and maternal care, and distributing contraceptives. These two clinics could also 
be considered as private businesses.
In recent years, a number of rural labourers also found jobs in the nearby city of 
Xianyang. Some just took casual jobs, while others found full-time jobs as contract 
workers (hetonggong) for a certain period, commonly three years. For example, many 
girls in the study area have found jobs in the textile industry. Xianyang used to be a textile 
industry centre of the region. However, it has become increasingly difficult lately for 
factory managers to recruit new workers from young women in the city. In comparison, 
country girls are preferred because they are more submissive and less demanding about 
wage and work conditions. Girls went to Xianyang not only for a chance to experience 
city life, but, more importantly, for a stable income. Financially, most unmarried young 
women in the area were still dependent on their family. Stable income would greatly 
improve their independence and status at home. In addition to contributions to the family, 
girls also have to save some money for their future marriage. During my stay in 
Nanshangzhao, I only heard of two people who had ever travelled to other provinces 
looking for job. Cross-regional migration for employment did not seem to be popular in 
the area.
In the non-agricultural category, there were also people working for the township 
government and its affiliated extensions. They not only earned more secure incomes, but 
also enjoyed higher social status. Apart from a few leaders, most employees of the
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township government were natives of the region, roughly divided into two groups: the 
older minban workers, and the newly recruited. During the commune period, the 
government used to hire high school graduates to work part-time in various local 
extensions such as primary schools, village clinics and the township agricultural machinery 
station. They were called community-funded {minban) workers, because they were paid 
mainly by community welfare funds. After the commune was dismantled, most minban 
workers were ‘upgraded’ to government employee status through an examination and 
registration procedure. Since the early 1990s, the district personnel departments have 
introduced a recruitment policy, allowing rural youths to directly apply for junior jobs in 
township governments. Although the quota was still limited and the competition fierce, 
this policy provided at least another chance of social mobility for local people.
3.5. Family planning in the study site
Since the late 1970s, rural China has experienced another drastic reform: 
population reform characterised by coercive birth control programs, including the 
controversial One-Child Policy. Compared with the institutional and economic reforms 
discussed above, the population reform has been implemented by the government with 
more specific targets and more intense vigour.
Birth control as a government policy in China has gone through several stages 
since 1949, and varied under the changing socio-economic environment. In the early 
1950s when China was recovering from civil war, the government was confronted with 
mounting tasks to consolidate its political power, restore social order and revitalise the 
economy. While firmly dismissing the doubts of some Western politicians on the 
Communists’ ability to feed China’s huge population, Mao proudly announced his belief 
that for China the numerous population was a ‘wonderful blessing’. China could well cope 
with the situation even if its total population might multiply several times, because people 
are not only consumers but also producers according to the Marxist theory. So the 
question was not whether China was over populated but whether it had enough manpower
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to speed up its industrialisation drive. This optimistic, but rather simplistic and biased 
viewpoint, underlay all major government policies concerning population issues in the 
1950s, which were mostly pronatalist.
In the mid-1950s, early family planning measures were introduced first in cities, 
such as legalising abortion and sterilisation and promoting contraceptive use. However, 
emphasis was primarily put on improving maternal and child health rather than limiting 
population growth. An explicit birth control policy was issued in the early 1960s only after 
the second baby-boom caused deep concern about the problem of unchecked population 
growth. Family planning offices (later renamed family planning commissions) were set up 
at both national and provincial levels, and pilot family planning programs, with education 
and free distribution of contraceptives, were introduced in selected areas. Although there 
was no clear-cut target for population growth, a slogan was employed to disseminate the 
government’s viewpoint on ideal family size: ‘one child is not too few, two children are 
just enough, and three children are too many’.
In the early 1970s when economic and social order was gradually restored 
throughout the nation after the early chaos of the ‘Cultural Revolution’, family planning 
resurfaced at the top of the government’s policy agenda. Population growth targets were 
formally embodied into national development plans from 1973. A renewed birth control 
campaign was launched under the slogan ‘Wan, Xi, Shao’, which outlines the three 
government endorsed reproductive norms of later marriage, longer spacing and fewer 
births. Although there were regional variations in the recommended age of late marriage 
and the recommended years of birth spacing, two was the universally recommended 
number of children for each couple.
The country embarked on a renewed drive for modernisation in the late 1970s as the 
‘Cultural Revolution’ came to a close. Top priority was given to the ‘Four 
Modernisations’ of agriculture, industry, defence and technology. The government’s plan 
required that the per capita GNP would quadruple from about US$ 250 in 1979 to US$
86
1000 by 2000. The achieve this ambitious target, the total population as a divider must not 
surpass 1.2 billion. Apart from these macro-economic rationales, the government also 
realised from a number of population projections that, given the young age structure of the 
population, the growth momentum could hardly be stopped even if couples had only two 
children. Only if 95 per cent of married couples in the cities and 90 per cent in the 
countryside had only one child in due course, could the total population of China be 
controlled at about 1.2 billion by the end of this century. Consequently, the One-Child 
policy was adopted as the strongest-ever measure in China’s family planning programs. 
Although it is arguable how much the policy enforcement is coercive, remarkable progress 
has been achieved in recent years to curtail rapid population growth. For example, China’s 
recorded Total Fertility Rate (TFR) dropped sharply from 5.8 in 1970 to 2.14 in 1990. 
Some scholars even believe that the fertility may well have fallen below replacement level 
in the early 1990s (Feeney and Yuan, 1994).
China’s birth control policy is in fact a combination of goals of late marriage, late 
childbearing, few births, and quality births (wanhun, wanyu, shaosheng, yousheng). The 
One-Child policy is a simple generalisation of this policy. To this date, birth control 
remains principally a national guideline. It is the local governments, primarily the 
provincial governments, that are responsible for working out concrete regulations, 
including population growth targets, conditions for having additional children, incentives 
and penalties, in accordance with local social, economic, political and cultural conditions. 
In Shaanxi, the first provincial regulation was formulated by the Provincial Family 
Planning Commission, and approved by the Provincial People’s Congress in 1981. Shaanxi 
policy followed the national guideline in setting its own targets. The criterion for age at 
marriage was 23 for women and 25 for men, although the legal marriage age was set in the 
Marriage Law at 20 for women and 22 for men. Late childbearing was defined as delaying 
the first birth until the mother is over the age of 24. As for the number of births, rural 
couples were allowed to have an additional child if they were classified as facing real 
hardships. The first child being a girl was considered one of those special conditions. 
According to the revised 1986 regulation, villagers whose only child was a girl became
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eligible to have a second child. However, those permitted to have a second child were 
required to space four years between their first and second births. At local levels, the 
provincial regulation is again subject to amendments by local governments. For example, 
the regulation enforced in Pingling was issued in 1994 by the township government based 
on the regional regulation of Xianyang City.
Birth control as a basic state policy is implemented through the existing centralised 
control system of the government, from the national level all the way down to the village. 
At each government level, there is a family planning commission in charge of formulating 
policies according to the national guidelines and co-ordinating programmatic activities in 
its dominion. Meanwhile, a mass organisation called the Family Planning Association is 
organised among program workers and activists at corresponding levels. Usually, the 
fulfilment of birth control plans ranks with major indicators of how a government performs 
in its term. Top officials keep pressing lower-level cadres to meet the plan targets through 
speeches, conferences and internal circulars. Also mobilised is the huge network of 
auxiliary organisations, such as party branches, women’s federations, trade unions and 
youth leagues. In the 1980s mass campaigns and crash programs were frequently used as 
major implementation methods, leading to occasional reports of violence and infanticide. 
In recent years, however, more routine and systematic methods were adopted to monitor 
fertility and ensure that targets were met. In the meantime, family planning commissions 
greatly expanded the network of technical service. In 1996, 85 per cent of townships in 
the Xianyang region had established their own family planning service stations and 20 per 
cent of villages their own family planning service clinics. In addition, 48 per cent of 
villages had at least one part-time family planning worker, 1,850 in total.
As observed by Greenhalgh (1993) in the other three Xianyang villages in the early 
1990s, local cadres ‘engineered’ a number of de facto policies to reconcile the state 
demands and villagers’ actual needs. Similar de facto policies also existed in the study site 
in mid-1996. For example, late marriage and late childbearing virtually disappeared from 
the policy objectives, and the requirement for spacing was often traded off for fines. As
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mentioned above, late marriage was promoted mainly in the early stages of birth control 
campaigns in rural areas. After the 1980 Marriage Law set the legal minimum age at 
marriage at 20 for women and 22 for men, the average age at first marriage in China 
decreased markedly. For example, the average age at marriage of rural women dropped 
from 22.3 in 1982 to 20.5 in 1990 (Sun, 1994). In Pingling, most young women got 
married as soon as they reached the legal age of 20, and conceived their first child 
immediately. In recent years, under-age marriage became so common that the township 
government had to issue a special circular to tighten up the marriage registration rules. 
Young couples would only be granted a marriage certificate after submitting a document 
from the villagers’ committee to verify their age, together with their own birth registration 
cards. A 500-Yuan fine would be incurred if couples were found to be married without 
proper registration. According to one informant, some parents who desperately wanted 
their children married early even bribed village cadres to write them a reference letter.
In comparison to the timing issue, the current policy gives more importance to 
controlling the number of births. Generally speaking, the township regulation of Pingling 
differs little from the provincial regulation in the number of children couples are allowed to 
have. Couples with one boy are asked to stop childbearing, and those with a girl can apply 
for a plan quota once the first child is four years of age. Under no circumstances will a 
third birth be permitted. Commonly, there are three types of enforcement methods: 
administrative discipline, material rewards and economic penalties. In the township 
regulation can be found more detailed requirements. For example, couples with one child 
must use contraceptives, and those with two children must undergo sterilisation. In 
Nanshangzhao, the only contraceptive method recommended is the IUD, and wives are 
most likely to undergo sterilisation. A husband is only suggested for the operation if the 
wife is not in good health. To ensure that all eligible women take appropriate birth control 
methods, the township government introduced in early 1996 a mandatory bi-monthly 
check-up among all married women in reproductive ages. The township hospital charges 
four Yuan for the check-up, which is aimed at the provision of reproductive health care, 
the insertion or verification of IUDs, and the detection of out-of-plan pregnancies. If a
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woman fails to appear, a 10-Yuan fine will be imposed. The result will go on each 
woman’s personal family planning record kept since 1995 by the village family planning 
worker. It seems that policy implementation depends increasingly on economic penalties. 
For example, those eligible women who are found not to have an IUD will be fined 100 
Yuan, and those who have not been sterilised will be fined 500 Yuan. Much higher fines 
will be imposed on couples who have unauthorised births, 4,000 Yuan for the second and
8.000 Yuan for the third, up to eight times the per capita annual income of 1995. If the 
offenders go away before clearing the fine, the village has the power to reclaim the land 
plot contracted to them.
At its face value the township regulation looks very harsh. However, the data 
collected from the village family planning records of Nanshangzhao indicate that the actual 
results of previous programmatic efforts are not as good as expected. Ms. Bian, the village 
program worker, keeps a record card of contraceptive use for every married woman up to 
age 40. From 1979 to 1996, there were 296 births to the 151 women on the record, 153 
boys and 143 girls. Allowing for the 12 childless newly-wed, each woman had on average
2.1 births. Of all women with children, 65 had two, 34 had three and eight had as many as 
four. Only 32 women had one child at the time of my fieldwork. It was still uncertain 
whether they would progress to the second birth later on8. According to Ms. Bian, most of 
the high-parity births occurred in the late 1980s when policy enforcement was somewhat 
relaxed in the region. However, two unauthorised births were recorded as late as 1995. In 
spite of such obvious violation of the birth control targets, no serious efforts were made to 
collect the fines.
The unsatisfactory performance of family planning programs in villages like 
Nanshangzhao is attributable largely to the changing role of village cadres, who play a 
dual role in rural China. On the one hand, they are charged with enforcing state policy 
among the rural populace. On the other hand, they are firmly rooted in the local 
community and supposed to serve their fellows. As Chan, Madson and Unger (1984)
8 More detailed discussion is in Chapter 6.
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concluded, rural cadres appear to have mediated state-community conflicts by kowtowing 
to the state during periods of mobilisation, but helping the local community in quieter 
times. Since the reform, it has become increasingly difficult for the authority to exercise 
direct control over village cadres, who are now elected by fellow-villagers rather than 
appointed by township officials. When state rules challenge local values, such as during 
birth control campaigns, village cadres often try, and sometimes succeed in, distorting 
central policy in favour of local interests (Greenhalgh, 1993). As I heard from an 
informant, village cadres nowadays would rather resign if things went badly wrong than 
risk spoiling their relations with fellow villagers.
Perhaps realising that village cadres are no longer reliable, or co-operative and 
supportive enough, in enforcing birth control policies, the local government has to send its 
own employees to the countryside. During my fieldwork, I coincidentally witnessed a new 
crash campaign in the study site in late April 1996. Work-teams were sent down by the 
district government; they were composed of officials, family planning workers and medical 
personnel, and provided with transport and equipment for contraceptive operations. Each 
team was designated to work in a number of specific townships9. In the meantime, 
township governments also organised their own employees to assist the district officials. 
Work-teams were assigned three major tasks: to check if all eligible women had taken the 
compulsory bi-monthly examination, to perform contraceptive operations (IUD insertion 
or sterilisation) for those who were supposed to have them, and to collect outstanding fine 
payments. The district government required the teams not to withdraw before every family 
was visited. Obviously, local governments cannot rely on such crash mobilisation 
repeatedly for enforcing such a long-term policy as birth control. However, villagers did 
feel the pressure of the visible presence of a large number of officials. Village cadres also 
had a good excuse to throw the blame upon others, while mediating face-to-face between 
officials and villagers.
9 A work-team of 55 officials and program workers from 13 departments, with five motor vehicles, were 
assigned to Pingling and the two neighbouring townships of Shuangzhao and Mazhuang.
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Table 3.5: Contraceptive use of married women under 40, by method 
and number of children, Nanshangzhao Village, mid-1996__________
Method No. of children 
0 1 2 3+
All Percentage
No use 12 0 0 0 12 7.9
IUD 0 32 20 8 60 39.7
Female sterilisation 0 0 44 34 78 51.7
Vasectomy 0 0 1 0 1 0.7
Total 12 32 65 42 151 100.0
Source: Secondary data collected by the author during the fieldwork.
Before I left the village of Nanshangzhao, all but two married women under 40 had 
undergone the examination obediently, and all women with children were using 
contraceptives10. As can be seen in Table 3.5, 51.7 per cent of all married women under 40 
used female sterilisation, 39.7 per cent used IUD and 0.7 per cent used vasectomy. 
However, it is interesting to find that 28 women with two or three children still used IUD, 
instead of sterilisation as the regulation required. I was told later that these women had 
been using IUD for several years. As long as the devices worked well, there was no need 
to ask them to change to sterilisation because of the high cost, 45 Yuan in comparison to 7 
Yuan for IUD insertion, and possible health risks. Also I heard that the two families that 
had unauthorised births in 1995 eventually made up the fines they had evaded. The tactics 
used by the work-team were, on the one hand, to visit (or more precisely harass) the 
families every day, pressing for the payment; on the other hand, families that made the 
payment by the deadline on 10 May were promised a 50 per cent deduction.
3.6. Summary remarks
Pingling Township and Nanshangzhao Village were chosen as the site of this study 
by taking into account both the original research design and the recommendations from 
local officials and experts. Although it is unrealistic to expect a community study to permit
10 The two women were at the time working in cities.
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conclusions about rural China as a whole, it certainly can provide rich insights into the 
topic under investigation.
Like most rural communities in China, Pingling and Nanshangzhao have 
experienced drastic social and economic changes over the last few decades. In review of 
the recent history of the study site, two points are relevant to further discussions in 
following chapters. First, what differs from other developing countries on a similar 
modernisation course is that changes in China result primarily from the government’s 
direct intervention based on ideological concepts or macro socio-economic rationales. 
With little power of decision-making in the current political system, villagers have been 
subject to various social engineering experiments that are not necessarily always in their 
best interest. Second, the highly centralised political control system and mass mobilisation 
are two effective means of the government to enforce policies. This unique mechanism 
helps translate the central leaders’ political will swiftly and thoroughly into nationwide 
practice, leaving far-reaching consequences to the society. In recent years of reform, 
villagers have begun to enjoy more freedom and power in making decisions about their 
own well-being. However, as the case of the birth control campaign shows, they still 
cannot escape entirely from government intervention.
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CHAPTER 4
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE ELDERLY 
4.1. Socio-economic development and the status of the elderly
The status and well-being of old people have long been a focus of recent studies on 
old-age security and support. In literature, however, there is no consistent use of the 
status or well-being of the elderly. Terms alternatively used also include situation, 
position, standard of living, quality of life, and so on. Although each of these terms carries 
its own connotations, in a general sense all are referring to some overall assessment of an 
older person’s life. Rudkin (1993) proposed that the status of the elderly could be divided 
into six dimensions: social status, level of activity, level of authority, economic status, 
physical status and psychological status. Most discussions in previous literature did not go 
into such details. To avoid possible confusions, the economic aspect of the question is 
defined in this chapter as economic well-being, and the social aspect as social status. 
Understandably, the two aspects are interrelated and interactive. Two additional issues 
should be addressed in the status study. First, status comprises characteristics of both the 
individual and his environment. That means status should be discussed more or less in 
relative terms, including not only a comparison between an individual’s past and present 
experience, but also a comparison between his own experience and that of others. Second, 
a complete picture of the status should include both the subjective and the objective 
aspects: it should also involve what people expect and what people experience (Palmore 
and Whittington, 1971).
In recent years, a number of theories have been developed to explain changes in 
status of the elderly in the course of modernisation. Cowgill and Holmes (1972) suggested 
that an inverse linear relationship exists between societal modernisation and the status of 
the elderly: the more industrialised a society becomes, the lower the status of the old 
person. Other studies have shown, however, that this relationship between modernisation 
and the status of the elderly is not linear, rather curvilinear across the entire range of
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societal complexity or development (Balkwell and Balswick, 1981). The elderly are 
accorded a low status in simple nomadic societies, a high status in settled agricultural 
communities, and a low status in modem industrial nations. The critical factor is how older 
persons control valued resources. In agricultural societies, particularly in the highly 
developed type of agricultural technology (intensive agriculture), the resources (the 
subject of inheritance) and skills of older people may be most valuable to others, resulting 
in high status. In contrast, property ownership is irrelevant to economic well-being in 
hunting and gathering societies, and very few members of industrial societies make a living 
from accumulated property assets. Wealth instead is acquired primarily by individual 
labour or by participation in the labour force. As the society becomes increasingly 
industrialised, the status of the elderly declines because of their declining control over 
valued resources, or the declining value of the resources they control. The inability to 
maintain control of critical knowledge in modem society is another factor that contributes 
to the loss of status. However, Palmore and Manton (1974) believed the curvilinear 
relationship is J-shaped. After a decline during the early stages of modernisation, the status 
of the elderly will stabilise and may even begin to rise when societies ‘mature’. On the one 
hand, the rates of change level off and the discrepancies between aged and non-aged 
decrease. On the other hand, new institutions such as social security and retirement 
benefits will replace family in maintaining the status and well-being of the elderly.
Lee and Kezis (1979) found that certain familial factors also affect the status of the 
elderly, and these factors are likewise correlated with type of economy. The status of the 
elderly is higher in societies with extended family systems than in those with nuclear 
families. The extended family is most often patriarchal, which means that power and 
lineage are traced through the males of the family. Moreover, status is high in societies 
with unilineal kin groups and patrilocal postmarital residence customs. Not surprisingly, 
such customs are commonly found in agricultural societies. Other researchers pointed out, 
however, the pitfalls of using ‘nuclearisation’ of the family to explain a decline in status of 
the elderly. Traditional society can hardly be generalised into one household type
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(Quadagno, 1982); and family living arrangements are constantly changing as family 
members experience different events (Martin, 1990).
From their study on the effects of socialisation values and ancestor worship, Ishii- 
Kuntz and Lee (1987) concluded that older people have higher status in societies where 
conformity is highly valued in children than in those in which self-reliance is a primary 
socialisation value. The inculcation of the value of conformity in children comes to 
constitute a resource for parents in old age. But when children are encouraged to be self- 
reliant, their independence from the senior generation results in lower status for the 
elderly. The practice of ancestor worship is also positively correlated with the status of the 
elderly. The effects of socialisation values reinforce Lee’s (1984) argument that familial 
factors are important in the determination of the status and treatment of older people in 
society.
The status of the elderly was high in traditional Chinese families, which agreed 
exactly with the characteristics researchers suggested above. First, China was for 
thousands of years a typical agricultural society, where land was the major means of 
production and subject of inheritance, and old people were respected for their knowledge 
and skills in agriculture. Second, most families were extended in structure and patriarchal 
in nature, which means that power was often concentrated on elderly men in the family. 
Third, according to the Confucian teachings, in Chinese families ancestor worship was 
strictly observed, and conformity and filial piety were highly valued in children. In fact, as 
Whyte (1997) observed, family life in the traditional Chinese society offers such a sharp 
contrast with that in Western societies that many family sociology textbooks devote one 
chapter or two describing the unique Chinese patterns.
Since 1949, the Chinese government has conducted a series of far-reaching 
experiments in social engineering. Davis and Harrell (1993) observed that the state 
socialism of the pre-reform period (1949-1979) has influenced the intergenerational 
relations within Chinese families in two conflicting ways. On the one hand, it destroyed
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much of private property, the economic basis that bonds the family and shapes family 
loyalty, and undercut the power and authority of patriarchs by attacking ancestor worship 
and gender inequality, the cultural and religious core of the extended family. On the other 
hand, it created conditions that stabilised and strengthened the traditional family. For 
example rising living standard and better health care reduced mortality, fewer infants died, 
living to old age become the norm, and limited migration under the household registration 
system (hukou) tied most adult men, the major providers for the elderly parents, to the 
place of their birth. All these factors have helped people from all social groups maintain 
larger and more complex kin networks than had been possible before 1949 (Tu, Liang and 
Li, 1989). Davis-Friedmann (1991) also noted the contradiction: although the state 
ideology differs greatly from Confucianism, the government not only tolerated but also 
encouraged certain traditional values and institutions like family support and long-term 
reciprocal care because of a number of considerations. Economically, the government is 
unable to finance and manage an all-inclusive social security system to replace the family’s 
traditional functions. Politically, the stability of the family is valued as an essential factor in 
maintaining social order and control.
As for the effect of state socialism on the status of the elderly, there are two 
conflicting theories. One theory is that the elderly have reaped many benefits in view of the 
socialist commitment to public ownership, egalitarian distribution of wealth, and collective 
responsibility for the material well-being of all citizens. The basic survival of those who 
can no longer support themselves was guaranteed, and life expectancy increased thanks to 
major improvements in public health. The improved security and longevity were not 
primarily the result of expanded public welfare measures. Instead, they were the result of 
policies that promoted stable family life and created the material and social conditions 
permitting adult children to support and care for their old parents (Stacey, 1983; Davis- 
Friedmann, 1991). The other theory is that the authority and power of the aged in families 
was weakened as a result of the elimination of private ownership of land and capital; also 
the government's atheist propaganda works against Confucian values and traditions. 
Younger members of the family were expected to be dutiful citizens first, filial children
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second; formal education was in state schools with a unified curriculum; and government 
officials made job assignments. These changes reduced not only parents' control, but also 
intergenerational loyalty and interdependence. Consequently, parents could not effectively 
discipline or punish those children who deserted them or failed to provide adequate 
support (Cherry and Magnuson-Martinson, 1981).
With the shift from a state socialist economy to a market-oriented economy, China 
has entered another drastically altered environment since the late 1970s. In rural areas, the 
reform measures resulted in the replacement of the commune system by family farming on 
de facto  private land. The new system has greatly boosted agricultural production and the 
income level of rural people. As for its effect on the elderly, there were a number of 
conflicting arguments among scholars. Some suggested that since peasants now work and 
manage their fields on a household basis, the new reforms should reinforce the traditional 
values on filial piety and the extended family. As family income increases, some peasants, 
although still a minority, are able to accumulate adequate funds to finance their own 
retirement (Olson, 1988; Thireau and Kong, 1994). For example, many villages that have 
become wealthy enough have developed their own community pension schemes. Others 
argued that the new reforms are likely to diminish the security of the aged because welfare 
assistance previously provided by communes is either no longer available or very limited. 
The increased opportunities for the younger generation in out-migration and wage 
employment, and the growing influence of materialism and consumerism, may foster 
endless generational conflict over the distribution of family resources (Goldstein, Ku and 
Ikels, 1990).
As mentioned previously, the modernisation theory asserted that the status of the 
elderly would decline in the course of socio-economic development. Although frequently 
cited as the most influential in the study of the aged population, it has also been frequently 
criticised as an oversimplification of reality (Goldstein and Beall, 1982). A number of 
issues deserve special attention when the status of the elderly in rural China is considered. 
First, part of the attraction to modernisation theory may be based on a distorted view of
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the experience of the elderly in Western, more modem societies (Martin, 1990). In a Third 
World setting like rural China, modernisation at this stage is far from complete. Compared 
with Western societies, the modernisation in China has achieved much greater progress in 
a much shorter period. It takes time for old social values and norms to adjust to the 
changed material reality. Second, the classical description of agricultural societies in the 
modernisation theory does not readily apply to the situation in rural China where land is 
nominally collectively owned and a state socialist economy is still functioning. Third, the 
modernisation theory gives more emphasis to the changes in social status than the 
economic well-being of the elderly. As the living standard of the population as a whole 
rises sharply from a near-poverty level in rural China, old people will certainly benefit as 
well. It seems that all researchers agreed that their economic well-being has improved 
since the reform. What they disputed was whether old people were still socially influential, 
and whether they were still properly taken care of.
4.2. The elderly in the study area: a profile
4.2.1. The elderly as seen from survey data
From the household survey conducted in Pingling, basic information on a total of 
1,198 persons was collected, including 214 co-resident old people aged 60 and above. 
Table 4.1 provides a rough picture of the old people surveyed through three socio­
demographic indicators: sex, age and education. Despite the small sample size, such 
information may be helpful for further discussions about the elderly’s economic well-being 
and social status in the study area.
Of the 214 old people, women accounted for 53.7 per cent and men for 46.3 per 
cent, with a sex ratio of 86.2 per cent. This complies to the typical pattern that the sex 
ratio is lower than 100 per cent in old age groups, when old men are commonly survived 
by old women. However, the survey ratio is slightly lower than the 1992 national average 
of 89.7 per cent (China Research Centre on Ageing, 1994). There was clearly a negative
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correlation between sex ratio and age. Sex ratio decreased as people became older. In the 
youngest old group of 60-64, the sex ratio was still quite high at 120.7 per cent. It 
dropped from 100.0 per cent in the next old group of 65-69 all the way to 58.7 per cent in 
the oldest old group of 75 and over. Old men in this last group were outnumbered by old 
women by almost half.
Table 4. 1: Distribution of the elderly by selected socio-demographic 
indicators, Pingling, 1996______________________________________
Item
60-64
Age group 
65-69 70-74 75+
All No.
A. Sex 
Male 54.7 50.0 40.0 37.0 46.3 99
Female 45.3 50.0 60.0 63.0 53.7 115
Sex ratio 120.7 100.0 66.7 58.7 86.2
B. Marital status
Unmarried 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 1
Currently married 81.3 63.0 64.0 34.8 62.6 134
Widowed 18.7 35.1 34.0 65.2 36.4 78
Separated 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.5 1
C. Education
Illiterate or semi- 68.8 70.4 74.0 80.4 72.9 156
literate
Primary school 17.2 24.1 20.0 15.2 19.2 41
Junior high+ 14.1 5.6 6.0 4.3 7.9 17
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
No. 64 54 50 46 214
Source: Household survey data.
At the time of the household survey, the majority of old people (62.6 per cent) in 
Pingling were currently married. In comparison, over one third (36.4 per cent) of the 
elderly were widowed. It is evident that the widowhood rate increased with age, from 18.7 
per cent in the youngest old group to 65.2 per cent in the oldest old group: three in five 
old people in this group were widowed. Obviously, widowhood rates differ also between 
old men and old women. As mentioned above, old women normally have a higher survival 
rate, because women tend to marry older men than themselves. In rural China where the 
influence of traditional values is still strong, old women seldom remarry after the death of 
their husbands. A further examination of the survey data reveals that, in the oldest old
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group, the widowhood rate was 47.1 per cent among men, and 75.9 per cent among 
women.
Education is useful as an indicator in the discussion because it is not only an 
outcome of the elderly’s status in the past, but also a factor that still affects their status in 
the present. In old times, only wealthy families could afford to send their children to 
school, and even in wealthy families, education was a privilege reserved primarily for boys. 
On the other hand, education provides a person with opportunities to learn more skills and 
make higher income. Thus, higher educational attainment increases people’s ability to 
accumulate sufficient resources, resulting in enhanced status and secure old-age support. 
In the study area, as seen from Table 4.1, the situation of educational attainment and 
literacy among the elderly was quite poor. The majority (72.9 per cent) fell into the 
category of illiterate or semi-literate. The semi-literate refers here to people who have 
some schooling but not up to the primary graduate standard set by the government 
education department. About one fifth (19.2 per cent) had completed primary school, and 
only a small proportion (7.9 per cent) reached junior high and above level. There was also 
a negative correlation between educational attainment and age. The oldest old group had 
the highest proportion of the illiterate and the lowest of junior high school graduates. 
Gender differences in literacy among old people were more striking, with old women 
having much lower literacy rates than old men. For example, the illiterate accounted for 
46.0 per cent among old men, while it doubled to 95.7 per cent among old women. 
Understandably, the high illiteracy among the rural elderly was attributable to the fact that 
they lived most of their early years in poverty before the accelerated socio-economic 
changes since 1949 and the introduction of the universal primary education policy in the 
1950s. It was a quite different picture for people in younger age groups. For example, the 
illiterate accounted for only 2.1 per cent in the group 18-39, and for 15.6 per cent in the 
group 40-59. In comparison, 82.1 per cent in the former group and 44.7 per cent in the 
latter group have completed junior high education.
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4.2.2. The present-day elderly: a unique generation
According to modernisation theory, the critical factor affecting the status of the 
elderly is how they control valued resources in a society. For example, old people enjoyed 
high status in agricultural societies because resources (the subject of inheritance) and skills 
they controlled might be most valuable to others, particularly in the highly developed 
intensive agriculture. In rural China, land is the primary resource of agricultural 
production. A noticeable feature distinguishing traditional Chinese agriculture from other 
agrarian civilisations was family farming on small land plots. Because of the mounting 
population pressure and diminished arable land, tiny farms were cultivated with such an 
extraordinary labour intensity, that Stacey (1983) described it as ‘gardening’. This familial 
mode of production shaped not only family size and structure, but also the status of 
members in the family. Being the production chief, the family head usually had absolute 
authority. Men enjoyed higher status than women did, because they performed over 80 per 
cent of farm labour. Superstructure is determined by economic basis. This highly intensive 
family farming developed Confucianism that institutionalised a patriarchal, patrilineal, and 
patrilocal family system. Filial piety was highly valued as the foundation of virtue and the 
root of civilisation. For nearly 2,000 years, Confucianism was the dominant cosmology, 
political philosophy, and the doctrine of proper ethics and comportment of the Chinese 
people. Understandably, supported by intensive family farming and enhanced by the filial 
piety-centred social norms, the elderly in rural China traditionally enjoyed a relatively high 
status at home and in the society.
Like most parts of China, as discussed in Chapter 3, the study area of Pingling and 
Nanshangzhao has been subject to a series of drastic social and economic experiments 
since 1949. During the last two decades of reform, the region was further exposed to an 
accelerated process of modernisation. These new developments have greatly influenced 
the local economy, and people’s daily life, and, not least, the economic well-being and 
social status of the elderly. Nothing has been more obvious than the effect on the two 
major factors for which old people were valued in traditional agrarian economy: the
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present-day elderly were not only deprived of private land rights, but also unable to amass 
sizeable resources after the collectivisation; their knowledge and skills of agricultural 
production became increasingly irrelevant in both the pre-reform and post-reform periods. 
They thus became a unique group in the status study.
Land is undoubtedly the most important resource of the rural economy. A striking 
effect of the state socialism that differentiates China from other developing countries is the 
guarantee of access to land for all farmers. The Land Reform of the early 1950s sent both 
landlords and the landless poor into the history books. Since then, private land ownership 
only existed for a short period. In the mid-1950s, land came under collective or 
community ownership11. Other major production resources, such as draught animals and 
large farming equipment, were also collectivised. Left to the family were only a small 
private plot for growing vegetables, small farming tools, the house and other household 
belongings. With family farming changed to communal farming, the family ceased to be a 
production unit, remaining largely a consumption unit. The labour input of family members 
to the communal production was almost the family’s only income source. The production 
team guaranteed all villagers a basic portion of staple food and some daily necessities. This 
egalitarian distribution system prevented rural people from falling into absolute poverty or 
hunger, but it also prevented them from accumulating sizeable personal savings and assets.
Participant 1: People were pitifully poor in the commune times. Ten workpoints 
(equal to one day’s work of a strong labourer) hardly valued one Yuan, barely to 
buy ten Jin (1/2 kilogram) maize!
Participant 2: Even maize was not always sufficient. The big problem was no cash 
money.
Participant 3: Cash? Thank goodness if the family did not owe the team 
workpoints12.
11 In China, collectivisation in rural areas does not equal nationalisation. In theory, land is not owned by 
the state.
12 It was not unusual that, at the time of end-of-season distribution, some families could not gather enough 
workpoints in the previous season to pay for the family grain ration, particularly those with a large 
number of dependants. They had to make up the outstanding points in the next season.
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Participant 4: Cash was really the problem. People sometimes even had no money 
to buy a box of matches. If one had no relatives in cities sending money back, the 
only hope was private plot (by selling products from private plots on the free 
market).
Participant 3: The free market was banned later on. Be careful if you wanted to sell 
something, the commune cadres would come to cut off your ‘capitalist tail’ 
(zibezhuyi weiba)13! (Focus discussion group, elderly males)
In the study area, as remembered by old people, the income of rural people during 
the commune period was low, and their living standard was not much better than a bare 
subsistence. After paying for basic daily necessities, farmers had little left for savings. The 
most valuable private property of a family was perhaps its house, usually made of mud 
bricks. The value of such houses ranged between 2,000 and 3,000 Yuan. More strikingly, 
this low living standard was ‘evenly’ distributed: there were neither wealthy families nor 
the extremely poor.
Two factors, low income level and limited economic freedom, were crucial in 
hindering the current old people from achieving over their working life financial security 
for their families as well as for themselves in old age. As Zweig (1997) concluded from the 
statistics of the 1970s, the overall income level of rural people in China was only about 
one fifth to one sixth of that of urban dwellers. Under the rigid commune system, 
agricultural production almost stagnated. Commune officials failed to run the economy 
effectively, and peasants had no interest in promoting productivity, either. Worse still, the 
government imposed a policy of large price scissors between industrial and agricultural 
products, to facilitate capital accumulation for industrial development. Peasants’ income 
was kept artificially low through the state monopoly in purchasing and marketing 
agricultural products (tonggou tongxiao). In the meantime, rural people chafed at the 
many restrictions on personal freedom: they were confined to their village by the 
household registration (hukou) system and could not look for work and higher income 
elsewhere; private production was discouraged through limitations on private plots and
13 The ‘capitalist tail’ is a frequent term in government documents during the Cultural Revolution period, 
referring to all types of private economic activities that the government discouraged.
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other household sidelines (such as poultry and pigs); private exchange was kept in bounds 
through the banning or strict control of free markets. In the 20 years from the early 1950s 
to the early 1970s, China’s total product of industry increased by over ten times, whereas 
that of agriculture increased by only two times, just keeping up with population growth. 
At an annual rate of just 1 per cent, little progress was made in living standard 
improvement in rural areas (Meisner, 1996). The slogan of ‘common prosperity’ under the 
commune system turned out to be an unexpected situation of ‘common poverty’.
Under the household contract system of the early 1980s, land in rural areas was 
reallocated to the families. In Nanshangzhao, for example, the total farm land of 130 
hectares was contracted to 275 families, with each family holding 0.2 to 0.8 hectares. Now 
that families have the right of land use up to 30 years, some researchers prefer to describe 
the current land ownership as de facto  private (Kelliher, 1992). In theory, however, land in 
rural China is still considered as community property. Farmers have the use right, but not 
the eventual ownership. That means land is not for sale. Sub-contract of plots between 
villagers is only allowed at the approval of the villagers’ committee, the nominal land 
owner. On the other hand, land plots are contracted to a family, not to a specific person. 
The household head has to consult with the villagers’ committee before making any 
decisions on land inheritance (or more precisely, contract inheritance). Therefore, even 
under the current family farming, the elderly cannot reclaim land ownership.
As in most societies that are experiencing an accelerated process of modernisation, 
old people in rural China have found that the value of their knowledge and skills in 
traditional farming is quickly diminishing. In fact, their knowledge and skills were abruptly 
devalued by the collectivisation a few decades ago. During the commune period, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, major decisions about agricultural production and rural 
management were made by commune officials in line with prevailing government policies. 
Team cadres were responsible for fulfilling commune plans at the village level. They had 
little power even to adjust the plans to local land or weather conditions. It was not 
uncommon that crops failed because of officials’ bad planning or mismanagement. In such
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a rigid system, peasants, young and old, had no part in deciding what they were supposed 
to do. On the other hand, knowledge and skills acquired from family farming were not 
necessarily useful for communal farming where peasant groups worked on expanded land 
plots.
The reform of the early 1980s has helped revitalise the family’s function as a 
production unit with a return to family farming. Farmers are now responsible for their own 
production and management. They have to work hard not only to cultivate the land 
intensively and carefully, but also to expand their income generating activities to other 
non-agricultural sectors. However, family farming in the 1990s is not the same as in the 
1950s. In the study area, as discussed in Chapter 3, rural economy has gradually moved 
from a single farming economy to a diversified economy. The use of machines and modem 
technology, such as chemical fertilisers and pesticides, became increasingly popular, and 
more and more people found jobs in wage employment.
Uncle Chen Wenfa is an old man in his late 60s. He and his wife live with their 
older son’s family. The family has two plots, one for growing wheat and maize, 
and the other for apple trees. All major decisions about farming are made by his 
son, who is now the household head. Asked if he has ever made any advice to his 
son, Uncle Chen is a little upset, saying that nowadays few young people are 
willing to listen to old people. They think what old people know is outdated. They 
(young people) buy new varieties of crops at the seed shop, and prefer to ask for 
advice from people in the technology station’. Uncle Chen quite supports his son 
using more new technology. For example chemical fertiliser is thought ‘simple, 
clean and effective’, compared with the old style farmyard manure. However, he 
feels he himself is too old to learn. T am not useful any more. I can’t even 
understand clearly what the directions say. What if you get the formula wrong? 
The entire crop will be ruined’ (Field work notes).
Under the new circumstances, as can be seen, old people have realised that their 
knowledge and skills of traditional farming are no longer very useful. Nevertheless, I 
found that few old people in the study area were eager to learn new technology. Lack of 
education is of course a major handicap. Another reason may be psychological barriers. 
Old people viewed new technology with a mixture of respect and fear: it is effective in 
raising the yield, but is not something that old people can grasp.
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4.3. Economic well-being of the elderly
As mentioned above, the economic aspect of the elderly’s status is referred to as 
their economic well-being. To compare the possible differences in the well-being of the 
elderly, Rudkin (1993) suggested the both absolute and relative assessments should be 
involved. While assessment of absolute well-being employs a standard set by the 
researcher, an assessment of relative well-being uses that of other people as the standard. 
In this study, well-being is discussed largely as a relative concept: the well-being of the 
elderly before and after the reform, and the well-being of the elderly in relation to other 
family members.
In previous literature, particularly in industrialised countries, personal monetary 
income has often been used as a key indicator to assess the economic well-being of the 
elderly. However, this indicator is not readily applicable in rural China. At present, most 
rural people are rvot engaged in wage employment, and co-residence with children is the 
main form of living arrangements of the elderly. It is difficult, if not entirely impossible, to 
find an accurate indicator that can clearly separate the well-being of the elderly from that 
of other family members. It is also difficult to compare with accurate indicators the well­
being of the current elderly with those in the commune period some 20 years ago, because 
of lack of reliable data. Most discussions in this sector, therefore, are based on information 
gathered through qualitative techniques, such as observations, in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions.
4.3.1. Improved living standard of villagers as a whole
During the commune period, as mentioned above, the living standard of families in 
the study area was very low. Since the reform of the late 1970s, the per capita annual 
income has increased by about four times from less than 300 Yuan to over 1,200 Yuan in 
the mid-1990s. Great improvement has been made in every aspect of village life. Old
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people also benefited a lot from the reform along with other segments of local population. 
The Chinese commonly use ‘yi shi zhu xing’ (clothing, food, housing and transport) to 
generalise people’s daily needs. Here four categories of food, clothing, housing and 
household appliances are used to discuss detailed changes occurred in the study area.
‘Mm yi shi wei tian ’ (Food is the first necessity of the people) is a centuries-old 
folk saying in China. No wonder food was given the top priority because the majority of 
the Chinese population has been under constant threat of hunger and poverty for 
thousands of years. Even to this date, the popular greeting rural people exchange with 
each other is not ‘Good morning’ or ‘Good evening’, but ‘Have you had your meal?’ 
Therefore, the most evident proof of the improvement in living standard is the quantity 
and quality of food rural people consume nowadays. As discussed in Chapter 3, the study 
area is located in a grain-producing region of the Guanzhong plain, and the staple food of 
local people consists of wheat and maize. During the commune period, grain was 
distributed by the production team on a per capita basis. The amount of the grain ration 
differed from year to year, about 200 kilograms depending on the total production and tax 
in-kind burden. In an average year, wheat made up one third of the ration and maize two 
thirds. A small amount of rapeseeds was also distributed as a source of edible oil. 
Although the ration was sufficient to keep villagers from starving, it could not ensure that 
everybody was well fed. Families had to make full use of their private plots to produce 
more non-staple foods as supplements, such as sweet potatoes, turnips and pumpkins. In 
spring, there were usually families suffering from the pre-harvest food shortage. Since the 
reform, not only has food quantity increased, food quality also has improved. Now 
families are free to grow and store as much grain as they need. During my fieldwork, there 
was no sign of food shortage before the wheat harvest in early June. The coarse foods like 
maize and sweet potatoes had almost disappeared from people’s diet. Old people were 
especially happy that they could have three meals a day of refined grain like wheat. An old 
informant told, during the commune period people did not have sufficient to eat, even 
working hard from morning till night. Now, every family is selling grain to the state. Once 
food is ample, fewer disputes occur at home. In the study area, the pattern of food
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consumption has also diversified. In addition to what they grew on the farm, villagers 
bought increasingly more food from the market, such as rice, vegetables and meat. I was 
surprised to find that a street pedlar came every day to sell fresh vegetables in 
Nanshangzhao. It is clear that the cash income at rural people’s disposal has increased as 
the local agricultural production becomes gradually specialised and monetised. An 
interesting and useful benchmark for measuring sufficiency and food quality in the study 
area is whether the family consumed or sold the eggs of their few chickens. During the 
commune period, eggs were commonly sold for cash on the market, because the 
production team rarely distributed cash to families. For those with no relatives remitting 
money from outside, selling eggs was almost the family’s only source of cash income, 
particularly to buy small necessities like matches, kerosene and tea. Another major source 
of cash income was raising one pig or two in the farmyard. However, the relatively large 
amount of cash income from selling pigs was usually devoted to more important purposes, 
such as purchasing farm tools or repairing houses. Since the reform, villagers still kept a 
few chickens at home, but mainly for self-consumption. Even pigs were largely not for 
sale. In fact, the number of families raising pigs were declining. Few young couples raised 
pigs nowadays. I was told that pig raising was labour and time consuming, and did not 
make much profit.
LFo yao jin zhuang, ren yao yi zhuang’ (Buddha is adorned with gold, and man 
with clothing) is an old Chinese folk saying indicating the necessity of clothing in people’s 
daily life. Before the 1980s, China had to maintain a cloth ration system for more than two 
decades to keep its population from cold. Under this system, each person was entitled to 
an annual coupon for about three metres of woven fabrics. In the study area, however, 
most villagers wore handwoven clothes. As discussed previously, cotton is widely grown 
in the region. The production team distributed a small amount of raw cotton to families 
after fulfilling government production plans. Handloomed cloth was considered tough to 
stand wear and tear. On the other hand, a lot of families simply had no money to 
materialise the ration entitlement14. The elderly told me that, during the commune period,
14 The cloth ration was just an entitlement, not in kind.
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people just had a few garments for changes, and everybody wore black or dark blue. 
There was little difference between men and women, children and adults. Since the reform 
the cloth ration system has been abolished. People’s clothing becomes increasingly 
variegated and colourful, thanks to two factors. First, textile products, especially made 
from chemical and synthetic fibres, are now much cheaper and readily available on the 
market. Second, rural people can afford to buy more ready-made clothes because of 
increased income. The traditional looms have totally disappeared from rural families. In 
the study area, I observed little difference in people’s clothing from that in urban areas. 
Although some old people still wore home-made, dark-coloured clothes, children and 
young people were all wearing colourful, ready-made ones bought from the market.
‘De qian de li, zhi fang zhi di (making money and profit, adding house and land) 
was a local saying in the study area in old times, when most of people’s spare money went 
to building houses or buying land. Since land is not purchasable under the current system, 
villagers began to renovate their houses with great enthusiasm as soon as they had some 
savings after the reform. Over the last two decades, the study area has witnessed two 
building booms. The first was in the mid-1980s when many of the old plastered mud 
houses were tom down and replaced by brick masonry structures. The second was since 
the mid-1990s when one- and two-storey reinforced concrete structures became popular. 
In the newly planned resident quarter of Nanshangzhao, most houses are two-storey 
concrete structures. Along both sides of the village lanes there were piles of construction 
materials, such as cement floorslabs, bricks and tiles, suggesting that those who had not 
yet rebuilt intended to do so soon. Particularly striking was the new focus on home 
ornamentation. Houses built in the mid-1980s were large and functional, while those built 
in the mid-1990s displayed personal taste. Many houses were decorated with fancy tile 
outwork or mosaic, such as tiles of flowers and Chinese characters adorning the entrance. 
After electricity was connected in the late 1970s, a running water system was completed in 
the late 1980s with the village’s own welfare fund. In recent years, the local government 
has launched a double-renovation program to popularise energy-saving cooking stoves
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and hygienic toilets. In housing conditions, people in the study area were not much worse 
off than city dwellers.
Twenty years ago, the so-called three big items of watch, radio and bicycle were 
the most admired household appliances in rural China. Now, the three big items have 
changed to TV set, washing machine and refrigerator. In the study area, the three old big 
items could be found in almost every family, so that it became no longer meaningful to use 
them as indicators of a family’s possessions. On the other hand, washing machines and 
refrigerators are still not widely used. In the household survey, only ownership of a TV set 
was used to measure the family’s living condition. Of the 284 households interviewed, 62 
per cent had a TV set: 12.1 per cent colour, and 47.9 per cent black and white. For young 
couples preparing for marriage, a TV set was an essential item on their shopping list. 
Another striking change was people’s style of beds. In most old houses people still slept 
on the Kang, a traditional brick bed. In most new houses, in contrast, the Kang was 
replaced by wooden beds, or even comfortable mattresses.
4.3.2. Economic well-being of the elderly in relation to younger generations
Compared with the commune period, old people’s economic well-being greatly 
improved after the reform. However, this does not necessarily mean that old people 
enjoyed exactly the same level of well-being as other segments of the population. In the 
study area, as suggested by both quantitative and qualitative information, the economic 
well-being of the elderly was somewhat lower than that of younger generations in the 
community or at home.
Based on the household survey data, Table 4.1 shows a comparison of households 
in three forms of living arrangements of the elderly: elderly-only households, households 
with at least one co-resident elderly member aged 60 and over, and households with no 
co-resident elderly. The living standard panel is divided into four categories according to 
the family’s level of per capita monthly income: poor, average, well-to-do and wealthy. At
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the present stage, most families in the study neither had a regular source of monetary 
income nor kept a strict household account. The respondents were only asked to choose a 
category that most suited their own situation. The income range of each category served 
as a rough benchmark. For example, the average level was set at the range 50-99 Yuan, 
because the official figure of Pingling Township was about 85 Yuan in 1995. Obviously, 
the household living standard here is used only as an approximate indicator of the elderly’s 
economic well-being, because it cannot clearly explain how old people are treated within 
the family.
In the study area, as shown in the survey results, old people were more likely to 
live in a poor or average household. While the elderly only group accounted for 9.8 per 
cent of the total households interviewed, it made up 40 per cent of all poor households. 
Nearly one third of the elderly-only group fell into the poor category, and none was 
classified as wealthy. The households with co-resident elderly were better off. Although 
the majority (71.1 per cent) believed that their living standard was at the average level, 
24.8 per cent considered themselves as well-to-do or wealthy. The proportion of 
households classified as poor was the lowest (4.1 per cent) among the three groups. 
Households with no co-resident elderly tended to enjoy a higher living standard, judged by 
the level of per capita monthly income. They had the lowest proportion in the average 
category (63.0 per cent) and the highest proportion in both the well-to-do (23.0 per cent) 
and wealthy (8.9 per cent) categories. However, their proportion in the poor category (5.2 
per cent) was slightly higher than that of the co-residence group. A close check-up of the 
survey results suggested that it might be partially attributable to the number of dependent 
children. Of the seven poor families in the young-adult-only group, two had four children 
and one had three.
Data in the other two panels in Table 4.1 also show a similar pattern. Judging by 
their housing conditions, the elderly-only group had the lowest proportion (17.9 per cent) 
living in concrete houses, and the highest (82.1 per cent) in houses built of other materials, 
including mud and burnt bricks. In comparison, over half of the young-adult-only group
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and over one third of the co-residence group were in the concrete category. The majority 
of the elderly-only group (89.3 per cent) did not possess a TV set at home. In the other 
two groups, families with no TV accounted for only about a third, 34.7 per cent in the co­
residence group and 30.4 per cent in the young-adult-only group. The comparison is 
particularly striking in the colour TV category. While colour TV was found in one fifth of 
the young adult only households, there was none in the elderly-only households.
Table 4. 2: Distribution of households by living arrangements and selected 
indicators of economic well-being, Pingling, 1996______________________
Item Elderly only Co-residence Young adult only
% No. % No. % No.
A. Living standard (per head monthly income in Yuan) 
Poor (<50) 28.6 8 4.1 5 5.2 7
Average (50-99) 67.9 19 71.1 86 63.0 85
Well-to-do (100-199) 3.6 1 20.7 25 23.0 31
Wealthy (200+) 0.0 0 4.1 5 8.9 12
B. Housing quality
Concrete structures 17.9 5 35.5 43 52.6 71
Others 82.1 23 64.5 78 47.4 64
C. Possession of TV sets 
Colour TV 0.0 0 9.9 12 20.7 28
Black-white TV 10.7 3 55.4 63 48.9 66
No TV 89.3 25 34.7 42 30.4 41
Total 100.0 28 100.0 121 100.0 135
Source: Household survey data.
The comparison based on the indicators displayed in Table 4.1 provides only a 
general pattern of the economic well-being of people living in various arrangements. Here 
attention should be paid to the difference between the living standard judged by income 
level and that by housing condition and TV possession. While income level reflects largely 
the family’s current situation at the time of the survey, the other two indicators also 
involve the family’s accumulated assets. In the study area, the new houses where young 
couples lived were not necessarily built by their own resources. In many cases, parents and 
other relatives also made contributions in money, materials or labour. According to an old 
tradition in the Guangzhong plain, parents had two major responsibilities for each male 
successor: to arrange a marriage and build a house. The adult sons had likewise two major
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responsibilities: to support parents in old age and arrange the funeral when they die. In 
reality, however, few parents could afford to build each son a house single-handed. If the 
family could accumulate enough money when the boys were still young, it was natural to 
renovate the family house first. Otherwise, the family had to pool all their resources and 
built a house for the son who first got married and moved out to form his own family. 
Quite often, the elderly parents continued to live in the old house with other unmarried 
children. The possession of a TV set told a similar story. After their basic necessities were 
met, people also increased their interest in a more colourful social and cultural life. For 
young people in the study area, a TV set was not only a symbol of status, but also an 
indispensable part of daily life. A TV set was high on their shopping list when money was 
available15. For the newly wed couples, it was almost an embarrassment if there was not a 
TV set in their dowries. As a result, people of the young-adult-only group were more 
likely to live in new houses and possess a TV set.
In the co-residence households, there are also evident differences in economic 
well-being between the elderly and the young. Generally speaking, the difference in food 
was minimal. What varied markedly was clothing and articles of daily use. Old people 
commonly wore old-style, home-made clothes in dark colours, while young people wore 
mostly modem, ready-made clothes. The clothes of young girls and children were 
especially colourful. Home-made shoes were still popular among the elderly, but no longer 
wanted by young people who preferred to buy shoes at the market. An interesting 
comparison is the furniture used in the household. While rooms of elderly couples were 
simple and only had a few pieces of old furniture, those of young people were usually 
filled with fashionable beds, desks and wardrobes, and decorated with novel ornaments. 
Obviously, the quality of life was slightly different for the two generations, even within the 
same family. From my observation, old people seemed to have very few extra material 
needs of their own. Apart from some small items like tea and cigarettes, the most cash the 
family spent for old people was on health care and medicine. Comparably, the elderly 
believed that young people and children spent a lot more.
13 The sharp drop in TV prices in recent years was another contributing factor.
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Participant 1: Young people nowadays are really big spenders. They like whatever 
they set eyes on.
Participant 2: That’s because more and more are available. Before there was little 
you could buy even if you had money.
Participant 3: Who cares if the young spend what they have earned themselves!
Participant 4: Kids don’t make money, but they cost even more.
Participant 5: Kids now are not like before. They are more expensive.
Participant 1: It is OK to spend money on kids. But I think young people should be 
more budget-conscious. You may need money tomorrow. Who knows? (Focus 
discussion group, elderly males)
Certainly, the differences in quality of life among family members cannot be 
explained simply as differences in treatment. Sometimes, they were caused by differences 
in attitude and habits. Old people in the study area seemed quite satisfied with their current 
situation, as described by an old saying ‘zhi zu chang le (A contented mind is a perpetual 
feast). As Nayar (1996) observed, past experience and expectations for future seem to be 
important ingredients in being satisfied with present life among old people. Asked about 
their personal experience, old people loved to make comparisons between now and the 
past, rather than between themselves and the young. Most frequently mentioned was the 
hard life during the ‘period of severe natural disasters’ from 1959 to 1961. For old people, 
being content and humble was considered a virtue, compared to excessive pleasure­
seeking. Although many old people lived frugally themselves, few openly complained of 
the life style that young people admired. Actually, they were happy to see that younger 
generations were enjoying a better life than they had. Their only concern was that money 
was spent on reasonable purposes and in a planned way.
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4.4. Social status of the elderly
As mentioned above, the status of the elderly was high in the traditional Chinese 
society. Economically, this was attributable to the resources and knowledge old people 
controlled in a highly developed intensive agriculture. In reality, the economic well-being 
of the elderly was not necessarily different from others because of the widespread poverty, 
famine and war that long prevailed in rural China. However, it was believed that the social 
status of the elderly was relatively high, because of the existence of a patriarchal, 
patrilineal, and patrilocal family system and the filial piety-centred social norms of 
Confucianism (Baker, 1979). For example, elderly household heads or parents were the 
major decision makers in the management of the household economy, division or 
inheritance of family properties, and children’s marriage and careers.
In previous literature there are few well established indicators to assess the social 
status of the elderly, particularly in developing countries. Also, the difference between the 
status of the elderly \w the family and that in the community has not been sufficiently 
addressed, although the two are usually interrelated. Rudkin (1992) proposed four major 
indicators based on her study in Java: respect for the elderly, importance of consulting the 
elderly, community organisation membership, and giving advice regarding marriage. These 
indicators have been reframed for collecting relevant information in this study. In the 
household survey of this study, two questions were related to the elderly’s social status: 
household head status and the role in major decision-making process in the family. The 
questionnaire used in the household survey in this study, as discussed in Chapter 2, is 
relatively simple and concise. A major handicap of using survey data to examine the social 
status of the elderly in the study area is the difficulty to understand the attitudes and 
experience of both older and younger generations. Information collected through 
qualitative techniques in Nanshangzhao Village is discussed in this section to show more 
insight into the social status issue from the changes in parents’ role in children’s marriage 
arrangements.
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4.4.1. Household headship among the elderly and their influence in decision-making
Obviously, being considered as a household head is closely related to the person’s 
status in the family. In traditional rural China, as Baker (1979) concluded, the household 
head was usually the oldest male in the family who controlled the household’s resources 
and major decision making. The head had a great deal of power over other members of the 
household. In him was vested all the family property, and he alone could dispose of it. 
There were also a series of political, social, economic and religious responsibilities 
household heads had to perform in the community. In contemporary China, however, 
household headship is not necessarily decided by a person’s sex or seniority under the 
more institutionalised household registration system. For the person registered as the head 
in a household, there are no strict requirements at present. It depends primarily on the 
family’s own choice. In most circumstances, a household head is the major bread-winner, 
the major decision-maker, or the major person that can be contacted publicly in the family. 
However, it is possible that, in some cases, a person was only nominally recorded as the 
head, regardless of his actual status at home. In the household survey of this study, a 
household head refers to the person so registered on the household registration card.
Of 284 households interviewed in Pingling Township, as displayed in Table 4.3, 
the majority (80.3 per cent) were headed by persons under 60 years of age. Those headed 
by old people over 60 accounted for about one fifth. Compared with their share of 25.4 
per cent in the total adult population aged 18 and over in the households surveyed, the 
headship rate of the elderly (21.9 per cent) was lower by about three percentage points. 
Evidently, the traditional pattern that only old people could qualify for household head 
status has shifted in favour of younger family members. Household heads were still 
predominantly male, 82.9 per cent among young adults and 83.9 among the aged. 
However, the fact that a sizeable proportion of women (16.9 per cent) were registered as 
household heads indicates an improvement of women’s status in the family, particularly 
among the younger generation.
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Table 4. 3: Distribution of household head, by sex and age group, 
Pingling, 1996___________________________________________
Age group Sex
Male Female All
% No. % No. % No.
18-59 80.1 189 81.3 39 80.3 228
60+ 19.9 47 18.7 9 19.7 56
Total 100.0 236 100.0 48 100.0 284
Source: Household survey data.
The criterion for households selected for this study was whether the family had any 
living old parents or relatives, not necessarily co-resident. Of the 284 households 
surveyed, 149 households had at least one co-resident elderly person. Obviously, it is 
somewhat misleading to include families with no co-resident elderly person in the 
discussion of household head status of the elderly. If only the 149 households with co­
resident elderly persons are taken into account, as shown in Table 4.4, the proportion of 
households headed by old persons increased to 37.6 per cent. However, if the factor of 
household type is considered, a few more interesting patterns can be observed. The 
proportion of the elderly being household heads decreased as the number of generations in 
a family increased. Of the 26 one-generation households, 25 (96.2 per cent) were headed 
by old persons. Since these households were composed primarily of old single people or 
couples, it is natural that the household heads were the elderly themselves. Of the 13 two- 
generation households with elderly parents and their unmarried children, 61.5 per cent 
were headed by old people. Three-generation households were the most popular form of 
household structure in Table 4.4, accounting for over two thirds of the total. Commonly, 
elderly parents lived with a married son and his family. In this category, just 21.8 per cent 
were headed by old persons. It seems that adult children were more likely to become 
household heads after marriage. In the study area, a small number of households consisted 
of four generations. Of the nine households in this category, only one was headed by an 
old person. It is interesting to note that the proportion of elderly-headed households in the 
most popular three-generation households (21.8 per cent) was surprisingly close to that 
observed in all households surveyed (19.7 per cent). Therefore, it is plausible to conclude
118
that the status of the elderly within families was no longer as important as in old times, 
judging by their household head status.
The decision-making power of a person is associated with his status in the family. 
In the household survey, two questions examined old persons’ decision-making on major 
household activities of adult children: the question on purchase of durable household 
appliances, such as TV sets, radios or bicycles, addressed mainly consumption issues, and 
that on management of the household economy, such as farming on the family plot, 
focused mainly on production issues. Originally, there were two additional questions in 
this panel: on old people’s role in decisions about house building and marriage 
arrangement. In the pretest of the questionnaire, it was found that such activities were so 
infrequent that to keep them in the questionnaire could not guarantee any meaningful 
results. These two questions were later dropped from the household survey, and used 
mainly in the outline for focus-group discussions.
Table 4. 4: Distribution of household head, by age group and household type, in 
household with persons aged 60+, Pingling, 1996___________________________
Age group __________________________Household type_______________________
1-generation 2-generation 3-generation 4-generation All
% No. % No. % No. % No. % No.
18-59 3.8 1 38.5 5 78.2 79 88.9 8 62.4 93
60+ 96.2 25 61.5 8 21.8 22 11.1 1 37.6 56
Total 100.0 26 100.0 13 100.0 101 100.0 9 100.0 149
Source: Household survey data.
The information provided in Table 4.5 comes from the 101 three-generation 
households with at least one co-resident old person. Households in other categories were 
not included because of difficulties in making comparisons or small sample size. For 
example, there is no point in considering the one-generation households where almost all 
members were aged. As shown in Panel A, in households headed by old persons, major 
decisions were more likely to be made by elderly parents than by adult children. In about 
two thirds of households, elderly parents had a final say in purchasing household durables 
(68.2 per cent) and managing the household economy (63.6 per cent). In other third of
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households, adult children would make decisions. In contrast, an obvious role exchange 
can be observed in Panel B, when it comes to households with adult children as heads. In 
the majority of these households, the adult children made the final decision, 93.7 per cent 
in purchasing household durables and 94.9 per cent in managing the household economy. 
Old people remained influential only in a small proportion of households. Despite the 
relatively small sample size covered by Table 4.5, it reflects to some extent the pattern and 
trend of the elderly’s social status in the study area. Household headship can still be used 
as a rough indicator of the elderly’s status in the family. As long as old people remained 
household heads, they were more likely to maintain influence and power in decision­
making. However, adult children had already taken over the real power in a sizeable 
proportion of families of which the elderly were still registered as nominal heads. Once the 
household headship was formally passed to adult children, most of the elderly’s power in 
decision-making was gone. There was little difference between the elderly’s role in 
decisions concerning consumption matters and production matters.
Table 4. 5: Distribution of major decision-maker in three-generation 
households, by age of household heads and activity, Pingling, 1996_______
Activity ____________ Major decision-maker________
Elderly parents Adult children______ Total
% No. % No. % No.
A. Households with head aged 60+
Purchasing household durables 68.2 15 31.8 7 100.0 22
Managing household economy 63.6 14 36.4 8 100.0 22
B. Households with head aged under 60
Purchasing household durables 6.3 5 93.7 74 100.0 79
Managing household economy 5.1 4 94.9 75 100.0 79
Source: Household survey data.
This finding largely matches the conclusion made by CASS Population Centre in 
their 1987 survey (Tian, 1988) that only a small proportion (18.7 per cent) of the rural 
elderly had decisive power in economic matters of the family. In comparison, nearly half of 
the urban elderly (49.5 per cent) were still influential in making major decisions. The 
reason lies in the crucial urban-rural differences in the mode of production. In cities, wage
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earning was the norm, and the majority of the elderly were covered by pension programs. 
In rural areas, by contrast, income was generated mainly through manual labour. Ageing 
parents became less productive over time, so their power in the family declined, as shown 
through the transfer of headship to adult children.
4.4.2. Influence of the elderly in children’s marriage arrangements
As noted above, nowhere more than in traditional China has the high status of the 
elderly been institutionalised in the Confucian norm of filial piety. The Chinese character 
for filial piety, ‘xiao ’, is composed of two parts: the upper stands for ‘old’ and the lower 
for ‘son’ or ‘child’. This can be interpreted as children being subject to parents, or what 
children owe to their parents. Once they became adults, children were obliged to fulfil 
various duties of piety affiliated to them by tradition. Three fundamental duties were 
frequently mentioned: to give birth to a son to continue the family line between ancestors 
and descendants, to provide for the parents in their old age, and to show respect and 
obedience to the elderly parents. In Confucian classics filial piety is valued as the root of 
both virtue and morality. Respect for parents should be extended to all seniors: Mencius, 
an ancient scholar, taught that one should honour the aged relatives of other people as if 
they were one’s own. (Chao, 1983).
Because of its short history, as discussed in Chapter 3, Nanshangzhao is not a 
traditional single-lineage village where all the males are descended on their father’s side 
from a single common ancestor, but a village with people of several different origins and 
clans living together, mainly from the Lius, Chens and Zhangs. In the village there were 
neither the strong clan organisations nor the dominating clan heads frequently observed in 
single-lineage villages in rural China, so, the traditional institutions that reinforced 
Confucian values like filial piety were weak. The social norms that support the high status 
of the elderly were more usually observed by individuals under peer pressure.
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Generally, the traditional requirements for young people to respect the elderly 
were not as strictly observed in Nanshangzhao as in a single- lineage village. This was 
clearly reflected by the way young people addressed the elderly in the village. In Chinese 
society, there are strict rules for addressing people according to their status at home, their 
position in the society, the interpersonal relationship, and the context. In a single-lineage 
village where people are from the same clan, each person has a fixed position in the 
kinship system based on his age, sex, marriage status and seniority. People usually address 
each other by specific clan names corresponding to their positions and relationships. 
Because such kinship systems are very complicated, the Chinese have developed also a 
very complicated clan name system16. To address an old person by his personal name, 
instead of his clan name, is considered impolite and ill-mannered. For example, the village 
where I spent two years with my classmates from Xi’an in the early 1970s was a typical 
single-lineage village. All villagers belong to the same Yan clan17. For us as outsiders, it 
was strange to see a few teenagers being called as ‘uncle’ by people much older than they 
were. Also unthinkable for us, educated at school in the communist doctrine of the class 
struggle, was that an elderly landlord, an ‘enemy of the people’, was always addressed by 
young people in a respectful way. In Nanshangzhao, however, there were no such strict 
rules on using clan names, because most people were not directly related.
Most young people still considered it proper to address the elderly with the general 
terms of ‘uncle’ or ‘aunt’, no matter whether they were directly related or not. A 
particular man was usually called ‘uncle’ plus his personal name, or people were indirectly 
addressed by reference to their child’s name, such as ‘Daqiang’s father’ or ‘Daqiang’s 
mother’. However, some old people complained that it was not unusual to be called by 
young people directly by their personal names. In fact, old people were very sensitive to
16 For example, ‘uncle’ in English may be translated into at least nine sets of names: bofu (elderly 
brothers of ego’s father), shufu (younger brothers of ego’s father), jiufu (brothers of ego’s mother), gufu 
(brothers-in-law of ego’s father), yifu (brothers-in-law of ego’s mother), tangshu (paternal cousins of ego’s 
father), biaoshu (maternal cousins of ego’s father), tangjiu (paternal cousins of ego’s mother), biaojiu 
(maternal cousins of ego’s mother). In each set of these names, persons can be further identified according 
to their seniority by an additional prefix like da (first), er (second) or san (third).
17 Because I myself have the same surname, the villagers usually gave me special treatment as one of their 
relatives, different from my classmates
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the way they were addressed in public. Perhaps for careless young people there was 
nothing wrong in using personal names, but for the elderly in question it seemed 
disrespectful. ‘In old times, we dared not to be that free and blatant. The elderly would 
give us a good scolding. Now young ones don’t know how to behave sometimes. They 
watch TVs and movies, only to learn bad manners’, an old man grumbled. A young 
informant told me that he never called old persons as ‘uncle’ if they did not get along well 
with his parents. Nevertheless, I found that personal names were used more to address the 
young old than the old old, and to address old men than old women. Girls and young 
women never called old persons by their personal names.
‘Bu xiao you san, wu hou wei da ’ (Topping the three unfilial behaviours is the 
failure to provide the family with a descendant) is a traditional Chinese saying. No one 
could satisfy filial piety without marriage, the first step to having a child. Marriage was 
therefore considered first as a family matter, rather than a private matter confined only to 
the young man and woman involved. Being the major decision-makers in the family, the 
parents had absolute authority over their children’s marriage, when and to whom. 
Frequently, the person in question was not consulted, and might only be informed after the 
arrangement had been made. Many men did not even see their bride until the wedding was 
over. Given the emphasis on family importance, young people had little free choice, but 
had to pin their hopes on ‘fu  mu zhi ming, mei shuo zhi yan (the parents’ will and the 
match-maker’s skill). For the parents, to arrange marriage for children was justifiable and 
necessary as part of their responsibility to secure the overall benefits of the family. In the 
meantime, their own authority, power and interest as seniors were also at stake. For the 
children, on the other hand, the marriage was not always tied by affection or in their own 
interest, but by duty to the family and parents. Whether the marriage itself was happy or 
successful became an issue of less importance. Not surprisingly, many marriages ended in 
failure, despite the parents’ original good intentions.
After 1949, the government launched a series of mass campaigns to promote state 
socialist ideology, including the education programs of the new 1953 Marriage Law. As
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part of the emancipation of women movement, free-choice marriage was encouraged to 
replace arranged marriage which was deemed as feudal and oppressive. The Law ruled 
that marriage should be negotiated by the individuals concerned without any interference 
or obstruction from third parties, usually from parents. Although not designed to 
discriminate against older people in general, the Law demanded that they should relinquish 
interference in their children’s marriage, an important part of their authority and power 
over affairs within the domestic domain. With their power base at home gradually eroded, 
the status of the elderly also declined. As concluded by Croll (1981) from a number of 
case studies in the 1950s, parents frequently perceived the operation of free-choice 
marriage to be a direct attack on their authority. The young people’s initiative in the 
marriage negotiations was commonly interpreted as a direct expression of disobedience or 
rebellion. Experiences over the last few decades show, however, that the substitution of 
free-choice marriage for arranged marriage was not an easy task. In the revised 1980 
Marriage Law, the development of new marriage and family relations was still given top 
priority in the government’s social reform agenda.
In the focus-group discussions of this study, the question was raised how the 
participants’ marriage was negotiated: arranged by parents or initiated by themselves. Not 
surprisingly, almost all of the 13 elderly participants mentioned that their marriage was 
arranged. Here ‘almost’ means that the persons who made the arrangement were not 
necessarily the parents. One old man presumed that it was his grandfather’s idea, and 
another believed his uncle played the major role after his father died. In comparison, none 
of the 14 young participants thought their marriage should be described as arranged. 
Instead, 11 agreed that their marriages were made possible by ‘jieshao’ (introduction) 
through various persons: parents, relatives or friends, with their own consent. The other 
three, all young men, were glad to disclose that they dated their partners privately, before 
informing their parents for approval. It seems that young men in Nanshangzhao had more 
freedom in courting girls of their choice, or more courage to admit it in public.
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Participant 1: My marriage was arranged by my parents when I was just 15. When 
they made the decision, That’s it. ‘Ziyou lianai (free-choice marriage) was never 
heard of at that time.
Participant 2: Who of us sitting here did not have his marriage arranged by 
parents? Not to mention the period before the Liberation (1949), free-choice 
marriage was rare even during the commune period! There are not many now, 
either.
Participant 3: It depends. In our times nobody dared to disobey the words of 
parents. Now young people do not always listen to you. They won’t necessarily 
live under the same roof with the old after the marriage.
Participant 4: Free-choice marriage is what the (Communist) Party policy requires. 
However, it won’t do if the opinions of the parents are ignored. Young people are 
prone to be carried away by their whims. What can you do with a wrong person as 
the rice is cooked (when the damage is done)?
Participant 5: Much worse for a young girl to act on her own! Even though she 
could file for divorce later, were the man not right, the gossip never ends. It brings 
disgrace to her parents.
Participant 1: As the saying goes: bu ting laoren yan, chikui zai yanqian (if one 
does not listen to the words of the old, suffering is before his eyes). All that we old 
people want is to do children good, anyway (Focus discussion group, elderly 
males).
Most of the old persons participating in the focus-group discussion got married in 
the late 1940s or the early 1950s before numerous ideology-motivated campaigns that 
attacked the ‘feudalist and superstitious’ values of Confucianism, including programs to 
popularise the new Marriage Law. Understandably, their marriages were almost entirely 
arranged by their parents or other senior members of the family. Asked about their 
experience in negotiating marriage for their own children, most old people admitted that 
they have played a certain part in decision-making, but none believed that they could 
single-handedly arrange marriage for their children nowadays. It was interesting to find 
that, after the decades-long propaganda of the government, ‘baoban hunyin (arranged 
marriage) has become an embarrassing term of political incorrectness. When talking about 
betrothal and marriage, people in Nanshangzhao tended to use ‘introduced marriage’ 
rather than ‘arranged marriage’ in comparison to ‘free-choice marriage’. Apart from the
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political factor, there were two plausible reasons why arranged marriage was seldom 
mentioned nowadays. For old people, there were now few cases of arranged marriage in 
the original sense where they had the monopoly of control over the whole procedures. 
Young people, on the other hand, wanted to prove that they did enjoy a certain 
independence in choosing marriage partners, even when the marriage negotiation was 
initiated by parents.
It is evident that, in the study area, the influence of the parents on children’s 
marriage was declining, as shown in the gradual shift from the old-style arranged marriage 
to the government-promoted, new free-choice marriage. However, while fully arranged 
marriage had almost disappeared, complete free-choice marriage was still not very 
popular, either. Compared with these two extreme situations, most marriages observed fell 
somewhere in between, frequently described as ‘introduced marriage’ that combined 
features of both the old and new patterns. This intermediate marriage pattern of 
introduced marriage had two variations. In the First instance, the parents took it upon 
themselves to initiate the marriage negotiations, and the young people were only later 
introduced to each other. However, parents no longer had the monopoly, and the marriage 
agreement was concluded with the consent of the young persons involved. If the consent 
was not forthcoming, parents could hardly proceed with the negotiation even if the mate 
they found for their child was thought to be the most suitable one. In the second instance, 
the young people selected their marriage partner, only to ask their parents for approval 
when certain progress had been made privately. That the young people took the initiative 
did not necessarily mean that they had personal contact at the beginning. They might also 
be introduced informally to each other by friends, classmates and relatives. In rural China, 
marriage was still considered a major family matter. It was almost never heard of in the 
study area that a young couple got married without the minimum consent of their parents. 
Such behaviour was often dismissed as irresponsible and unacceptable. As I observed, 
influence of the parents was stronger in the first variation of introduced marriage, 
particularly when the young person in question was a girl. In the second variation, parental 
influence was markedly weakened.
126
During my stay in Nanshangzhao, it happened that the village head, Mr. Liu 
Qingming, was organising the wedding ceremony for his youngest son of 21. The 
bride was also from a village cadre family in a neighbouring village. The two young 
people knew each other when studying in the same high school, but had little 
personal contact before because they were in different classes. In fact, the marriage 
negotiation was initiated by their fathers. The two fathers got acquainted at 
township government meetings. Although both men had expressed privately their 
interest in becoming ‘qinjia’ (in-laws), they still asked their children about their 
opinions. ‘Arranged marriage won’t do nowadays, let alone for us village cadre 
families’, said Mr. Liu. After the two young people agreed, according to the local 
custom, the Liu family still asked a respectable elder from the clan as a go-between 
to offer the bride’s family a formal proposal (tiqin), together with gifts. Then the 
two young people, accompanied by their fathers, paid a formal visit to their future 
partner’s family to get ‘examined’ (xiangqin). After a simple engagement 
procedure, the preparation for the formal wedding ceremony began. The Liu family 
was responsible for providing the bridal room, furniture and all expenses of the 
wedding reception, the bride’s family for clothes and bedding. The wedding 
ceremony was held in Mr. Liu’s house on the Labour Day of 1 May 1996, a public 
holiday. Eight large round tables, piled with food and drinks, were arranged in the 
courtyard for the reception. Invited were township cadres, all male clan seniors in 
the village, and relatives of the both families. Surprisingly, in addition to the 
marriage certificate, also announced at the ceremony was an old-age support 
contract (shanyang laoren yiwu shu), signed by the young couple and their 
parents, and certified by the villagers’ committee. Although kowtow was long 
abolished, the young couple were asked to bow three times to their parents to 
show their gratitude. All elderly persons were offered repeatedly by the 
bridegroom and bride in turn wine and cigarettes as a gesture to show respect 
(Field-work note).
Obviously, Mr. Liu’s case fell into the first variation of the popular introduced 
marriage: parents initiated and concluded the marriage negotiation with the consent of 
children. Three factors in this particular case of stronger parental influence deserve further 
discussion. First, Mr. Liu was himself influential not only as a household head at home, but 
also as a village head in the community. His initiative to get related through children’s 
marriage to a likewise influential village cadre family might have been motivated by an 
intention to expand his own power base. Second, the young couple had much in common 
because of the similar family background. There might be no practical reasons to reject 
their parents’ suggestions. And third, the young man was to a certain extent still 
dependent on his father. Almost all expense for the marriage was paid by the family, and
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he had to live with his parents in the same house after marriage. This might dampen his 
willingness to disagree, if any.
4.5. Summary remarks
Obviously, studies on old-age security and support are not complete without an 
overall assessment of older people’s life, frequently referred to as the status of the elderly. 
In the modernisation theory, however, the status of the elderly is not always clearly 
defined. For example, according to the version which implies an inverse linear relationship, 
the status of the elderly is lower in the more industrialised society. Does it mean that their 
economic well-being or quality of life also deteriorates? According to the version of the 
theory which posits a curvilinear relationship, on the other hand, the status of the elderly 
has improved as a result of the introduction of state welfare programs in developed 
societies. Does it mean that the elderly still enjoy a high level of social esteem and respect? 
In this study, to avoid possible confusions, economic well-being is used to describe the 
economic aspect of older people’s overall situation, and social status the social aspect. So 
far, most arguments of the modernisation theory are based on observations in developed 
societies where societal transition has taken a relatively natural, gradual and complete 
course. Special caution is needed to compare or test the theory in a Third World setting 
like rural China, where the modernisation process has proven to be fast, turbulent and far 
from complete.
The status of the Chinese elderly was traditionally high. Theoretically, this was 
attributable to the resources and knowledge old people controlled in a highly developed 
intensive agriculture. In reality, the economic well-being of the elderly was not necessarily 
different from that of others because of the widespread poverty, famine and war that 
prevailed in China over hundreds of years. However, their social status at home and in 
community was consolidated by the extended family system and the filial piety-centred 
social norms of Confucianism.
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Since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, the government has imposed 
a series of ambitious social engineering programs according to the state socialist doctrine 
that drastically changed China’s social and economic structures. In rural China, no social 
experiment has been so bizarre and destructive as the commune system (1958-1982). 
During the last two decades of reform, rural regions were further exposed to an 
accelerated process of modernisation. As people who have experienced all these 
externally-induced changes, the present-day elderly generation in rural China ended up as 
a unique group in the population: they suffered from poverty, war and famine and were 
deprived of education in their youth before 1949, they had limited opportunities to amass 
sizeable assets at their prime ages during the commune era, and now when the economy 
has been liberalised under the household responsibility system for making profits and 
getting rich, they are too old to take advantage of the new rules.
It is widely acknowledged that in the studies of people’s status, a big problem is 
the lack of accurate historical comparisons and multi-dimensional indices to make any 
meaningful judgements about whether things are better or worse over time. This 
community-based study could not be spared from drawbacks due to data limitation. 
Information was gathered largely from the elderly’s recollections and self-assessments, as 
well as this author’s personal observation. In the study area it is evident that people’s 
living standard has greatly improved after the reform since the late 1970s. Old people as 
part of the population also witnessed marked progress in their own economic well-being, 
compared with that during the commune period. However, this does not automatically 
lead to the conclusion that old people enjoyed the same level of well-being and quality of 
life as the younger generations at home or in the community. Old people were more likely 
to live in households of lower income, in poor housing conditions, and with no TV sets. 
What is worth noting is that old people were generally satisfied and content with their 
present life.
The government’s campaigns against ‘feudalist and superstitious’ practices in rural 
China have greatly eroded the power and influence of old people at home and in the
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community, since they seemed to embody the traditional values. In the study area, only a 
small number of old people still played an active role in the family, as household heads or 
major decision-makers. The influence of elderly parents on children’s marriage 
arrangements was diminishing, shown by the popular ‘introduced’ marriage as a 
compromise between the traditional arranged marriage and the modem free-choice 
marriage. This resulted in the present-day elderly becoming the first generation in history 
to lose their monopoly in arranging marriages for their children. Among the elderly 
villagers, there was a common feeling that older persons are not as respected and 
influential as in the good old days.
Not surprisingly, findings from a community-based study like this one are far from 
sufficient to test any schools of the modernisation theory, particularly when they are 
abstracted from the unique experience of the present-day elderly. Nevertheless, a general 
trend was discernible in the study area: as the society becomes increasingly modernised, 
the importance of old people reduces. With inadequate economic security and declining 
status, the need of the present-day elderly for family support is understandably high.
130
CHAPTER 5
FAMILY SUPPORT FOR THE ELDERLY 
5.1. Defining family support
Generally speaking, the needs of old people are the same as those of the rest of the 
population, such as food, clothing, housing, transport and health care. However, as they 
become dependent after withdrawing from productive activities because of age and frailty, 
old people are often subject to special needs for support. Care and support of the elderly 
are of major concern in rural China where there are no formal means of support and few 
public care institutions. In general, the family remains the principal provider of old-age 
support. The term ‘family’ is defined here narrowly as a group of persons with common 
ancestry: parents and their offspring, for two obvious reasons. First, household structures 
are commonly found in China to be confined to such groups. According to the 1992 
survey on aged population, 95.1 per cent of all households in rural areas consisted of 
immediate family members only. Second, support given beyond the family is still limited. 
The same survey found that only 5.7 per cent of rural elderly were covered by pension 
programs (China Research Centre on Ageing, 1994). In this study, as noted in Chapter 1, 
the term ‘family support’ is preferred to ‘household support’, because non-resident family 
members also play a role in providing for the elderly.
Support provided for the elderly by family members can be roughly divided into 
three forms: economic, physical and emotional. Economic support includes monetary 
assistance, such as living allowances, remittances and pocket money, and material goods, 
such as food, clothing, medication and gifts. Physical support refers to the labour input in 
carrying out productive activities on and off the farm, maintaining the household, and 
nursing the elderly during illness or disability. Emotional support gives the elderly the 
feeling of being respected and cared for, and a sense of belonging within the household as 
well as the wider community. In this study, special emphasis is given to economic support 
for the elderly, although in reality the three forms of support are not mutually exclusive.
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For example, working on elderly parents’ contracted land plots can be seen not only as 
physical support, but also as a form of economic support through increased per unit yield. 
Additional remittances or small gifts to elderly parents on their birth day or at the Chinese 
New Year can be seen not only as material support, but also as a form of respect and 
affection from children, and thus a form of emotional support. Needless to say, caring for 
an old person during illness provides him or her with as much peace of mind as physical 
comfort. The most prominent aspect of family support and assistance in rural China is 
coresidence in which the elderly are supported in the form of shared housing, food and 
other necessities.
5.2. Living arrangements of the elderly
In both industrialised and developing countries, living arrangements of old people 
have become a major focus of research and received increasing policy attention. This is 
because the place in which the elderly live and the people with whom they live provide 
some indications of the amount of potential support available to the elderly. For example, 
elderly people living alone and without families will require their own financial resources, 
and extensive support if disabled. By contrast, coresidence with children even under 
circumstances of good health and economic independence of the elderly is viewed as a 
form of insurance against future uncertainties. This is particularly true in developing 
countries, as Martin (1988) observed that the majority of elderly Asians live in the same 
household as their offspring. Understandably, there are a number of benefits in 
coresidence, ranging from companionship and emotional support to the fulfilment of the 
physical and financial needs of parents and children. Adult children provide parents with 
financial support and physical care, while elderly parents offer help with childcare and 
housework. This is especially important when young women in the household work 
outside the home. Coresidence also economises on the cost of living. Parents and children 
can save money by living and eating together. Thus, ‘economies of scale’ and the ability to 
consume household ‘public goods’ provide an added incentive to coresidence (Lam, 
1983). In rural China, the elderly traditionally continued to live in the house they had
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occupied since early marriage and at least one child remained coresident. During much of 
the period of coresidence, an interdependent relationship developed with forms of support 
and assistance going in both directions between parents and children. Grandparents help in 
housework and caring for grandchildren, and adult children reciprocate by providing for 
the ageing parent’s material and health care needs. Only as the health and physical ability 
of the elderly deteriorate eventually with age, does the balance of services start to flow 
gradually from the younger to the older generation. Of course, coresidence also has its 
drawbacks, such as a loss of privacy, and the diminished control of the elderly over 
household resources after adult children take over the headship. Da Vanzo and Chan 
(1994) identified a series of factors that might affect seniors’ living arrangements. The 
number, ages, and gender composition of children available generally played a major role 
in decisions to coreside.
The discussion on living arrangements of the elderly in this study is primarily 
concerned with potential support from family members. Therefore, major attention is 
given to household structure, rather than to the probability of living with children, as 
observed in most living arrangement studies. Moreover, data collected from the small 
household survey do not allow detailed analysis. The term ‘potential’ should be stressed in 
the discussion here, because coresidence with children does not guarantee that old 
people’s needs will be adequately met, and living independently is not evidence that their 
needs are not being met. To determine who the potential supporters are, households from 
the survey are divided into four groups by the number of generations in the household: 
one-generation, two-generation, three-generation and four-generation households. One- 
generation households consist of old people who lived either alone or with spouses. Two- 
generation households consist of old people and their children, unmarried or married. 
Three-generation households consist of old people, their children and grandchildren. Four- 
generation households consist of old people, their children, grandchildren and great-grant- 
children. Obviously, the first two groups can also be classified as ‘nuclear household’, the 
last two as ‘stem household’. Apart from the one-generation households, the three other 
groups can all be generalised as coresident households.
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Table 5.1: Percentage distribution of old persons, by sex and household 
structure, Pingling, 1996_______________________________________
Household Males Females All
structure % No. % No, % No.
One-generation 22.2 22 16.5 19 19.2 41
Two-generation 11.1 11 8.7 10 9.8 21
Three-generation 63.6 63 70.4 81 67.3 144
Four-generation 30.0 3 4.3 5 3.7 8
Total 100.0 99 100.0 115 100.0 214
Source: Household survey data
Table 5.1 shows the percentage of old people in the study area living in the four 
household categories. Significant proportions (80.8 per cent) of the elderly resided with 
their offspring in the three forms of coresidence. About two-thirds of them were found in 
three-generation households. Overall, there was a slight tendency for elderly females 
rather than males to live with their children. In comparison, about one fifth of the elderly 
were living in one-generation households, alone or with a spouse.
Table 5.2: Percentage distribution of old persons, by sex and coresident family 
members, Pingling, 1996_____________________________________________
Coresident Males Females All
family member % No. % No. % No.
Alone 2.0 2 2.6 3 2.3 5
Spouse only 20.2 20 13.9 16 16.8 36
Spouse and/or 
unmarried children
8.1 8 5.2 6 6.5 14
Spouse and/or 
a married son
54.5 54 65.2 75 60.3 129
Spouse and/or 
a married daughter
11.1 11 9.6 11 10.3 22
Spouse and/or 
others
4.0 4 3.5 4 3.7 8
Total 100.0 99 100.0 115 100.0 214
Source: Household survey data
A further look into the data reveals, as shown in Table 5.2, that among the old 
people in one-generation households, five were living alone and others were with a 
spouse. Old persons living by themselves deserve special attention, because their daily
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needs may not be sufficiently met in the prevailing familial system of old-age support. The 
dominant form of living arrangements of the elderly was coresidence with a married son. 
As Mason (1991) observed, there is a distinct and, in some cases, a relatively inflexible 
preference among the elderly in many East Asian societies to coreside with one or more 
adult sons. The survey result indicates that, in the study area, the influence of traditional 
norms was still strong. However, in none of the households did two or more married 
siblings coreside with their parents under one roof. It seems that the stem-joint household, 
a form typically observed in wealthy households in traditional China, has almost 
disappeared in modem times. This reflects the trend for Chinese families to become 
increasing small and nuclearised18. Unlike some other East Asian countries like Japan and 
Korea, it is not a common practice in China for the eldest son to remain at home, inherit 
family property, and provide for the elderly parents. With whom the parents are to 
coreside is often influenced by a number of factors. In the study area, parents were more 
likely to coreside with the youngest son. Of the 129 old persons coresiding with a married 
son, over half (56.6 per cent) chose to live with the youngest son, twice the proportion 
living with the eldest (24.8 per cent). Here attention should be paid to the fact that some 
persons in the eldest son group were single sons in the family. For the parents, to live with 
them is the only choice, if not living alone or with a daughter. Once families with two or 
more sons were considered, the proportion of old people coresiding with the youngest 
sons increased to 61.8 per cent.
As discussed in Chapter 3, land, the major element of production in rural China, is 
still community owned. Even under the household responsibility system, farmland was 
only allocated to families on a per capita basis. As I found out from personal interviews, 
economic factors, such as inheritance of family properties, only played a limited role in 
parents’ decision to coreside. Most commonly, the child who coresides with the parents at 
the end of their life span has remained in the parental home most of the time since 
childhood. Thus, although many parents start out their elderly years with several children
18 The 1992 survey on aged population found that only 1.1 per cent of rural elderly lived with two or more 
married children in one household (China Research Centre on Ageing, 1994).
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coresident, over time children get married and move out one by one until typically the 
youngest is left. Sometimes, the choice was more likely be influenced by parents’ personal 
affection.
Participant 1: There are no rules with which son parents coreside. Parents usually 
live with the one they feel most worried about.
Participant 2: Economic conditions never count. The elderly are willing to live on 
chaff with the family they choose (Focus discussion group, young males).
Traditionally, the youngest child in the family always enjoyed partiality from 
parents. If the youngest child was a boy, he would continue to live at home after his 
marriage. There are also some practical reasons for parents staying with the youngest 
sons. For example, the youngest are more likely to need parental help, because they are 
not as well established as their elder siblings. Since the youngest sons in the family have 
received special treatment from their parents, they are expected to bear the major 
responsibility in caring for them in old age, often with financial assistance from other non­
coresident siblings.
Mr. Liu Jianhai, my host in Nanshangzhao, is the youngest one of three brothers in 
his family. He moved to a new house after marriage, while his parents live with his 
second elder bother. Mr. Liu’s brother is good in farming and manages 24 Mu of 
land, half of which is sub-contracted from fellow villagers. He needs more help at 
home because he has four children, three daughters and one son. Mr. Liu feels 
embarrassed for not living with his parents. ‘People are gossiping’, he said. Mr. 
Liu’s wife, married into the family from a neighbouring village, is under even 
greater pressure. She has to visit her parents-in-law more frequently to prove that 
she is not an unfilial daughter-in-law. Traditionally, the relationship between 
mothers and daughters-in-law in the village is problematic, often resulting in family 
disputes. It is especially difficult for young women from outside to gather 
sympathy and understanding from fellow-villagers (Fieldwork notes).
In the study area, as illustrated in Table 5.2, only a small proportion of old people, 
about 10 per cent, coresided with a married daughter. For the 14 old persons who had no 
sons, it was naturally the only choice of coresidence. However, there were still eight old 
persons who chose to live with their daughter’s family, although they also had male
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offspring. This indicates that the traditional pattern of coresidence has started to change, 
or at least, become flexible. It is interesting to find that, unlike the dominant role of the 
youngest sons in parents’ choice of coresidence with sons, the eldest daughters were 
preferred if parents indeed wanted to live with daughters. Of the 22 old persons, 14 were 
living with the eldest daughter in the family. A plausible explanation is that parents wanted 
the eldest daughter to marry and remain at home, so that the married-in son-in-law could 
help as an additional labour hand when other children were still young.
In the study area, there was a variation of the regular coresidence, in which the 
elderly lived with each of their surviving children in turn. The old persons concerned were 
mostly widowed, and their children lived close to each other, say, in the same village. 
Although this kind of living arrangement was not very popular, being practised by only 
three out of the 284 old persons surveyed, it provided a chance for adult children to share 
the responsibility fairly evenly. Actually, it was a simple compromise among quarrelling 
siblings, not necessarily a desired form of support by the elderly. Old people might face 
unexpected difficulty or inconvenience in readjusting to the new environment while 
moving from one family to another. The old persons I visited in Nanshangzhao only 
considered the by-turns arrangement the last option, if they could no longer take care of 
themselves. T don’t like to see my daughter-in-law putting on a long face, as if I owe them 
something’, said an old woman.
Table 5.3: Percentage distribution of old persons, by age group and 
selected form of living arrangements, Pingling, 1996______________
Living arrangements Age group All
60-64 65-69 70-74 75+ % No.
One-generation household 26.6 26.0 14.0 6.5 19.1 41
Coresident household 73.4 74.0 86.0 93.5 80.9 173
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
No. 64 54 50 46 214
Source: Household survey data
As displayed in Table 5.3, the proportion of old people living in one-generation 
households decreased with age. While over one-fourth of the elderly in the group 60-64
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lived alone (single or with a spouse), in the group 75 and over the proportion dropped to 
about one in twenty. It is understandable that, even when financial resources are available, 
it is still difficult for the ‘old old’ to live independently by themselves. Old people become 
too frail at advanced ages to perform daily activities. In the meantime, the widowhood rate 
among the old old also rises sharply. As discussed in Chapter 4, the proportion widowed 
among the old people surveyed in this study increased from 18.7 per cent to 58.7 per cent 
(Table 4.1). Even if old couples can look after each other in independent living, it becomes 
no longer possible for the survivor after the spouse has died. Martin (1990) suggested that 
family living arrangements are constantly changing as family members experience different 
events. Coresidence with children may be delayed until the older parents are widowed or 
sick. In the study area, the proportion of old people living alone was quite small. From 
personal interviews I got the impression that this form of living arrangement was not 
necessarily the old people’s own free choice, but rather an unwanted reality they had to 
accept reluctantly. The reasons for the elderly to choose independent living in Western 
countries, such as privacy and individualism, are not familiar to the present-day elderly in 
rural China. Elderly parents were left in the old house simply because all children moved 
out after marriage. This does not mean that the elderly were abandoned, since 
arrangements were usually agreed upon by children to share financial and physical support. 
For old people who were still healthy enough to look after themselves, the big loss might 
be the happiness of living in a ‘normal’ large family. It is interesting to find a striking 
contrast from my experience both in the study area and in Australia. While old people in 
Australia are usually very proud of living independently, the few elderly I visited during 
my fieldwork were quite upset at having to live by themselves. It seems that living 
arrangements also have different emotional and psychological meanings to people of 
different generations and from different cultural backgrounds.
5.3. The availability of family members
Family support of the elderly, in its very sense, is provided by family members. 
Therefore, the availability of family members, particularly children, is a major factor
138
influencing the extent to which the support is provided. Understandably, those old people 
who do not marry, those who divorce or are widowed and those who have no living 
children are especially vulnerable. In this section, the discussion focuses on the two 
aspects of the availability of family members: the demographic availability in terms of the 
widowhood rate and the total number of living children, and the geographic availability in 
terms of the residence distance and contact frequency between elderly parents and adult 
children. To a certain extent, the type of living arrangements can also be considered as an 
indicator of the geographic availability of family members. For example, coresidence 
means that at least an adult child is always available at home.
5.3.1. The availability of a spouse
It is understandable that, in most studies on family support of the elderly, attention 
is focused mainly on the support provided by family members of younger generations. 
However, mutual support and care by elderly spouses also play an essential part in 
preserving the overall well-being of the elderly, particularly when the couple lives by 
themselves. Old men, usually in a better financial position, play the role of resource 
providers, and old women, often a few years younger, the role of caregivers. And not the 
least, love and companionship between the old couple is not something that can easily be 
replaced by other family members. For example, when people get old in China, they 
commonly refer to their spouse affectionately as laobanr (my old companion).
Traditionally, the economic security of an old man in rural China might rest on the 
ownership and control of family property, whereas that of an old woman depended 
entirely on the provision of her husband or children. Although great efforts have been 
made by the government over the last few decades to promote gender equality, the status 
of women, especially old women, is still relatively low at home and in the community. 
Very few old women in rural areas have control over family resources. As shown from the 
household survey in the study area, only nine of the 56 elderly household heads were old 
women (Table 4.3). None of the old women I visited in Nanshangzhao agreed that they
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had a final say in family decisions. However, it is relatively easiy for them to influence the 
outcome when their husbands are in control. ‘Sons just listen to their own wives’, 
complained an old informant. On the other hand, old women provided most of the physical 
support and care for their elderly husbands, such as cooking, washing and housework. 
Even in multigeneration households, old women did more in caring for old men than all 
other family members.
Table 5.4: Percentage distribution of old persons living with their spouse, by age 
group and sex Pingling, 1996____________________________________________
Sex Age group Total
60-64 65-69 70-74 75+ % No.
Males 82.9 66.7 90.0 52.9 74.7 74
Females 79.3 59.3 46.7 24.1 52.2 60
All 81.3 63.0 64.0 34.8 62.6 134
Source: Household survey data
Table 5.4 shows that in the study area more males than females lived with their 
spouse, and the proportion decreases with age. Females were less likely to reside with 
their spouse, reflecting a greater incidence of widows, particularly in the oldest group of 
75 years and above. The proportion of old women living with their spouse declines more 
rapidly with age than for old men. For example, 79 per cent of women aged between 60 
and 64 lived with their spouse; this figure falls to 24 per cent for those aged over 75. The 
equivalent decrease for old men is relatively moderate, from 83 to 53 per cent. As in most 
Third World settings, the high widowhood rate among old women in rural China has three 
plausible reasons: the higher life expectancy of women, the tendency for men to marry 
younger women, and the traditional intolerance of the remarriage of old women.
Under the current circumstances in the study area, the level of financial and 
material support provided by the family is not necessarily related to old people’s marital 
status. However, the availability of a spouse did have an important effect on the overall 
well-being of the elderly, particularly in meeting their special needs in physical and 
emotional support. It seems that old men were more likely to have a spouse providing
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such support. In comparison, most old women would depend on other family members, 
mainly their children, for support in finance, materials, daily activities and companionship. 
As a by-product of the rising life expectancy, it can be expected that the joint survival of 
elderly spouses will increase in future. Although the financial implication of such a 
development is still not clear, the mutual support and care by the elderly themselves will 
certainly ease their dependence on other family members.
5.3.2. The availability of children
In the discussion of family support for the elderly, the most significant 
demographic availability of family members is perhaps the availability of children. Old-age 
security has been widely believed to be one of the important motives for high fertility in 
developing countries (Nugent, 1985). Many arguments that fertility decline will erode the 
family’s role in providing for the elderly are based on the assumption that the likelihood 
and extent of family support are associated with the number of living children. As for the 
present-day elderly in developing countries, being supported by children does not seem to 
be a problem, since most of them have a large number of children bom during a period 
when fertility was high and deliberate control of family size was rare. For example, Chen 
and Jones (1989) found in ASEAN countries that only very low proportions of persons 
aged 60 and over, even those aged 75 and over, had no surviving child. Knodel, Chayovan 
and Siriboon (1992) found from the 1986 SEC APT survey that the likelihood of receiving 
support from children, as well as the average number providing support, increased with 
family size. Nevertheless, the relationship between family size and the extent of support 
was not obvious. On the bases of their findings in China, Xia and Ma (1994) questioned 
the validity of the widely accepted view that the function of family support for the elderly 
would be weakened as the number of children declined. They argued that first, family 
support was not the same thing as children support, and concern should also be given to 
the relations between the elderly and their spouses; second, there were many factors 
affecting the possibility for children to grow up from potential supporters into actual ones; 
third, family support was a multi-sided concept, including economic support, daily life care
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and emotional relief, and the number of children was diversely related to these functions. 
In this section, however, the discussion is based on the assumption that all living children 
are ‘potential’ supporters.
Table 5.5: Distribution of old persons and married adult household 
heads, by age group and number of living children, Pingling, 1996
Age group No. of No. of children Mean
persons 0 1 2 3 4 5+
60+ 214 2 12 19 18 38 125 4.8
40-59 90 0 9 45 27 6 3 2.4
19-39 132 4 52 60 15 1 0 1.7
Total 436 6 73 124 60 45 128 3.0
Source: Household survey data
In Table 5.5 the people covered in the household survey are divided into three age 
groups: all old persons aged 60 and over, middle-aged household heads aged 40-59, and 
young household heads aged 19-39. At the time of the survey, over half of the 214 old 
people had five or more children, and only two remained childless. The highest number of 
children was eight. On average, old people in the study area had 4.8 children. That the 
present-day elderly have a large number of children represents a typical pre-fertility decline 
situation in rural China before the 1970s. In fact, it is likely that they have more living 
children than did any earlier generations, since mortality dropped sharply while fertility 
remained high during the period 1950-1970. In old times people might have similarly high 
fertility, but would end up with fewer living children in old age because of the prevailing 
high mortality. Thus, the vast majority of the elderly had at least one adult child potentially 
available for support. Although data from the survey do not allow for detailed analysis on 
the relationship between the level of support the elderly actually received and the number 
of children they had, a large number of children would provide the elderly with more 
potential supporters or more choice for coresidence. If an elderly couple have only one 
son, they have to live with him, no matter what his personality or family finances are, if 
they do not opt for living alone.
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In comparison, as shown in Table 5.5, people of younger generations in the study
area had fewer children. In the middle-aged group of 40-59, for example, the average
number of children decreases by half to 2.4. The similar figure drops further to 1.7 in the 
young group of 19-39. The lower fertility of younger generations is largely attributable to 
the massive family planning programs introduced since the 1970s. However, the low level 
observed in the young group is not necessarily reliable, because people in this age group 
might not have completed their childbearing or achieved their desired family size. The
level of the middle-aged group looks quite reasonable, slightly above the replacement
level.
Children’s role as potential supporters not only depends on their number, but also 
on their geographical availability, that is, the frequency of contact with elderly parents. As 
Hugo (1988) argued, with rapid rates of urbanisation and age-selective rural-to-urban 
migration, there is a strong chance that the elderly will be physically separated from those 
family members who would provide for their support and care. As discussed above, over 
80 per cent of old people surveyed in the study area coresided with their children. Daily 
contact between family members is obviously not a major issue. Problems might arise for 
the few elderly who lived by themselves. A further look into the survey data reveals that 
all the 41 old persons living alone had surviving children, ranging from two to eight. The 
distance between the residence of old people and that of their children varied: 11 had at 
least one child living in the same village, 13 had one child in the same township, and two 
had one child in the same district. The remaining 15 old people had children living in other 
places. Just because family members do not live together, it should not be assumed that 
financial, practical and emotional support are no longer exchanged. The typical living 
arrangement of the elderly in Western countries, separate residences in close proximity to 
children, may also become a preferred option by some of the rural elderly in China.
In the discussion of kin availability, McDonald (1989) pointed out that there can 
be a fallacy involved in examining only the elderly. It is important also to take account of 
the middle-aged persons who have surviving parents. In the household survey of this
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study, additional information has been collected to examine young adults’ role in 
supporting non-resident parents. Of the 284 households surveyed, 132 were headed by
Table 5.6. Percentage distribution of non-resident old persons, by sex and 
selected indicators of geographical availability of children, Pingling, 1996
Item Males Females All
% No. % No. % No.
A. Residence distance
Same village 85.3 87 84.3 91 84.8 178
Same township 3.9 4 3.7 4 3.8 8
Same district 5.9 6 8.3 9 7.1 15
Others 4.9 5 3.7 4 4.3 9
B. Contact frequency
Almost daily 76.5 78 75.9 82 76.2 160
1-3 times per week 8.8 9 9.3 10 9.0 19
1-3 times per month 6.9 7 6.5 7 6.7 14
Others 6.3 8 7.0 9 8.1 17
Total 100.0 102 100.0 108 100.0 210
Source: Household survey data
adults under 60 who had elderly parents living separately, totalling 210. As shown in Panel 
A of Table 5.6, the majority of old people (84.8 per cent) lived with the respondents in the 
same village. Very few lived beyond the district boundary. Therefore, the contacts 
between young adults and their non-resident elderly parents were quite frequent, as 
illustrated in Panel B. Over three-quarters of the old persons maintained almost daily 
contact with their non-resident children. Another one-tenth met their children one to three 
times a week. There was a correlation between the distance and the number of visits. The 
farther the parents lived from their children, the fewer contacts between them. There is 
only a slight difference in being visited between old men and old women. However, 
detailed information shows that young women contacted their non-resident parents more 
frequently than young men. Among household heads who lived with their parents in the 
same village, all women reported that they visited the elderly almost daily, whereas only 
85.3 per cent of young men did so. Although economic support can be accomplished 
impersonally, such as through remittances, it is widely believed that physical and emotional 
support requires direct intergenerational contact. The frequent contact between elderly
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parents and their non-resident children suggested that the care needs of old people in the 
study area were largely being met.
5.4. Economic support received by the elderly
The potential for support discussed in the availability of family members may not 
translate automatically into real support. Questions were also raised in the household 
survey about the current economic support received by old people in the study area in 
terms of the form and the level of support. Economic support in the survey is defined as 
both monetary and material support received on a regular or an ad hoc basis. The former 
includes cash income from own labour, pension benefits, regular living allowances, 
remittances, and pocket money. The latter includes food, clothes, medication, and gifts 
such as tea and cigarettes. Assistance in farming and transport is also considered as part of 
material support, because it helps bring in material benefits or cut down financial costs.
5.4.1. Forms of economic support
In the household survey, six forms of economic support were identified: (1) Self 
support: referring to the elderly living on their own resources, such as income from own 
labour, pension benefits or personal savings. (2) Self and children: referring to the elderly 
living on the joint resources of themselves and children; (3) Mainly sons: referring to the 
elderly supported mainly by their sons; (4) Mainly daughters: referring to the elderly 
supported mainly by their daughters; (5) All children: referring to the elderly supported by 
their children jointly; and (6) Others: referring to the elderly supported by others, such as 
relatives, community or friends. In Table 5.7, the elderly are divided into four panels 
according to selected indicators: age group, sex, living arrangements and working status. 
It is worth noting that ‘still working’ in the working status panel is defined as full-time 
engagement in productive activities. ‘Retired’ refers to those elderly who have retired 
from formal sector jobs and receive benefits from various pension programs.
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Table 5.7: Percentage distribution of old persons, by form of economic support 
and selected indicators, Pingling, 1996_____________________________________
Item Form of economic support1 All No.
1 2 3 4 5 6
A. Age group
60-64 21.9 23.4 43.8 4.7 6.3 0.0 100.0 64
65-69 13.0 3.7 63.0 5.6 13.0 1.9 100.0 54
70-74 6.0 8.0 64.0 10.0 12.0 0.0 100.0 50
75+ 0.0 0.0 78.3 10.9 6.5 4.3 100.0 46
B. Sex
Male 14.1 15.2 51.5 8.1 9.1 2.0 100.0 99
Female 8.7 5.2 68.7 7.0 9.6 0.9 100.0 115
C. Living arrangements
Alone 20.0 20.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 5
With spouse only 33.3 8.3 36.1 0.0 22.2 0.0 100.0 36
With spouse and/or 7.1 57.2 35.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 14
unmarried children 
With spouse and/or a 4.7 6.2 83.7 0.0 5.4 0.0 100.0 129
married son
With spouse and/or a 0.0 4.6 0.0 72.7 22.7 0.0 100.0 22
married daughter 
With others 50.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 37.5 100.0 8
D. Working status
Still working 57.8 24.4 8.9 0.0 8.9 0.0 100.0 45
Retired 23.1 38.5 23.1 7.7 7.7 0.0 100.0 13
No longer working 2.7 2.0 73.2 10.1 10.1 2.0 100.0 149
Not sure 0.0 28.6 71.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 7
All 11.2 9.8 60.7 7.5 9.3 1.4 100.0
No. 24 21 130 16 20 3 214
Source: Household survey data
aNote: l=Self support; 2=Self and children; 3=Mainly sons; 4==Mainly daughters; 
5==A11 children; 6=Others.
As shown in Table 5.7, over three quarters (77.5 per cent) of old people surveyed 
in the study area were supported by adult children in one form or another. Sons were the 
principal providers, with nearly two thirds of old people (60.7 per cent) receiving 
economic assistance mainly from their sons. Still, a sizeable proportion of old persons 
(21.0 per cent) relied on their own resources, or were partially assisted by children, for a 
living. However, their number decreased with age. In the group aged 75 and above, the
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elderly were entirely provided for by children or other relatives. When the elderly’s sex is 
taken into account, women were more likely than men to be supported by sons. In the self 
support and/or children assistance categories men outnumbered women by half, not 
surprisingly, because old men tend to keep working on the farm as long as health permits, 
while old women usually stay at home doing housework. Sons not only played a dominant 
role in support when coresiding with elderly parents, but also made major contributions to 
parents living in other arrangements, such as alone, with spouse only, or with unmarried 
children.
As Andrews and Hennink (1992) pointed out, one aspect of ageing which is often 
overlooked in many studies is the contribution the elderly make to the household 
economy, household tasks, care-giving and other daily activities. Among the 214 old 
people surveyed in the study area, as shown in Table 5.7, 45 were still engaged in full-time 
productive activities. Consequently, over 80 per cent of the working elderly were able to 
support themselves economically, assisted occasionally by children. In comparison, over 
90 per cent of the elderly no longer working relied primarily on children for support. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that these old people have stopped working 
altogether, just eating the bread of idleness at home. On the contrary, most old people I 
visited still kept themselves busy with various activities on and off the farm. As in most 
Third World settings, retirement entirely from work at the specific age of 60 is simply 
inconceivable for most old people in rural China. It is very common for old people to 
continue working. Productive people in their 60s are not seen as a dependency burden. In 
advanced ages, old people gradually reduce the time and amount of work according to the 
limits of their physical capability. Old men in the study area usually gave a helping hand to 
adult children on the farm, such as in weeding or fertilising. During the fruit-bearing 
period, some old men even moved temporarily to live in huts built beside family orchards 
to guard against petty thieves or bird damage. For old women, it is needless to say that 
their role in cooking, doing laundry, child-minding and other housekeeping tasks is 
indispensable. This importance of mutual assistance between elderly parents and their 
adult children in coresidence is also evident from the focus-group discussions.
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Participant 1: How can we rural people afford retirement like city-dwellers! One 
still has to rely on the family. Anyway, the family is yours also.
Participant 2: Old people simply know nothing about staying idle, because we are 
bom to such a hard lot. We are used to it.
Participant 3: As a saying, liu shui bu fu  (the running water does not go stale), 
working keeps you always fit (Focus discussion group, elderly males).
Participant 1: It is a habit for old people to keep working, not matter how much 
they can help. Otherwise, they feel mei guohuo (no joys in life).
Participant 2: Parents will lend a hand to any son in difficulty (Focus discussion 
group, young males).
Participant 1: Whether you have a grandma at home or not really makes a 
difference. Meals are cooked, and kids are looked after.
Participant 2: Great if the grandma helps. But one can’t take it always for granted. 
What if you are not on good terms with her? (Focus discussion group, young 
females)
5.4.2. The level of economic support
The well-being of old people is influenced not only by the form of support, but also 
by the level of the support they receive. Obviously, the level of support is related to the 
‘adequacy versus equity’ issue raised by Rudkin (1993): a concern with adequacy refers to 
some minimum standards of well-being, whereas a focus on equity emphasises how well 
one group fares relative to others. In other words, the level of economic support can be 
discussed from two perspectives: whether the basic needs of the elderly can be adequately 
met, and whether their living standard is different from that of other generations. In 
industrialised countries, the amount of individual monetary receipts from various pension 
programs is often used as an indicator of the economic support the elderly receive. 
However, such an indicator is not readily available in rural China where the economic
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Table 5.8: Percentage distribution of old persons, by monthly living 
expenditure and selected indicators, Pingling, 1996_______________
Item Monthly living Total No.
expenditure (Yuan)
<50 50-100 >100
A. Age group
60-64 76.6 20.3 3.1 100.0 64
65-69 61.1 35.2 3.7 100.0 54
70-74 72.0 28.0 0.0 100.0 50
75+ 78.3 19.6 2.2 100.0 46
B. Sex
Male 69.7 27.3 3.0 100.0 99
Female 73.9 24.3 1.7 100.0 115
C. Living arrangements
Alone 80.0 0.0 20.0 100.0 5
With spouse only 72.2 27.8 0.0 100.0 36
With spouse and/or 
unmarried children
57.1 42.9 0.0 100.0 14
With spouse and/or a 
married son
71.3 27.1 1.6 100.0 129
With spouse and/or a 
married daughter
86.4 13.6 0.0 100.0 22
With others 62.5 12.5 25.0 100.0 8
D. Working status
Still working 71.1 26.7 2.2 100.0 45
Retired 61.5 23.1 15.4 100.0 13
No longer working 74.5 24.2 1.3 100.0 149
Not sure 42.9 57.1 0.0 100.0 7
E. No. Of children
0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 2
1 91.7 8.3 0.0 100.0 12
2 84.2 5.3 10.5 100.0 19
3 50.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 18
4 73.7 26.3 0.0 100.0 38
5+ 70.4 27.2 2.4 100.0 125
All 72.0 25.7 2.3 100.0
No. 154 55 5 214
Source: Household survey data
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monetisation is still at a very primitive stage and old-age support is provided primarily by 
family members through non-monetary means. In the household survey of this study, the 
level of economic support was defined as the monthly living expenditure of old people in 
three categories: under 50 Yuan, 50-100 Yuan and over 100 Yuan. The respondents were 
asked to make a choice that mostly applied to the situation in their family. To address the 
adequacy issue, the benchmark of 50 Yuan in the low expenditure category was based on a 
rough calculation of the minimum cost of daily necessities old people might need in the 
study area, according to information collected during focus-group discussions: 25 Yuan 
for staple food like wheat and maize, 10 Yuan for non-staple food like vegetables, and 15 
Yuan for other purposes like clothes and medication. The equity issue can be addressed 
approximately through a comparison between the expenditure level and the per capita 
monthly income of 85 Yuan made by rural residents in Pingling in 1995.
As displayed in Table 5.8, the majority (72 per cent) of old people spent 50 Yuan 
or less per month, including own labour income and family support. This suggests that the 
resources at their disposal were barely enough to cover the minimum living cost assumed 
in this study. About one-quarter of the elderly received 50 to 100 Yuan per month, quite 
abundant compared to the average monthly income of 85 Yuan in the region. A very small 
proportion could afford the high level of expenditure of 100 Yuan and over. Older persons 
and females were more likely to be found in the low expenditure category. The effect of 
living arrangements and working status, however, cannot be found in a consistent pattern. 
It seems that old people coresiding with sons were slightly better off than those with 
daughters, and old people still working were slightly better off that those not working. A 
further look into the three-generation households reveals that the proportion of old people 
receiving support below 50 Yuan was lower in households headed by elderly parents (48.1 
per cent) than that by adult children (65.6 per cent). It indicates that coresidence with 
adult children in an ‘ideal’ extended family was not necessarily a sign of special economic 
well-being or good treatment for the elderly. What is important is whether the elderly were 
in real control of the family’s finances. Similarly, people still working were likely to have 
better access to family resources.
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The number of children is believed to be a key factor in influencing old people’s 
well-being, as in a traditional Chinese saying: the more sons, the more happiness. Rearing 
many sons was considered an investment for old-age support. The data from the 
household survey show that the proportion of old people in the low expenditure category 
decreases gradually from 100 per cent in the childless group to 70.4 per cent in the five 
and above group, which suggests the possibility of a correlation between the number of 
children and the level of living expenditure of the elderly in the study area. However, such 
a relationship is not fully accepted by a chi-square test as statistically significant. 
Obviously, the level of living expenditure of the elderly was dependent also on other 
factors. While coresidence undoubtedly involved the most comprehensive type of support, 
non-resident children also made contributions to ease the burden of their siblings who 
were coresident. In the household survey, 144 household heads had parents living 
separately. Over two-thirds of them (67.4 per cent) reported providing regular living 
allowances for their non-resident parents. Of the 22 female household heads, those who 
made regular contributions accounted for 68.2 per cent, even slightly higher than that of 
males at 67.2 per cent. It was still not popular for women in the study area to head a 
household. Nevertheless, the above proportion indicates that, once they assumed the 
control of family resources, they also took over responsibility for old-age support.
In the study area, adult children were well aware of their individual obligations. 
Unlike in Japan where a particular child is clearly designated in advance as the main 
supporter, in rural China sons share equally in supporting elderly parents. Such obligations 
were generally agreed upon when adult children, normally sons, moved out of the parental 
house to form their own family after marriage. If they do not share equally, they usually do 
not benefit equally in the division of household resources. Before, support agreements 
were often reached orally under the supervision of village cadres. In recent years, they 
must be written down on the old-age support contract, including the detailed obligations 
that each coresiding and non-residing child had to fulfil. From non-residing children, a 
living allowance was often paid in cash, since old people are largely self-sufficient in staple
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food nowadays from the land plots allocated under their own names. Cash was more 
flexible for purchasing other necessities on the market. It is quite interesting to find that 
living allowance was commonly paid in accordance with an unofficial local standard, 
approximately 50 to 60 Yuan per old person. This standard was also widely accepted in 
most old-age support documents as a basis for calculating each adult child’s obligation. 
Therefore, having more children, particularly sons, does not necessarily mean that elderly 
parents would receive a higher level of economic support, but rather that each son paid a 
smaller share to meet that standard. Full living allowances were more likely to be paid to 
the elderly living alone. For example, if an old couple had three non-resident sons, each 
son would provide about 40 Yuan per month. If there were five non-resident sons, 
however, each one only had to pay about 25 Yuan per month. When the elderly parents 
coresided with one son, other non-resident sons just had to pay a limited amount of pocket 
money, ranging from five to 20 Yuan per month. It is not unusual to hear complaints from 
old people about the heavy burden of rearing many children, particularly many sons. They 
provided housing and paid the costs of the wedding when sons married, but when they 
became old, having more sons did not result in receiving more income or support. Worse 
still, having more sons might cause more domestic conflicts and arguments. If a non­
resident son shirked his commitment to paying the living allowance on time, parents were 
reluctant to go asking for the payment, for fear of damaging ‘face’ or family reputation. 
As an informant pointed out, old parents would rather live in difficulty than make a 
demand. Sometimes, village cadres were called in to settle the dispute. In the traditional 
belief of ‘jiachou bu ke wai yang’ (domestic foibles should not be exposed), nothing was 
more embarrassing.
5.5. Old people in different situations: case studies in Nanshangzhao
The above discussions, based mainly on the quantitative data collected from the 
household survey, are aimed at an overall picture of the economic support received by old 
people in the study area of Pingling. In reality, needless to say, conditions vary markedly 
from one family to another. Qualitative information collected from observation and in-
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depth interviews in Nanshangzhao Village may give more insights into the way families 
provided for the elderly and old people coped with or adapted to different situations in 
their later years.
5.5.1. Childless elderly
In rural China where sons and the family are given top importance in old-age 
support, the childless elderly are of particular interest. Marriage in Chinese society is 
almost universal, and the proportion of childless elderly is very low. Traditionally, if a 
couple had difficulty in giving birth to or bringing up a biological child, adoption was a 
widely accepted alternative. Children were usually adopted from close relatives, a practical 
choice for continuing the family line and fostering kin solidarity. This arrangement also 
ensured that the adopted children suffered no discrimination in the community. According 
to the 1992 survey on aged population, the proportion never married among the rural 
elderly was 1.1 per cent, and the proportion childless was 2.4 per cent (China Research 
Centre on Ageing, 1994). However, for the small number of disadvantaged people who 
ended up in old age without a child, particularly a son, life was really hard. During the 
collective period from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, childless old people were 
commonly provided for by community welfare funds under the Five Guarantees system to 
meet their basic needs in food and fuel, clothing, housing, medical treatment, and burial. 
However, this was provision at a very basic level. Those who received it suffered from 
low social status and a sense of humiliation. Since the Household Responsibility system 
was introduced, a lot of community welfare programs have been reduced or even 
abolished, because of the shrinkage in welfare funds. In the study area of Pingling, 
childless old people relied largely on their own labour income and ad hoc material 
assistance from relatives. Villagers’ committees usually provided some cash during harvest 
or holiday seasons. In the household survey, only two childless old people were identified. 
One is an old man of 65 living with his younger wife. The couple depend mainly on self- 
support. Another is a widowed old woman of 84 living with relatives in a large family of 
nine. In terms of the level of economic support, both old people fell into the low-
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expenditure category. As Davin (1994) suggested, the poverty and low standard of living 
provided farmers with a constant reminder of the sad fate of those who failed to bring up 
children.
Uncle A, 62, is the only childless old man in Nanshangzhao, living alone in an old 
but well-kept house with a big courtyard. He has four brothers, two living in the 
neighbourhood and two working in other cities. There is only limited contact with 
his brothers’ families, because his nephews are ‘unfilial’ and always make troubles. 
Uncle A used to work as a factory worker in Baoji after graduating from a 
polytechnic school in the 1950s. In the early 1960s, he was forced to quit the job 
owing to so-called ‘political misconduct’, and returned to Nanshangzhao with a 
lump sum pension of 7,000 Yuan, quite a fortune during that time. After their 
parents died, the brothers divided family property, and Uncle A lives since then in 
the house allocated under his name. He did not marry until in his late 40s, because 
during the commune period he was discriminated against as a ‘political enemy’. In 
the late 1970s when the situation improved after the reform, he married a divorced 
woman with a girl of 15. The couple worked hard and saved enough money for the 
girl’s education all the way to college. After the girl was assigned a job by the 
government in Xianyang, Uncle A’s bad luck returned. First his wife moved out to 
live with her daughter in the city, and two years later filed a divorce from him. Left 
alone, Uncle A is extremely disappointed. No longer interested in getting married 
again, he has already started to prepare for his own old-age security. Fortunately, 
his old skill in the factory helped him find a job two years ago in a private-owned 
garage in the village after the liberalisation of rural economy. Now he can make 
200-300 Yuan per month. Normally, Uncle A has little to spend, because, like 
other villagers, he is basically self-sufficient in food. The money he earned goes 
largely to savings. He is quite optimistic that he will be able to support himself in 
old age. ‘Nothing to worry about. I shall keep working until I can no longer. See, 
I’ve even got my coffin and graveclothes ready at home’, he tells me proudly. 
Asked why he does not join the life and old-age insurance program offered by the 
township office of the China Insurance Company, Uncle A gives two reasons. 
First, the manager of the office is not trustable, because he was involved in a 
financial scandal just a few years ago. Second, it is not time to think about 
retirement, because he thinks himself still in good health at the moment (Fieldwork 
note).
Of course, Uncle A’s situation is unique in the study area. First, his being childless 
resulted primarily from political reasons beyond his control. Second, he is able to support 
himself with his skills that have become highly valued in rural industry. Third, the 
experience of working in a factory in a big city makes him familiar with modem ideas such 
as independent living. Economically, Uncle A has basically secured his own old-age
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support. Physically, however, he may still need assistance once he is too feeble to look 
after himself. I heard from village cadres that people have already tried to find him a new 
partner. To fellow villagers, a person living alone is simply inconceivable. Well established 
but still not very old, Uncle A should have no problem to get remarried if he likes.
5.5.2. The elderly with no sons
Family support for the elderly is supposed to be provided by all family members, 
especially adult children. In traditional China, however, sons were required to bear the 
major responsibility of old-age support. Indeed, sons represented survival, prosperity, 
security and a future for the family. Because of their potential role as begetters and 
providers of family income through labour and skills, sons were specially desired by 
parents, as reflected in an old saying ‘the more sons, the more family fortune’. Of course, 
sons were preferred not only for economic reasons. In the traditional practice of ancestor 
worship, sons also represented the continuity of the family line, linking ancestors and 
descendants. In the study area, for example, it is the eldest son’s responsibility to organise 
his parents’ funeral ceremonies, even if he was not the prime provider of economic 
support. In spite of their efforts, it is natural that a small number of people might end up 
without a son in old age. Among the 214 elderly surveyed, 16 had only daughters, ranging 
from one to five. All but two of them coresided with a married daughter. These two, an 
old couple, lived separately from their three married daughters in the same village. Similar 
patterns have also been found by Goldstein and Ku (1993) in a community study in 
Zhejiang province. Old people without sons usually adapted in two ways: some kept a 
daughter at home, bringing her a husband who would live with them in an extended family; 
others lived in separate residences in close proximity to a married daughter. In the study 
area, married-in sons-in-law are usually referred to as bange’er (half-sons) or yanglao 
nuxu (sons-in-law of old-age support), indicating explicitly their essential roles in 
providing for the parents-in-law.
Uncle B, 65, and his wife have no sons but four daughters. All daughters are
married. Girls commonly marry at younger ages. After the three elder ones married
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out one by one (two in neighbouring villages and one in the neighbourhood), Uncle 
B helped the youngest daughter find a husband through relatives and got her 
married at home. Now the young couple have two boys of their own. The young 
man, Mr. Li, is from a poor village about 300 kilometres away in North Shaanxi. 
He came to the nearby city of Xianyang as a migrant worker a couple of years ago, 
while his two elder brothers remained at home with his parents. Mr. Li is quite 
happy to stay, because Nanshangzhao is economically much better off than his 
home village19. He gets not only a nice wife, but also a well-established family, 
without having to start from scratch himself. Uncle B and his wife are also 
satisfied. The young man has received more schooling than their daughter, and 
brings regular cash income from his job in Xianyang. More importantly, the young 
man is sensible, respectful and always well-mannered. Uncle B thinks he is treated 
much better by his son-in-law than other elderly by their biological sons. ‘Sons 
tend to be careless, and take everything for granted’, said Uncle B. It is interesting 
that, as part of the marriage conditions, Mr. Li accepted not only the responsibility 
to support his parents-in-law, but also a special arrangement that his eldest son 
takes Uncle B’s surname to sustain the family line. That means, when Uncle B dies 
one day, his eldest grandson, not his son-in-law, is expected to chair the funeral 
rituals, even nominally. Mr. Li’s younger son, on the other hand, follows his 
father’s surname. The two boys therefore have different surnames, representing 
two separate family lines (Fieldwork note).
Traditionally, a young man who married into his wife’s family usually suffered 
from low status or discrimination as waixingren (persons with exceptional surnames) in 
the community, particularly in a single-lineage village where all people belonged to the 
same clan. In Nanshangzhao, however, such discriminative practice is not popular because 
there is no single dominating clan in the village. In single-lineage villages virilocal marriage 
was also a routine practice so that girls rarely married young men in the same village. 
However, it is not uncommon in Nanshangzhao that young women get married locally and 
live near their parental house after marriage. Regardless of their current living 
arrangements, old people can still receive frequent visits from married daughters. In the 
focus-group discussions, Uncle B’s situation was repeatedly mentioned by the elderly as 
an example that a good son-in-law is better than an unfilial biological son. Greenhalgh, 
Zhu and Li (1994) also found in their study that married-in sons-in-law could provide 
unexpected benefits for the family involved. They often brought new skills with them, and 
treated their parents-in-law better than real sons did. This suggests that old people in the
19 Migrant workers usually have difficulties to get registered as formal residents in cities, even if they have
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study area have begun to accept that the number and sex of children are not necessarily 
the sole determinants of old-age support. Sons-in-law are particularly expected to be, and 
highly valued as, potential providers of economic support. Nevertheless, they are not 
considered a proper replacement for sons in social and religious functions.
5.5.3. The elderly living separately from children
Although coresidence was the prevailing form of living arrangements of the elderly 
in the study area, as discussed in above sections, there was still a small proportion of old 
people who lived in separate residences from adult children, alone or with spouse. Under 
the current circumstances of rural China where a public pension program is non-existent, 
separate living is slightly different from independent living as observed in most 
industrialised countries. Independent living stresses primarily the financial independence of 
the elderly, while separate living refers mainly to the geographic separation between 
parents and children. Financially, some old people in the study area, particularly males and 
people in their early 60s, relied on their own labour income'0, others depended entirely on 
non-resident children for support. However, for the very frail old persons, the need for 
physical assistance and care becomes increasingly evident in independent living as well as 
in separate living.
Uncle C, 65, is partly paralysed from a stroke and bedridden most of the time. He 
requires constant care from his wife, the only other person in the family. 
Fortunately, Aunt C, an untiring woman in her late 50s, can still manage to carry 
out most caring tasks, such as cooking, dressing, doing laundry and housework, 
and assistance in using the toilet. Uncle C and his wife have five sons and one 
daughter. The four elder ones moved out to their own houses in the same village 
after marriage, while the youngest one remained. It has been settled in the family 
division agreement that the youngest son will take responsibility for supporting the 
elderly parents, because he is going to inherit the family house. Eight years ago, 
the young man left home to join the army. Originally, he planned to return home 
after three years of routine service. However, he was later sent to a military school 
for advanced training, and promoted to an officer position. Being uncertain about
married locally. However, rural residence is easy to obtain.
20 For the present-day elderly in rural China, as discussed in Chapter 4, private properties or personal 
savings, if any, are extremely limited.
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his returning home, the young man now settles down with his wife in Gansu. His 
marriage was actually held at home. Before the young couple left, they renovated 
the family house and prepared two coffins for his parents according to the local 
custom. To fulfil his obligations of old-age support, the young man regularly sends 
money back. After he heard of his father’s illness, what he can do is just to increase 
the remittance to 50 Yuan per month. Uncle C’s elder sons now help look after the 
farm, and occasionally do shopping in Xianyang. Each of the four sons provided 
ten Yuan per month as pocket money. At this income level, the old couple can 
afford quite a comfortable life, as observed from their living conditions. Everything 
in the house is kept clean and tidy. There is a TV set in the bedroom, and a modem 
stove in the kitchen that uses honeycomb-shaped briquette, commonly found in the 
cities. By comparison, other families in the village still use the old-fashioned brick 
stoves built on the kitchen floor. The old woman is much concerned about who is 
going to care for her husband if she is no longer capable. She does not see an elder 
son and his family moving in as an option. Rather, she still misses her youngest son 
and hopes that he will return home soon. ‘Look, his bridal chamber is still kept 
intact’, Aunt C said sadly while showing me the room (Fieldwork note).
That Uncle C and his wife now live by themselves is obviously not their free 
choice. The unexpected disruption of coresidence is caused largely by a mismatch in life- 
cycle transitions between the two generations. As people age, their needs in assistance 
increase because of disengagement from economic activities and the onset of chronic 
health problems. In the meantime, their children also proceed through difference life-cycle 
stages, such as entering the labour force and forming their own families. The living 
arrangements in which the elderly end up are not necessarily what they originally desired. 
At the present stage, Uncle C and his wife were basically free from financial worries 
thanks to the regular remittances from their non-resident son. However, the necessary 
physical care for the functionally impaired old man could only be given by his wife. Non­
resident children, even living close-by, are not always available for help. For the elderly 
who have needs in both economic and physical assistance, living alone is extremely 
difficult. Emotionally, independent living is not considered ideal, either, because Chinese 
traditionally believed that er sun rao qi (with children and grandchildren playing around) is 
part of people’s happy life in old age.
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5.5.4. The elderly in coresidence
In rural China, old-age support is provided mainly in the form of shared housing, 
food and other necessities through coresidence. In the study area, as discussed in Chapter 
3, land has been evenly allocated, though nominally, to individual families. Limited 
community welfare benefits are also available to those in temporary financial crisis. 
Therefore, what villagers worry about is no longer absolute poverty or survival as 
observed in other developing countries among landless people (Dharmalingam, 1994). 
Although living standards may vary from one family to another, the treatment received by 
old people in coresidence was not markedly different from that of other family members 
under one roof. For most elderly, their life in later years is secure in coresidence. Under 
current circumstances, family members choosing coresidence are determined largely by 
cultural norms that require adult children, sons in particular, to provide for their parents in 
old age. Moreover, coresidence is an effective strategy of the family to meet practical 
needs for mutual assistance and support between the old and young generations. As 
discussed in Chapter 6 from the survey data, coresidence in three-generation households is 
still the most preferred option of living arrangements in old ages. Mutual assistance and 
care between the old and young generations rank high in people’s consideration.
Grandpa D is a widower aged 79, and lives with his only-son’s family in a four- 
generation household. For Grandpa D, such an arrangement has not been 
interrupted by changing family events over the last few decades, neither his son’s 
marriage nor his wife’s death. For his son, Uncle D, supporting the old man 
through coresidence is his utmost responsibility as a danchuan (single successor of 
the family line). Both Uncle D and his wife, Aunt D, have received high school 
education, quite uncommon in their generation, and are experienced in managing 
the household economy. Apart from growing grain and vegetables on their family 
plot, Uncle D runs a small chicken farm of about 200 birds, and Aunt D makes 
dresses for external contract at home. On average they can make about 300 Yuan 
per month. Uncle D has two sons and one daughter. The daughter now lives with 
her husband’s family in a neighbouring village. The elder son, a skilled factory 
worker, stays at home after marriage. His wife also works in a factory. The young 
couple can bring home regular cash income. They have a little boy of two looked
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after by Aunt D. Uncle D’s young son is still in high school. Of the seven family 
members, four are making sizeable cash income. With a total income of over 800 
Yuan per month, the family’s living standard ranks as one of the highest in 
Nanshangzhao. Uncle D says that the old man and the toddler boy are the two 
persons who receive the most preferential treatment in the family. Nevertheless, 
Grandpa D is in fact not 100 per cent dependent, because he still keeps himself 
busy with some light housework. According to Aunt D, the old man does not want 
to stay idle from morning till night. ‘Movement is good for health’, he likes to say 
(fieldwork note).
In the study area, as in the case of Grandpa D, the decision of coresidence is 
usually made commonly before children all get married and move out. The son the parents 
chose to live with them will stay all the time, and provide for them later in old age. It is 
not popular for elderly couples to live independently in an ‘empty nest’ for a certain period 
after all the children have left home, and one or more children to move in with parents 
only when they are too old to look after themselves, as observed in some other countries 
(Martin, 1990). Although Grandpa D has only one son, a situation where the family line is 
danger of breaking up, he is still able to enjoy a happy life in his later years. An important 
factor is that the old man’s investment in his only son’s education finally paid off. Elderly 
participants in focus-group discussions agreed from Grandpa D ’s example that the fortune 
of old people lies not necessarily in how many children they have, but in whether their 
children are filial and able to make money.
5.5.5. The elderly in destitute conditions
In the study area, the level of support the elderly received is not closely related to 
their living arrangements, although coresidence seems to be the best form to meet their 
basic needs. As shown in Table 5.8, the majority of old people covered by the household 
survey fell into the low living expenditure category, regardless of whom they lived with. It 
is not unreasonable to assume that a small number of old people still lived in relatively 
destitute conditions. According to a survey conducted by the District Committee on 
Ageing in 1995 in Qindu, including the study area of Pingling, 12.5 per cent of the total of 
4,940 aged persons had reported constant economic difficulties (Guo, 1995). It is found
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that most elderly in this group lived separately from their children, and were unable to 
work because of advanced age or poor health. That they received inadequate support from 
children was caused mainly by two factors. Some adult children were constrained in their 
capacity because they had problems in supporting their own families. Others simply lack 
willingness to provide for their elderly parents. The latter case was frequently observed in 
families with many sons.
Grandpa E has been dead for three years. Although he had eight sons, six living in 
Nanshangzhao and two in other places, he led a miserable life in his later years. 
Grandpa E and his wife used to live alone on living allowances jointly paid by their 
non-resident sons. However, not all sons paid their contributions on time. After his 
wife died, no one was left at home even to prepare food for him. Since the 
brothers could not reach an agreement on the responsibility to care for the old man 
at home, Grandpa E had to eat in his sons’ families by turns. Other daily activities 
he still had to perform himself with great difficulty. Extremely upset, Grandpa E 
fell ill soon. At his deathbed, it is told, the brothers were still quarrelling over 
medical expenses. I was told by the village old people that the dispute in Grandpa 
E ’s family was caused mainly by the discord among his daughters-in-law. 
Gradually, the solidarity between the brothers was ruined. The old man became an 
undeserved target of their furies. During my fieldwork, surprisingly, the brothers 
found renewed unity at the third anniversary of their father’s death, the date 
symbolising the end of the traditional three-year mourning period. They organised 
a lavish commemoration ceremony, inviting all fellow villagers to a Qinqiang 
(Shaanxi Opera) performance in the daytime and a video show in the evening. 
However, most old people I talked to disliked such meaningless flaunting of 
money. ‘They do it just to save their own face, because one of the brothers has 
been nominated as the village treasurer lately,’ one old man criticised, ‘just like the 
saying: huo zhe bu gei yi wan fan , si le yanxi bai man yuan (when the old man 
was alive there wasn’t a full meal, when he is dead there is a full banquet in the 
courtyard)! The money could have been better spent on the old man while he was 
alive’ (Fieldwork note).
Although the number of old people in extreme economic difficulties is small, their 
well-being deserves special concern in studies on old-age support in rural China. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the present-day elderly belong to a unique generation in the 
population. They are more likely to depend on family support because few of them could 
secure their own old-age support during the commune period. Special efforts are needed 
to examine why and how some old people fell out of the current family support system,
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even they have their own children. As shown in the above case, domestic disputes and lack 
of willingness to provide support were the major factors leading to Grandpa E ’s suffering.
There have been frequent reports about a resurgence of traditional family rituals 
and other associated practices in rural China in recent years (Davin, 1994). Usually family 
ceremonies serve as an opportunity to strengthen family solidarity and display family 
influence in the community. So far, the government has shown no real attempts to 
suppress such activities. However, officials of the District Committee on Ageing were 
deeply concerned about the spreading of the phenomenon ‘boyang houzang’ (insufficient 
support but extravagant funeral) in the region. It is considered outdated and irrational, not 
only contrary to the wishes of old people, but also harmful to social conventions in the 
community.
5.6. The willingness of support
For most families in the study area, to provide for the elderly is not entirely beyond 
their financial capability, particularly when the elderly have land, the key resource in rural 
China, registered under their names. The present-day elderly have a large number of 
children, 4.8 on average, as presented in Table 5.5. In theory at least, if all children 
contribute to their parents’ upkeep, having many children results in a large pool of 
resources, even if the individual contribution is small. Therefore, the major factor that 
influences the adequacy of support is the willingness of family members, sons in particular, 
to fulfil their obligations. Also in theory, having many sons might increase the probability 
that one will remain filial and meet his commitment eventually. However, the opposite 
assumption is that everybody’s business is nobody’s business. The elderly might be 
neglected in the endless rivalry and dispute among siblings, as seen in Grandpa E ’s case.
In the study area, the influence of traditional values, such as that sons provide for 
elderly parents, is still strong, particularly among the elderly. However, the social pressure 
on younger generations to behave exactly in accordance to old norms is diminishing as the
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Status of the elderly declines. According to Whyte (1997), there are a number of reasons 
to suspect that family obligations may have faded in China. For example, the official 
propaganda promotes loyalties among youth to the Party and the state, rather than to the 
family. Modernisation threatens filial sentiments by fostering a ‘conjugal’ pattern of family 
life that stresses the husband-wife bond, rather than father-son commitment. Under the 
influence of Westernisation and conspicuous consumption, generation gaps emerge in 
personal orientations and values. To a certain extent, these factors also work in the study 
area against traditional norms, leading to a weakened willingness of children to provide 
support. Nevertheless, as McDonald (1989) pointed out, the measurement of the 
willingness is difficult because answers will always be given in a context of the need for 
support and the capability to offer. How to frame appropriate questions is another trouble. 
Obviously, under the current circumstances in rural China, not being willing to support 
parents is an attitude that a person is too embarrassed to admit, even if he does have it 
privately. Therefore, McDonald suggested that recorded behaviour is more useful than 
questions about attitudes.
In focus-group discussions, both elderly and young participants acknowledged that 
young people nowadays tended to attach more importance to their own family life. More 
attention was given to their own children than to elderly parents. The typical answer is that 
the children nowadays are jingui (as precious and dear as gold) because of their small 
number due to the government’s birth control policy. This is in accordance with the 
‘conjugal’ theory proposed first by Goode (1963) that, in the course of modernisation, the 
focus of family life will gradually shift from the vertical relationship between parents and 
children to the horizontal relationship between husband and wife. The spirit of 
independence will be more valued than the traditional norms of obedience and filial 
obligation. Nevertheless, the theory does not by any means suggest that the elderly will be 
abandoned. Rather, the responsibility of support should be taken over primarily by public 
institutions. In the study area, as discussed above, most old people still depended on the 
family for support. The proportion of those living in economic difficulties were relatively 
small. From their investigation into the cases of inadequate support, officials of the District
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Committee of Ageing found two decisive elements: adult sons’ loyalty and their wives’ 
influence. In my own interviews with old persons in Nanshangzhao, ill-mannered 
daughters-in-law were also blamed for poisoning the parent-son relations, vividly reflected 
in a popular ballad:
Die ba jingu zheng duan le (to raise children, Dad has exhausted his energy),
Niang ba xin cao lan le (and Mum has gone through all sorts of worries),
Wa xu ge xifu xin bian le (the boy ceases to be loyal after marrying a girl),
Yong shang erzi bu jian le (when parents are in need, the young ones can nowhere 
be found). (Fieldwork note)
If external conditions, such as peer pressure or financial capability, remain the 
same, a young man’s attitude toward old-age support is usually determined by his moral 
conscience and the quality of his relations with parents. Officials of the District Committee 
on Ageing believed that education and self-cultivation play a major role in the former case. 
Educated sons are more likely than the uneducated to remain filial and committed (Guo, 
1995). In the latter case, as Goldstein and Ku (1993) found in their Zhejiang study, 
support from children was in many cases a function of how the elderly had treated their 
children in the past. This finding is of special significance when the sex of the old person 
and the number of children are taken into consideration.
Nugent (1985) argued that children’s loyalty is shaped not only by existing social 
norms, but also through a ‘loyalty training process’ in the family. Since dispensers of such 
training are usually women, they are more likely to gain from such loyalty training. The 
household survey results reveal that widowed old women in the study area were more 
likely to coreside with their adult children, as reflected in a local saying: an old mother at 
home is a blessing for the family. Widowed old men were not always as lucky. In China, 
the difference stems largely from the varied responsibilities the father and the mother used 
to bear according to traditional values: yanfu (a strict father) who teaches rules and 
exercises discipline, and cimu (a merciful mother) who provide loving care and fostering. 
Strains in the father-son relationship are not uncommon, only to be concealed under the 
established custom of filial piety. By contrast, the mother-son relationship is based more 
on affection than on authority. Therefore, adult sons are more willing to coreside with and
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support for widowed mothers than with fathers. Certainly, there are also practical reasons 
for living with an old woman. For example, old women are able to provide more help in 
housework and child minding, and for a longer time, because they tend to lose their 
spouse at an earlier age while still in good health. In comparison, widowed old men are 
more likely to be in advanced ages or in poor health. Most of them have difficulties in 
looking after themselves, let alone helping others do housework.
As shown in the case studies in Nanshangzhao, old persons with a few children 
were not necessarily worse off economically in old age. In comparison, domestic disputes 
over old-age support are more likely to occur in families with many sons. The present-day 
adults all experienced hardship during the commune period when they were young. Those 
from larger families had to face fiercer competition at home for limited family resources 
and stretched parental attention. Consequently, few of them feel that they owe their 
parents special treatment. Like the financial obligation, the moral obligation of old-age 
support is also shared by siblings. The larger the number of siblings, the lighter the burden. 
As far as willingness for support is concerned, it is possible that a young man from a large 
family does not feel particularly guilty for breaking his commitment.
In both focus-group discussions and personal interviews, almost all people agreed 
that daughters-in-law played an essential role in backing up married sons’ commitment to 
old-age support, particularly when young couples lived in separate residence from elderly 
parents. This reflects not only the increasing popularity of the ‘conjugal’ pattern of family 
life, but also a fundamental change in the status of daughters-in-law in rural China. 
Daughters-in-law traditionally suffered from low status in an extended, patriarchal family. 
The mother-in-law-daughter-in-law relationship was considered especially difficult, often 
being a tyranny of the older woman over the younger. However, the status of married 
young women has improved tremendously over the last few decades, thanks to a number 
of factors, such as the state propaganda on gender equality and women’s empowerment, 
laws that protect women’s rights and interests, the increased level of educational 
attainment among girls, the abolition of arranged marriage, and the participation of women
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in productive activities outside the home21. In the study area, for example, the illiteracy 
rate among old women aged 60 and over was 76 per cent. It dropped to 17 per cent 
among women aged 40-59, and further to 5 per cent among those aged 18-39. Few young 
women now stay at home as dependent housewives after marriage. Economic 
independence enables them to have more freedom and power at home.
Information from qualitative sources suggests that many families in the study area 
managed the household economy in such a way that the husband makes money, while the 
wife controls spending. The husband is frequently called xvaizhanggui, literally the 
manager who supervises external business, and the wife neizhanggui, the manager who 
looks after internal matters, a far cry from the traditional housewifes. There were jokes 
that husbands have to beg for pocket money from their wives, described as persons 
suffering from qiguanyan (tracheitis, a homonym in Chinese for wife-in-tight-control). 
Even if a non-resident son himself remains loyal, he has to ask his wife’s consent, before 
putting aside a certain amount of family income for his parents. At this stage, how his wife 
reacts often affects the outcome22. If the wife is supportive, everything will be all right. If 
not, there will be only two options left for the young man: either to insist on his 
obligations and annoy his wife, or to disappoint his parents by not paying, or not paying 
fully, his due share. Unfortunately, a lot of domestic disputes are triggered by such 
disagreements in providing old-age support. It is interesting to notice that, while 
complaining of inadequate support, old persons usually looked for various excuses for 
their sons and blamed daughters-in-law as prime troublemakers.
21 According to an old informant, the prohibitive costs of marriage, ranging from 10,000 to 20,000 Yuan, 
might be another reason why the daughter-in-law enjoys special privilege in her husband’s family. The 
family simply cannot afford to lose her in a divorce case.
22 Obviously, it is unrealistic to expect a young woman to be as compassionate to her parents-in-law as to 
her own parents. Their reaction also depends on how other brothers-in-law contribute.
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5.7. Promoting family support at both the national and local levels
In traditional China, support of the dependent elderly by children is determined by 
strong cultural prescriptions. Although filial impiety was categorised as one of the ten 
unpardonable offences, family members, and children in particular, provided support to the 
dependent elderly through a sense of moral rather than legal obligation. No criminal code 
was introduced to punish persons who failed to fulfil their duties. Since the founding of 
the People’s Republic in 1949, the government has worked out a series of laws and 
policies that require the financial support of parents by their adult children. It is worth 
noting that, unlike in other campaigns of social engineering, the Party propaganda never 
promoted the idea that the state should take over the responsibility of old-age support 
from families, particularly in rural areas. Phillips (1992) has identified it as one of the 
communist ideals that have been considerably modified in China. Young people have been 
encouraged to rebel against feudal or superstitious activities that old people used to 
practise, such as ancestor worship or arranged marriage. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that they should also relinquish their responsibility to provide for their 
parents in old age. On the contrary, respect and support for the elderly are praised among 
the Chinese nation’s principal virtues that should be continually advanced and enriched. 
However, in recent years, the government has increasingly to resort to administrative and 
legal measures to enhance family’s role in providing old-age support, in order to offset the 
fading influence of traditional values such as of filial piety in a modernising society.
The responsibility for supporting elderly parents by sons and daughters was first 
reaffirmed in the 1954 Constitution. Both the 1980 Marriage Law and the 1985 
Inheritance Law also include detailed clauses to give legal backing to the obligation of the 
family to support and care for its elderly members. These obligations fall equally on both 
men and women. Step, foster and adoptive relationships carry the same privileges and 
obligations as any other parent-child relationship. In 1996, the People’s Congress 
approved the first special law in this area: the Law on Protection of the Rights and 
Interests of the Elderly. It sets clear stipulations for family support and social security for
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the elderly, their participation in social development, and the legal liabilities of activities 
that infringe upon their legal rights and interests. In rural areas, family members bear the 
major responsibility for old-age support. The community should continue to provide for 
the destitute elderly through the Five-Guarantee (wubao) system. Such explicit 
government requirements for and backing to the obligation of family members become 
increasingly important at a time when the likelihood and extent of family support is 
diminishing under the influence of modernisation.
In line with the state policy, local government in the study area has also worked 
out a series of strategies to promote family support for the elderly, including propaganda 
and education programs, special organisations like village associations of the elderly, the 
introduction of the old-age support contract, and a number of back-up old-age insurance 
programs. With these programs, officials of the District Committee on Ageing hope family 
support will be increasingly strengthened through institutionalisation, standardisation, and 
adherence to the principles of policy transparency and the rule of law. As experience over 
the last few years shows, such strategies and programs have produced quite satisfying 
results.
Propaganda and mass education programs are considered a part of the regular 
methods of the Chinese government in policy enforcement. It is no wonder that programs 
have also been designed to popularise government policies, legal knowledge and moral 
standards relevant to family support among people of both old and young generations. 
Usually, government documents and education materials are distributed first to village 
cadres, and then announced to villagers at regular village meetings or through the village 
wire-broadcasting system. The top priority is given to the rights and interests of the elderly 
and the obligations of other family members as set in law, since villagers’ knowledge in 
legal issues is generally inadequate. Each year, the township government will nominate 
and award on the annual market day (the first of April in the traditional calendar) model 
villages, model families, model parents-in-law and model daughters-in-law in old-age 
support and care. That categories are created specifically for parents-in-law and
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daughters-in-law confirms once more the importance of the relationship between them in 
securing family support in the study area. In the meantime, verdicts of the district court 
will also be publicly announced on persons who have failed repeatedly to fulfil their old- 
age support obligations. With achievers awarded and violators penalised, the local 
government sends villagers a clear message about what examples to follow.
Under the guidance of the township government, the Township Committee on 
Ageing started in 1989 to help organise laonian xiehui (the old people’s association) at 
village level, which enjoys the same status of mass organisation as the women’s federation 
and the youth league. At the time of my fieldwork, all villages have set up such an 
organisation to look after the rights and well-being of the rural elderly. All persons aged 
60 and over are entitled to membership, and a small group of three to five people is 
elected as standing representatives23. The association has three major tasks: working out 
village regulations on protection of the rights and interests of the elderly and, in 
association with the Party branch and the villagers’ committee, supervising their 
implementation; organising study and recreational activities for the elderly, particularly on 
the National Old People’s Day, the ninth of September; and providing the elderly with 
practical assistance in every-day life, such as mediation of domestic disputes. For example, 
an old couple in Nanshangzhao was on bad terms with their three daughters-in-law. They 
hardly talked to each other. Since the finances of their sons’ families were controlled by 
the young women, the elderly had not received their pocket money for a long time. Having 
heard of their complaint, the chairman of the old people’s association went to visit the 
young women one by one, and persuaded them to accept an agreement that the 
association people would come to collect the money every month on behalf of the old 
couple. Although the chairman was unable to rebuild the family harmony, he at least 
ensured that the old couple could get their pocket money on time. However, the village 
association of the elderly as a mass organisation in the community is largely created or 
imposed by the government from above. To bring into full play its proposed roles depends
23 They are normally paid some income compensation by the villagers’ committee for working for the 
community.
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on at least three factors: whether village cadres are supportive, whether the 
representatives elected are respected and influential, and whether the community is 
wealthy enough to provide enough fund. In places where even the Party branch ceases to 
function, the old people’s association only exists in name.
Since the early 1990s, a new program has been introduced in the study area under 
the name of shangyang laoren yiwushu (old-age support contract, Appendix 3), in order 
to provide solid legal backing to family support. According to the officials of the 
committee, the program is designed not only to put into effect the national policies such as 
family support and family planning24, but also to meet the practical demands of the local 
elderly. Traditionally, old-age support responsibilities of children were agreed upon orally 
at the time of family division, usually under the supervision of a clan elder or a village 
cadre. Disputes often occur because of the lack of a written document. Government 
officials also feel it is difficult to intervene. Enlightened by the recent education programs, 
old people have become increasingly conscious that their rights and interests need more 
legal protection. The old-age support contract serves exactly such a purpose.
The old-age support contract is defined as a permanent document with legal effect 
that only terminates once the dependent elderly die. The standard contract form is printed 
and distributed by the District Committee on Ageing. It is to be signed by both the 
providers and the dependants, and approved by the villagers’ committee and the old 
people’s association. For legal considerations, the contract also has to be notarised by the 
district office of the public notary. If a dispute arises, the dependent elderly have the right 
to ask village cadres to mediate or the district court to intervene. In the study area, all 
young couples with parents aged 60 and above are required to sign the contract. For those 
who apply for marriage registration, no certificate will be granted until they can present a 
completed copy. In Nanshangzhao, village cadres even insisted that they would only 
accept invitations to a marriage ceremony if the young couple agreed to announce their 
old-age support contract in front of the guests. In some other villages, the completion of
24 The old-age security motive of high fertility is discussed in Chapter 6.
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the old-age support contract has been further linked to the allocation of house sites or 
birth plan quotas. At the time of my fieldwork, a total of 56 copies of old-age support 
contracts have been finalised.
The old-age support contract consists of two categories: material support and 
emotional support. The terms of support are usually proposed by children, and agreed to 
by elderly parents. In a copy I acquired from a coresident young couple in Nanshangzhao, 
the former category includes items like providing appetising meals, seasonal clothes, 
pocket money, birthday presents, and health care, while the latter category includes items 
like frequent inquiry about parents’ opinions and needs, maintaining family harmony, and 
no quarrel and arguments. In the case of non-resident children, the amount of living 
allowance payment is usually fixed in detail. As stated in the contract, the agreed terms 
can be readjusted if conditions alter. As acknowledged by officials of the District 
Committee on Ageing, the introduction of the old-age support contract is only part of the 
government efforts to promote family support for the elderly in rural areas. There is still 
room for further improvement after this formal job is done. Nevertheless, the presence of a 
written contract did help reduce the incidence of domestic disputes in the study area. In 
1994, for example, 5 per cent of all cases heard by the district court involved support 
disputes. In 1995, this proportion dropped to only 0.3 per cent. Many disputes were 
settled in the community without appealing to the court.
Although family support is the major form promoted by the government, there is 
still a small number of old people that end up with no children and resources to depend on. 
Therefore, the government also encourages a number of back-up measures to prevent 
those childless elderly from falling into poverty, mainly the Five-Guarantee system and old 
people’s homes. At the present stage, however, the service and assistance provided under 
such programs are extremely limited, because of difficulties in raising community welfare 
fund. In the study area, the childless elderly who are unable to work could receive on 
average 30 Yuan of assistance per month. The township government also runs a small 
home with only four residents and a middle-aged woman as carer.
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5.8. Summary remarks
As people become frail with age and retreat from economic activities, there is a 
gradual increase in their needs for assistance and support, which can be divided roughly 
into three areas: economic, physical and emotional. In the study area, as in other places in 
rural China, old-age support is provided primarily by the family. Old persons were more 
likely to live with and be supported by married sons, particularly the youngest one. This 
quite agrees the ‘role reversal’ model frequently mentioned in the intergenerational 
transfer theories, where adults at working ages provide support to both old and young 
dependants in the household. Under current circumstances, coresidence is the most 
popular form of old-age support for a number of reasons, such as the influence of cultural 
norms, cost-effectiveness thanks to the economy of scale in shared food, housing and 
other facilities, and benefits from mutual support and care between members of different 
generations. Still, a small number of old persons lived separately from their children and 
relied mainly on self-support. The present-day elderly have on average a large number of 
children as potential providers, because they are the generation who experienced the high 
fertility period from the 1950s to the 1960s. Most of them, including those living alone, 
have non-resident children living in the vicinity. Over two-thirds of non-resident children 
reported regular economic transfers to their parents. Generally, the level of economic 
support the elderly received was not high, with the majority falling in the low-expenditure 
category of 50 Yuan or less per month. However, absolute poverty is not a major issue 
because old persons have land plots allocated under their names. The community can also 
provide limited relief fund in case of crisis.
The level of economic support the elderly received was not necessarily closely 
related to the number and sex of children they have or children’s financial capacity. 
Rather, it was influenced primarily by the willingness of children to provide support. In the 
study area, daughters-in-law were more likely to take the lead in making family decisions, 
because they usually control the household finance, especially in non-resident, nuclear
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families. This diverged markedly from the old Chinese traditions of patriarchy and 
masculine authority in family life. Inadequate support was often caused by domestic 
disputes between parents and children or among siblings.
As Chan (1991) suggested, the Chinese government has adopted a ‘reluctant 
collectivist’ policy rather than a classical socialist one in developing the country’s welfare 
programs. It has basically decided that support and care for the elderly will continue as a 
family responsibility, particularly in rural areas. Nowadays, modernisation is gradually 
eroding the influence of traditional values such as filial piety as shown in the study area, 
resulting in weakened willingness of children to provide for elderly parents. As a 
counterbalance, the government has introduced a series of political, economic and legal 
measures to back up the familial system of old-age support. Some of these measures are 
quite unique, such as the village association of the elderly and the old-age support 
contract. Obviously, these measures are hardly ill intended. However, the way they are 
enforced reminds people of the government’s regular practice: resorting to mass campaign 
and political pressure to push forward the state will. In China’s current transition from 
state economy to a more market-oriented economy, the exceptional intervention of the 
government in people’s everyday life can still be felt.
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CHAPTER 6
OLD-AGE SECURITY AND FAMILY PLANNING:
ATTITUDE AND STRATEGY
6.1. The old-age security-fertility hypothesis
In China as in most developing countries, old people receive much economic, 
physical and emotional support from their children. However, it does not logically follow 
that they have children only for this reason. In previous literature, there are at least three 
major theories trying to explain people’s fertility motives, based on different assumptions 
and in different analytical frameworks. First, the ‘benefit maximisation’ approach, or the 
micro-economic neoclassical theory, assumes that couples as ‘economic persons’ tend to 
maximise household benefits directly or indirectly through rational allocation of limited 
household resources. In this context, children are viewed as a particular type of good. As 
the society undergoes gradual transformation from a lower level of development to a 
higher level, the role of, and expectations from, children also changes from investment 
goods to consumer durables. The concept of children as an investment good and an 
assurance of old-age security is considered to be one of several props sustaining high 
fertility in developing countries. Second, the ‘social-cultural’ approach believes that social 
and cultural factors also play a role in situations where economic factors fall short of 
providing evidence. In China, for example, peasants believe that giving birth to a son is 
their filial obligation to continue the family line, ‘to continue the incense smoke at the 
ancestral shrine’. Third, the ‘risk minimisation’ approach holds that high in priority among 
people’s basic concerns for the future are those of risk and uncertainty, particularly in 
rural areas of developing countries where the market is usually incomplete and imperfect 
and pension programs are unavailable. For parents there may be no alternative but to rely 
on children to reduce and cope with these risks. They will not make use of family planning 
services because they must have many children deliberately as ‘insurance’. In China, the 
policy implication is obvious: before the government can find proper answers to all the
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risk factors, it seems difficult for rural people to accept the targets set in official birth 
control plans.
Leibenstein (1957) was the first to introduce the old-age security motive in the 
analysis of fertility determinants. The hypothesis states that the expectation of relying on 
children in one’s old age promotes the desire for large families. The motive tends to be 
stronger when the level of development is low and there are no alternative old age and 
insurance programs. Over the last few decades, there have been an enormous number of 
studies on the value of children in influencing fertility in developing countries. The findings 
and arguments available support as well as negate the hypothesis that consideration of 
children, sons in particular, as old-age economic security strongly influences the fertility 
level upward. The conflicting evidence, therefore, suggests that the old-age security- 
fertility relationship must be analysed within the given social and economic structures so 
as properly to understand the working mechanism.
Early evidence of the importance of children as sources of old-age security came 
mainly from micro-level studies in developing countries. For example, Cain (1981) 
observed from a comparative study in South Asia that under conditions of old-age risks 
(such as disability) and generalised risks (such as natural disasters), and in the absence of 
efficient risk-coping institutions, the insurance value of children may be an overriding 
incentive to have a large family. It may be necessary to have an average of five children to 
ensure that a son will be available to care for his parents when they are old. A more 
systematic and comprehensive investigation of the importance of the old-age security 
motive for children in various countries is found in the Value of Children Project. 
Kagitcibasi (1982) concluded in the project report that the old-age security value of 
children is more likely to be found in developing countries than in developed countries, 
women are more likely than men to give old-age security as a very important reason for 
having a child, and sons are more likely than daughters to be important sources of old-age 
support.
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Nugent (1985, 1990) is one of the main proponents of the ‘risk-minimisation’ 
theory, arguing that people in developing countries face much more substantial risks than 
those in industrialised countries because of greater fluctuations and uncertainties. Having 
reviewed a substantial number of studies from different parts of the world, he identified a 
number of institutional conditions that make children sources of old-age security: (1) 
underdeveloped capital markets; (2) uncertainty about the accumulation of assets 
necessary for old age and disability; (3) the absence or inefficiency of private or public old- 
age and disability insurance programs; (4) confidence in the loyalty of children to their 
parents; (5) the absence of well-developed labour markets for women and children; (6) 
underdeveloped markets for the goods and services that elderly people consume; (7) the 
absence of a spouse who is considerably younger; and (8) the perception of old age as an 
appreciable portion of the life cycle. These conditions are created and maintained by the 
macro-economic structure, social institutions and specific cultural norms. He concluded 
that
old-age security is likely to be an important motive for fertility when the relevant 
parent is both uncertain about his/her ability to be self-supporting in old age and 
dubious that there are other more reliable or more effective means of such support 
than his/her own children (Nugent, 1985: 76).
It is plausible to assume that old-age security still remains a major fertility motive 
in the study area, because most of the conditions identified by Nugent also exist there. In 
the context of rural China, the micro-economic neoclassical theory is useful in explaining 
couples’ fertility decisions. Children may be viewed as an investment good and an 
assurance of old-age security when savings institutions and pensions do not exist, 
assuming that the cost of rearing many children is either negligible or made worthwhile by 
the expected benefits. As a popular saying has it, yang er fang lao, j i  gu fang j i  (rearing 
children for old age and laying up grain against famine), children are considered as 
important as grain reserves in crisis management. However, to what extent have the 
villagers made the investment, that is, how many children are sufficient for future support 
needs? A conventional assumption of the fertility-security hypothesis is that the 
expectation of relying on children for old-age support promotes high fertility. Couples will
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try to minimise the chance of inadequate support and care by having as many children as 
possible (Polgar, 1971; Jones, 1977). Bulatao (1981) found, in his study on the value of 
children at different stages in the family formation process, nevertheless, that economic 
considerations appear to be important only after the third child. The old-age security 
factor probably does not explain variation among desires for small families. Most people 
want at least one or two children, regardless of their economic value. De Vos (1985) 
concluded from a comparative study between Taiwan and the Philippines that expecting 
old-age economic support from children was an incentive to have large families. However, 
the effect was not apparent between the replacement threshold of two or more children, 
but between wanting three or more children. An empirical relationship between the old- 
age security motive and a desire for large families could be attributable to the fear of child 
mortality, or the need for sons but no daughters. In China, the level of infant mortality is 
low at the present stage, 34.4 per thousand according to the 1990 statistics. Child survival 
is no longer a major consideration in people’s fertility decisions. In contrast, son 
preference still plays an important role (Whyte and Gu, 1987; Wen, 1993). The question 
is, if sons are still considered investment goods, do people still believe in having as many 
sons as possible?
Apart from economic considerations such as labour force and old-age support, 
Chen and Mu (1996) argued, in discussions on people’s fertility desires in rural China, that 
more emphasis should be given to the influence of social norms such as filial piety and son 
preference that support parental claims for support and care in old age, particularly from 
sons. According to the Confucian belief of ancestor worship, the way for a person to 
achieve the ultimate meaning of life is not through his own atonement or reincarnation but 
the life of his descendants. To practise filial piety and produce a son is the most important 
responsibility for a person as a link in the live world to continue the family line, and, thus, 
his own life. Since the interest of the entire family is at stake, fertility decision-making 
involves not only the young couple in question, but also other family members. In this 
context, the couple’s own interest in old-age security, that is, whether they themselves will 
be sufficiently supported by children, is reduced to a secondary position. Producing a son,
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rearing him to adulthood, and getting him married can be seen as a person fulfilling his 
family responsibility, not necessarily making an investment for his own future interest. 
Having met his obligations, the person is entitled to ask his sons to take their responsibility 
of old-age support, a practice strongly endorsed by the prevailing social norms. The other 
question is, if one surviving son is sufficient to continue the family line, do people still 
want additional sons under the current low-mortality regime?
In the reality of the contemporary China, all the economic and social-cultural 
effects on people’s fertility desires fade before a central birth control program. It seems 
that the old-age security-fertility discussion becomes irrelevant if the government is 
successful in imposing the standard birth control targets under the One-Child policy that 
encourages young couple to pledge to have only one child, regardless of sex. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, this policy is largely based on calculations about the relation between macro­
demographic and macro-economic growth. Like most ambitious social engineering 
programs launched by the government over the last few decades, this policy takes little 
consideration, at least at the initial stage, of the possible micro-social effects on families 
and individuals. As Greenhalgh (1993) pointed out, it is appallingly out of touch with 
reality in rural areas. Since people’s fertility desire is motivated by a various factors, it is 
unrealistic to influence their fertility attitudes and behaviour just by imposing unpopular 
policies.
Obviously, family planning is of great significance in such a large developing 
country as China, and family planning programs have achieved remarkable progress by 
cutting down China’s TFR from 5.8 in the early 1970s to 2.2 in the early 1990s. However, 
fertility did not go down far enough to the level that the government originally expected, 
even after a wide range of coercive measures were employed. The strategy of using 
government sponsored massive birth control programs to reduce fertility appears to have 
reached its limit. For example, Whyte and Gu (1987) have made three major findings from 
their review of over 20 family-size preference surveys in several locations in China. First, 
the majority of the respondents did not prefer a large family of three or more children.
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Second, few respondents replied that having one child was best. Third, two children were 
the most commonly stated preference, though desired size was higher in rural than in 
urban areas. In terms of the sex of children, the overwhelming preference was for one boy 
and one girl. This indicates that considerable success has been achieved in promoting the 
small-family norm. But success was less obvious in gaining acceptance of the idea that 
having only one child is desirable. If underlying family-size preferences were the only 
influence on fertility behaviour, it is plausible to assume that more women than are 
currently doing so would have two or more children.
So far, few studies conducted in China have made special attempts to test the old- 
age security-fertility hypothesis in the presence of a strong government birth control 
program. This topic was only briefly touched on by Greenhalgh (1993) in her study 
conducted in the same district as this study. In the villages she visited, Greenhalgh also 
found a strong preference for two-child, mixed-sex families. Asked about why one son and 
one daughter are ideal, villagers gave distinct answers. The heavy economic burden was 
frequently mentioned as a barrier for having many children. The cost of sons is especially 
high owing to expensive items such as weddings and houses. As for old-age support, one 
son is sufficient because the parents can expect to live with him in their existing house. A 
two-son family, considered ‘disastrous’ by some villagers, must build an additional house. 
More importantly, there is a growing sense that sons are unreliable, and may not be willing 
to support their parents in old age. When there is only one son, he has a clear obligation. 
When there are more than one, domestic rivalry and dispute may cause great humiliation 
and even economic hardship for elderly parents. A daughter, in comparison, is desired 
largely for her crucial role in providing physical and emotional support.
In fact, the feasibility of old-age security with fewer children has already been 
explored in recent years by scholars with computerised simulation programs. Enke and 
Brown (1972) believed that the targets of birth control programs in developing countries 
to reduce fertility could be achieved without jeopardising the support in old age that most 
parents receive from their children. The compatibility between reduced fertility and
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continued old-age support depends on the timing of births. In societies where sons are 
expected to provide support, they proposed an ‘always a son’ strategy, whereby parents 
have a son as soon as possible and then practise contraception so long as he survives. 
Such a strategy works because of the recent fall in infant and child mortality and the gain 
in people’s life expectancy, as observed in most developing countries. For example, if life 
expectancy is 50 years, parents with no more than four children bom can typically achieve 
a 0.9 probability of one son being alive when the father reaches age 65. In places where 
life expectancies are longer, parents can have still fewer children and yet be reasonably 
assured of a surviving son to support them in their old age. For parents, therefore, 
contraceptive use and spacing of births not only prevent unwanted births but reduce the 
number of births need for old-age support. For the population as a whole, the growth rate 
will drop accordingly.
Apparently, the ‘always a son’ strategy has far-reaching policy implications in 
China for a number of reasons, such as the strong preference for sons, low mortality and 
high life expectancy in relation to the average standard of developing countries, and 
explicit government policies promoting birth control and family support. In recent years, 
most suggestions by scholars to modify the One-Child policy follow a similar direction. 
For example, Bongaarts and Greenhalgh (1985) propound a two-child policy plus delayed 
childbearing as an alternative, to guarantee parents having at least one adult child to 
support them in old age. In practice, as identified by Greenhalgh (1986), China’s birth 
control regulations enforced at local levels are often a combination of one- and two-child 
policies. While third and higher-order children are expressly discouraged, a second child is 
allowed for couples facing great hardship, provided they space at least four years between 
the first and the second. In the context of rural China, great hardship usually refers to 
having no sons. Therefore, the One-Child policy has been virtually ‘peasantised’ by village 
cadres with a more pragmatic One-Son policy (Greenhalgh, 1993).
Other scholars have proposed alternative means of providing old-age security in 
rural China, beyond family support and the population policy. Johnson (1994) asserted
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that, by modifying current policies and promoting education at the primary and secondary 
levels, China would achieve lower fertility without strong family planning programs. One 
of the policies is to introduce a modest social security system. A rural pension program is 
financially attainable if given a reasonably high priority. By employing micro-simulation 
models of parity and kinship, Lin (1994) came to the conclusion from a micro-simulation 
model that rural families in the coming decades only have to cope with moderate levels of 
old-age dependency. For example, the proportion childless among rural women aged 65- 
69 will drop from eight per cent in 1990 to 2.5 per cent in 2030, thanks to reduced 
mortality. Very few households will have heavy old-age dependency burdens, just one per 
cent in 2030. He suggests a ladder of social security options for the government, 
beginning with programs designed to benefit those with the greatest difficulties, such as 
the childless elderly. Tian Xueyuan25 suggested diverting the only-child insurance 
premiums currently paid by the government to a special old-age pension fund, in order to 
encourage couples to accept the one-child policy. A pilot program has already been 
launched in Sichuan province, in 1990 (Zhan, 1992).
6.2. Living arrangement expectations: ideal family size and structure
Family size and structure are often used as criteria to examine the form of living 
arrangements. It is straightforward that family size refers to the total number of persons in 
a family. In comparison, structure here refers to the number of generations in a family. In 
practice, however, there are several quite different meanings. For example, family size 
defined by the United Nations (1987) refers to the number of persons in a nuclear family, 
consisting generally of a man, his wife, and their children, while in countries like China 
where family household is commonly used, family size also includes all coresident family 
members who are related to the head by blood, marriage or adoption. When it comes to 
the discussion of completed family size, family size norms and family size preference in 
demography, family size is sometimes considered as a convenient shorthand for the 
number of children. Certainly, there is a close link between ideal number of children and
25 Director of the Population Research Centre of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
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ideal number of all persons in a family. To avoid possible misunderstanding, the term 
‘fertility preference’ is more frequently used than the term ‘family size preference’ in the 
comparative studies on the results of the World Fertility Survey (Lightboume and 
MacDonald, 1982).
Family size preference as a social norm is considered consistent with the prevailing 
social institutions. For example, Freedman (1963) thought that the extent to which the 
family served basic social functions helped to determine the society’s family size 
preference. Changes in fertility are unlikely without prior changes in these social norms 
and institutions. The concept of family size preference in ideal number of children has 
found wider applicability in fertility studies in recent years. Although some demographers 
doubt the feasibility of using survey data to predict fertility, it is generally accepted that 
family size preferences are indispensable in conceptual frameworks for analysing fertility 
level and behaviour (Davis and Blake, 1956; Freedman, 1975; Mason, 1983). Since this 
study is primarily concerned with family support for the elderly, or the availability of 
family members to provide the support, family size preference is here reflected in the ideal 
number of persons in a family household, in comparison to the ideal number of generations 
in a family household. In the context of rural China, whether respondents are willing to 
remain childless voluntarily is still an improper, if not an insulting, question. The 
demographic availability of potential providers of old-age support is usually taken for 
granted. The ideal number of children can be interpreted indirectly from the answers of 
ideal family size. It is worth noting that, in contrast to the explicit policy regulating 
people’s fertility behaviour in terms of number of children, the government has made no 
attempts to limit real family size or reshape its structure. Nevertheless, as Zeng (1992) 
observed, there are implicit policies that favour the three-generation family for the sake of 
upholding the tradition of respecting and supporting the elderly. Generally speaking, 
changes in real family size and structure are still subject to a wider range of social and 
economic factors that are far more complicated and unpredictable than fertility per se.
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Table 6.1 gives the percentage distribution of answers to the question about ideal 
number of persons in a family household, mean and its standard deviation by selected 
indicators of personal characteristics. Respondents included not only household heads, but 
also other family members aged 60 and above. Generally speaking, four-person 
households were most popular in the study area, favoured by about one-third of the 
respondents. Three-person households were chosen by another one-quarter of them. 
Altogether, nearly 60 per cent of respondents liked to live in small families with three or 
four persons. People who preferred large families with five or more persons accounted for 
another one-third. Only a small proportion (5.9 per cent) opted for households with two 
persons, a married couple presumably. That means, in terms of old-age support, the 
majority of respondents (94.1 per cent) expected that potential providers would be 
available at home. A second thought may be relevant to people’s fertility desires. 
Assuming that a three-person household consists commonly of two parents and one child 
and a four-person household of two parents and two children, it is plausible to infer that a 
sizeable number of villagers have accepted the idea of the One-Child family, although the 
majority sti\\ wanted at least two children.
In Panel A of Table 6.1 age is divided into three groups: the young group aged 
from 18 to 39, the middle-aged group from 40 to 59, and the aged group of 60 and above. 
It is not surprising to find that small or nuclear family norms found widespread acceptance 
among young people, resulting in the lowest mean of 3.8. Nearly two-fifths of respondents 
in this group thought a three-person household, or a typical One-Child family, ideal. 
Together with those in favour of a four-person household, the small family with one or 
two children makes up 82.2 per cent of all preferences. The lowest standard deviation also 
underlines a higher degree of concentration. With an average number of persons in a 
household at four, the majority of people in middle ages (68.8 per cent) also agreed with 
small family norms, but were slightly less enthusiastic about the One-Child family idea. 
The elderly group has the highest mean number of 4.4, but their preference also seems 
quite diverse as shown by the high level of standard deviation. Over half chose to live in 
large households with five or more persons. It is worth noting that the elderly group has
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Table 6.1: Percentage distribution of respondents to the question about ideal 
number of persons in household, by selected indicators, Pingling, 1996______
Item Ideal number of persons in family Total No. Mean Std.dev.
2 3 4 5 6+
A. Age group
18-39 1.5 38.5 43.7 11.1 5.2 100.0 135 3.8 0.853
40-59 5.4 24.7 44.1 14.0 11.8 100.0 93 4.0 1.042
60+ 9.3 17.0 21.4 25.8 26.4 100.0 182 4.4 1.297
B. Sex, under 60
Males 3.7 36.5 40.2 13.2 6.3 100.0 189 3.8 0.934
Females 0.0 15.4 61.5 7.7 15.4 100.0 39 4.2 0.902
C. Sex, 60 and above
Males 11.2 20.4 19.4 22.4 26.5 100.0 98 4.3 1.360
Females 7.1 13.1 23.8 29.8 26.2 100.0 84 4.5 1.126
D. Education
Illiterate 8.8 17.5 21.9 25.5 26.3 100.0 137 4.4 1.288
Primary school 7.2 20.5 37.3 16.9 18.1 100.0 83 4.2 1.170
Junior high+ 3.2 34.2 41.1 13.7 7.9 100.0 190 3.9 0.956
E. No. of generations in household
1 20.0 28.0 28.0 14.0 10.0 100.0 50 3.6 1.239
2 4.8 37.4 49.0 6.1 2.7 100.0 147 3.6 0.783
3+ 3.3 17.4 24.9 27.7 26.8 100.0 217 4.6 1.154
F. Living 
standard
Poor 15.8 31.6 42.1 0.0 10.5 100.0 19 3.6 1.121
Average 5.9 20.8 36.3 20.4 16.6 100.0 289 4.2 1.128
Well-to-do 3.8 28.8 28.8 20.0 18.8 100.0 80 4.2 1.166
Wealthy 4.5 77.3 13.6 0.0 4.5 100.0 22 3.2 0.752
All 5.9 25.9 33.9 18.3 16.1 100.0 4.1 1.143
No. 24 106 139 75 66 410
Source: Household survey data
the highest proportion not only among those favouring a large family (52.2 per cent), but 
also among those favouring the other extreme of two-person household (9.3 per cent). It 
is not difficult to explain the former phenomenon, since the influence of traditional norms 
is still quite strong among the elderly. The puzzle is why some aged people opted for a 
single or two-person household. Information from personal interviews shows that old 
people’s opinion on living arrangements seemed to be influenced by the situation they 
were trapped in. To a certain extent, the ideal might be just a reluctant admission of the
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reality. By contrast, few people of younger generations could imagine that they would end 
up living alone.
The means in Panels B and C of Table 6.1 indicate that larger families were more 
preferred by women in the study area, whereas two-person families were more preferred 
by males. To see the effect of sex in detail, the respondents were divided into two groups: 
those aged under 60 and those aged 60 and above. The general preference for large 
families was still detectable in the old age group, as discussed in the previous paragraph. 
The young age group shows a different pattern. Although both men and women favoured 
small families, women were more likely to choose four-person household than three- 
person families. This implies that, although small-family norms were quite popular among 
younger generations, the One-Child norm found more approval among males than females. 
The difference in family size preference in general, and acceptance of the One-Child policy 
in particular, between males and females reflects their respective status and roles both at 
home and in society. Men are usually more outwardly oriented, better educated, financially 
more independent, and more open to new ideas. In societies like that of China where 
government influence is very strong, men are more likely to be convinced or exposed to 
pressure first, because of their active involvement in social life. In contrast, women are 
usually family oriented and have fewer external opportunities or connections. Their 
preference for a larger family can be explained not only by persisting traditional values, but 
by practical financial and emotional needs as well.
It is well documented in previous literature that modem education is an effective 
vehicle for the dissemination of small-family norms. In Panel D of Table 6.1 the level of 
education is divided into three groups: illiterate, primary school, junior high school and 
above. The means of preferred number of persons in a family decrease from 4.4 among the 
illiterate to 3.9 among those who have at least junior high school education. The shrinking 
standard deviation (from 1.288 to 0.956) indicates that the higher the educational level, 
the more clustered the ideal value. In the high-education group, for example, when the 
ideal number of persons in a household moves up by one category from four to five, the
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approval rate dropped sharply from 41.1 to 13.7 per cent. The proportion of those who 
still preferred families with six or more persons is less than one-third of that observed in 
the illiterate group. Needless to say, the age factor must be taken into account here, since 
in the study area age is negatively related to the educational level. As shown in Table 4.1, 
72.9 per cent of old people aged 60 and over fell into the illiterate category. Therefore, old 
people’s preference is consistent with their education level.
In Panel E in Table 6.1 household structure is divided into three groups: single­
generation, two-generation and multi-generation of three and above. The mean number of 
persons in a family is the same for the first two groups, only the ideal value of the two- 
generation households is more concentrated as shown in the smaller standard deviation. In 
the multi-generation group the mean increased by one person to 4.6. This indicates that 
people in the study area were more likely to favour family size compatible with the 
structure they currently lived in. For example, 86.4 per cent of the two-generation group 
preferred small families with three or four persons, while 54.5 per cent of the multi- 
generation group picked up large families with five or more persons. As far as the ideal is 
concerned, or excluding premature death or divorce, only large families can make multi­
generation living likely. A three-generation household should consist at least of five 
persons: two grandparents, two parents and one child, an interesting variant of the One- 
Child family promoted by the government.
Living standard in the questionnaire is roughly divided into four groups in Panel F 
of Table 6.1: poor, average, well-to-do and wealthy, according to respondents’ personal 
judgement in relation to local economic conditions. The survey reveals no statistically 
significant relationship between living standard and people’s family size preference. The 
means suggest that people from both extremes, poor and wealthy, preferred smaller 
families. The wealthy group has the highest preference for three-person households. It is 
plausible that poor families could not afford a large family, whereas wealthy families chose 
not to have more children. The majority who considered their standard of living as average 
or well-to-do were in favour of larger households. This suggests that living standard has a
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dual effect on people’s fertility preference. As living standard rises, it may encourage some 
people to want more children and others to want fewer. The relationship appears to be 
negative only after the family reaches a higher standard of living.
Table 6.2: Percentage distribution of respondents to the question about ideal 
number of generations in household, by selected indicators, Pingling, 1996
Item Ideal number of generations
in family
1 2 3+
Total No. Mean Std.dev.
A. Age group
18-39 0.7 48.1 51.2 100.0 135 2.5 0.517
40-59 3.2 29.0 67.7 100.0 93 2.6 0.545
60+ 5.5 14.3 80.2 100.0 182 2.7 0.548
B. Sex, under 60
Males 2.1 38.6 59.3 100.0 189 2.6 0.537
Females 0.0 48.7 51.3 100.0 39 2.5 0.506
C. Sex, 60 and above
Males 6.1 11.2 82.7 100.0 98 2.8 0.552
Females 4.8 17.9 77.5 100.0 84 2.7 0.546
D. Education
Illiterate 5.1 16.1 78.8 100.0 137 2.7 0.546
Primary school 3.6 22.9 73.5 100.0 83 2.7 0.535
Junior high+ 2.1 40.5 57.4 100.0 190 2.5 0.539
E. No. of generations in household
1 12.0 32.0 56.0 100.0 50 2.4 0.705
2 2.0 44.2 53.7 100.0 147 2.5 0.541
3+ 2.3 17.4 80.3 100.0 213 2.8 0.469
F. Living standard
Poor 10.5 42.1 47.4 100.0 19 2.4 0.684
Average 3.5 28.7 67.8 100.0 293 2.6 0.547
Well-to-do 2.5 23.8 73.8 100.0 80 2.7 0.508
Wealthy 0.0 36.4 63.6 100.0 22 2.6 0.492
All 3.4 28.8 67.8 100.0 2.6 0.546
No. 14 118 278 410
Source: Household survey data
Table 6.2 gives the percentage distribution of answers to the question of ideal 
number of generations in a household, the mean and its standard deviation by selected 
indicators of personal characteristics. Ideal number of generations in a household is 
divided into three categories: one, two, and three and above. Over two-thirds of
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respondents preferred to live in a stem household consisting of three generations. Two- 
generation households were also popular, with an approval rate of 28.8 per cent. Very few 
people (3.4 per cent) chose to live in a single-generation household. The mean number of 
generations in a household is about 2.6. This dominant preference for coresidence of three 
generations remains little changed when broken down by five independent variables: age, 
sex, education, number of generations in current household, and living standard. Together 
with those favouring two-generation households, the proportion of respondents who 
expected coresidence with children reached 96.6 per cent. Clearly, minor variations still 
exist. For example, as people aged, they were more likely to choose living alone or in a 
stem household. The higher the education people obtained, the more likely they were to 
choose to live in a nuclear family of two generations. Generally speaking, people were 
more likely to favour the structure that was compatible to their current living 
arrangements.
Table 6.3: Correlation coefficients between dependent and selected 
independent variables (p<0.05)______________________________
Independent variables Dependent variables
No. of persons No of generations
Age 0.2699 0.2328
Sex 0.1720
Education -0.2384 -0.1828
No. of generations 
Living standard
0.3174 0.2375
Table 6.3 shows the correlation coefficients to look at the independent effect of 
age, sex, education, the number of generations in the current family and living standard on 
the two dependent variables: the ideal number of persons and generation in a family. It 
seems that age and the current number of generations in the household have the strongest 
positive effect on people’s preferences for family size and structure. The influence of 
education is also visible, but from an opposite direction. If males are coded as 0 and 
females as 1, there seems to be a positive but weak association (0.172) between sex and 
the ideal number of persons. Such an association is not significant when it comes to the 
ideal number of generations. The relationship between living standard and people’s
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preference for family size and structure is not evident. It is worth noting that living 
standard itself is sometimes influenced by other socio-demographic factors. More often it 
is used as a dependent variable rather than an independent variable in social science 
studies.
From the household survey results, it is evident that the small family norm in terms 
of ideal number of persons in a household has been widely accepted by villagers in the 
study area. Over two-thirds of respondents thought small families with four persons at 
most are ideal. Preferences for family structure in terms of ideal number of generations in 
a household reveal that a considerable proportion of people (67.8 per cent) were in favour 
of multi-generation households. The fact that very few people preferred two-person or 
single-generation households indicates that independent living as observed commonly 
among the elderly in other industrialised countries is not going to be a popular choice of 
rural people in the near future.
Perhaps the most surprising finding from the household survey is the inconsistency 
between the ideal number of persons and the ideal number of generations in a family 
household. As discussed above, a three-generation household should consist of at least 
five persons: two grandparents, two parents and one child. Obviously, this runs counter to 
the popular choice of the ideal number of persons in a family at no more than four. Of 
course, for a three-generation stem household, a combination of four members is possible, 
but far from ideal according to Chinese traditions, which always see premature death of 
family members or dissolution of a marriage as a tragedy. This inconsistency can possibly 
explained in this way. On the one hand, because of the changing social and economic 
situations in general, and the government’s explicit birth control targets in particular, the 
majority of villagers might have changed their fertility desires from having many children 
to having fewer children, as reflected in the popularity of small-family norms. On the other 
hand, people still thought coresidence in a multi-generation household ideal. As discussed 
previously, the inconsistency in government policies is likewise apparent, promoting both 
birth control and family support for the elderly in rural areas. Given the general acceptance
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of small-family norms and the popular approval for multi-generation households at the 
grassroots level, it seems to be possible to reconcile the two inconsistent sets by 
encouraging young couples to have fewer children but still coreside with elderly parents.
6.3. Expectations of coresidence
At the present stage, coresidence is the most popular and practical form of family 
support for the elderly in rural China. As indicated in the household survey results 
discussed previously, respondents showed a strong preference for coresidence with 
children, in terms of the ideal number of persons in the household as well as the ideal 
number of generations in the household. The proportion of people expecting to live in a 
three-generation household is especially high. Only a small number of people favoured 
living independently either in a two-person household or a single-generation household. In 
the household survey, respondents were further asked about their attitude toward 
coresidence, which would provide more insights into rural people’s expectation for old- 
age support in future.
Table 6.4 presents the percentage distribution of responses to the question whether 
young people should coreside with elderly parents after marriage by selected indicators of 
personal characteristics. The total number of respondents, 378, is smaller than the 410 
which appeared in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, because those who ticked ‘don’t know’ were 
omitted from discussions here. As can be seen, the majority of respondents gave an 
affirmative answer to the question raised. People who did not agree with the idea 
accounted for less than one-third. In terms of distribution, the results quite agree with the 
pattern shown in Table 6.2, of nearly two-thirds of respondents preferring multi­
generation households.
When broken down into different socio-demographic groups, the general pattern 
basically remains. However, slight variations are still visible. For example, the approval 
rate seems to increase by age, from 68 per cent in the young group to 75.7 per cent in the
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Table 6.4. Percentage distribution of responses to the question 
whether young people should coreside with elderly parents, by 
selected indicators, Pingling, 1996__________________________
Item Yes No Total No.
A. Age group
18-39 68.0 32.0 100.0 125
40-59 70.2 29.8 100.0 84
60+ 75.7 24.3 100.0 169
B. Sex, under 60
Males 64.4 35.6 100.0 174
Females 91.4 8.6 100.0 35
C. Sex, 60 and above
Males 75.0 25.0 100.0 92
Females 76.6 23.4 100.0 77
D. Education
Illiterate 76.8 23.2 100.0 125
Primary school 66.2 33.8 100.0 77
Junior high+ 70.8 29.2 100.0 178
E. No. of generations in household
1 40.9 59.1 100.0 44
2 59.7 40.3 100.0 129
3+ 86.3 13.7 100.0 205
F. Living standard
Poor 81.3 18.8 100.0 16
Average 72.7 27.3 100.0 268
Well-to-do 73.7 26.3 100.0 76
Wealthy 50.0 50.0 100.0 22
All 72.0 28.0 100.0
No. 272 106 378
Source: Household survey data
aged group, as displayed in Panel A of Table 6.4. This suggests a weakened willingness 
among rural youths to coreside with elderly parents. Understandably, young people are 
more willing to embrace new concepts and values associated with modernisation and 
Westernisation in the era of market-oriented reforms. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
‘conjugal’ pattern of family life has become increasingly popular among young people in 
the study area; this gives more emphasis to the husband-wife bond than the parent-son 
obligation. Here the demographic factor is also important. The present-day youth belong 
to the baby-boomer generation, and most of them have a large number of surviving
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siblings, perhaps the largest on average in China’s modem history. For an individual, the 
probability of living separately from parents is high, given the fact that Chinese parents 
usually live with just one married son and his family. It is likely that, in the foreseeable 
future, the approval rate for coresidence among young couples will continue to decline 
from the current high level of 68 per cent. It takes time for the baby-boom effect of the 
1950s and the 1960s to fade away gradually.
Generally speaking, women were more likely than men to value coresidence, 
particularly women in the younger generation, as shown in Panels B and C of Table 6.4. 
While the gender difference is small in the aged group, it is more apparent in the young 
group: the approval rate among females is 1.4 times as high as that among males. This 
indicates that, even among younger women, the family orientation was still strong in the 
study area. In coresidence with the elderly, young women usually provide important 
physical and emotional support, so that family care is even called female care (UN, 1994). 
In the meantime, they also benefit from coresidence at a time of increased female 
participation in the labour force. As observed from the study site, the inter-generational 
assistance often took the form that young women went to work in the daytime while 
elderly parents (or parents-in-law) stayed home doing baby-sitting and housework. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, old women were more likely to coreside with a married son and 
his family. The high approval rate among younger women suggests that they might also 
expect to coreside with children in old age. The qualitative information shows that 
younger women in the study area have become increasingly influential in family decision­
making. If they remain committed continuously, the present-day younger women will 
become a powerful backing force to support coresidence not only now, but in the 
foreseeable future.
There are no consistent patterns when the education factor is taken into 
consideration, as presented in Panel D of Table 6.4. The highest approval rate for 
coresidence is found in the illiterate group. It quite agrees with that observed in the aged 
group, because the majority of old persons in the study area have no schooling. Of the two
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educated groups, the approval rate among those who received at least junior high school 
education is higher than that among those who graduated from primary schools. This is 
compatible with the observation of officials of the District Committee on Ageing that 
people of higher education tend to retain filial respect and treat their parents well. There 
are two plausible reasons. They may have a higher level of moral conscience that values 
providing for the elderly as a virtue, or a better understanding of government policies and 
laws that emphasise the family’s obligations in old-age support.
People’s current form of living arrangements has a clear effect on their approval of 
coresidence: the more generations in the household, the higher the approval rate, as 
suggested in Panel E of Table 6.4. The proportion who agreed with coresidence in the 
multi-generation households is twice as high as that in the single-generation households. In 
comparison, the effect of living standard is not as obvious in Panel F of Table 6.4. It seems 
that people from wealthy families were less enthusiastic about coresidence.
Obviously, the reason for approving coresidence varies from person to person, and 
from family to family. In the household survey, respondents were also asked to choose 
from a list the reasons that most agreed with their personal or family situation. Table 6.5 
only covers those who favoured coresidence, smaller in total number compared with Table 
6.4. Those who disagreed or had no idea were omitted. Since each person was allowed to 
tick as many reasons as possible, each percentage entry in the table only illustrates its 
relation to the total number of persons in the corresponding category. A percentage total 
is meaningless in this situation. The seven pre-identified reasons for supporting 
coresidence are: (1) to continue family traditions; (2) to facilitate inter-generational 
assistance and care; (3) to enhance family influence in the community; (4) to minimise 
living costs; (5) to cope with housing shortage; (6) to improve management of household 
economy; and (7) other reasons.
As presented in Table 6.5, to facilitate inter-generational assistance and care is the 
most frequently chosen answer on the reason for coresidence. Overall, 95.6 per cent of the
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272 respondents considered it the major reason for supporting coresidence, three times 
higher than the next answer: to continue family traditions. Cost of living and housing 
conditions were also considered important by around ten per cent of the respondents. In 
comparison, other reasons listed in the questionnaire only have limited bearing on the 
topic. It can be concluded with certainty that inter-generational assistance is the dominant 
reason for people to value coresidence in the study area, followed by continuity of family 
traditions.
Table 6.5. Percentage distribution of responses, by reasons for supporting 
coresidence, by selected indicators, Pingling, 1996_______________________
Item Reasons for coresidencea No.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A. Age group
18-39 25.9 96.5 1.2 15.3 16.5 9.4 1.2 85
40-59 30.5 98.3 1.7 0.0 1.7 3.4 1.7 59
60+ 24.2 93.8 3.9 11.7 10.9 6.3 2.3 128
B. Sex
Males 28.2 94.5 2.8 12.2 14.4 7.7 2.2 181
Females 22.0 97.8 2.2 6.6 3.3 4.4 1.1 91
C. Education
Illiterate 26.0 94.8 4.2 9.4 6.3 4.2 2.1 96
Primary school 15.7 98.0 2.0 5.9 9.8 9.8 2.0 51
Junior high+ 31.8 94.9 2.0 14.0 16.4 9.5 2.0 124
E. No. of generations in household
1 22.2 88.9 5.6 0.0 0.0 5.6 5.6 18
2 29.9 96.1 2.6 6.5 9.1 7.8 0.0 77
3+ 24.9 96.0 2.3 13.0 12.4 6.2 2.3 177
F. Living standard
Poor 7.7 100.0 0.0 7.7 7.7 7.7 0.0 13
Average 20.3 97.4 2.6 5.2 4.7 3.6 1.6 192
Well-to-do 46.4 91.1 0.0 25.0 21.4 10.7 3.6 56
Wealthy 45.5 81.8 18.2 27.3 13.6 36.4 0.0 11
All 26.1 95.6 2.6 10.3 10.7 6.6 1.8 272
Source: Household survey data
aNote: l=Family tradition; 2=Inter-generational assistance and care; 3=Family 
influence; 4=Living cost; 5=Housing conditions; 6=Management of the household 
economy; 7=Others.
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The general patterns dominated by inter-generational assistance remain largely 
unchanged in all socio-demographic categories, with only minor variations. The effect of 
age is not consistent, as shown in Panel A of Table 6.5. People of all three age groups 
gave high value to inter-generational assistance. Of course, to people in each group, the 
advantage of coresidence comes in different forms. The elderly benefit primarily from 
economic, physical and emotional support provided by family members of younger 
generations, while adult children benefit from a helping hand offered by parents. 
Compared with the middle-aged, people of the younger and older groups reported more 
concerns about the household economy in terms of living costs and housing conditions. 
Panel B displays little gender difference when it comes to inter-generational assistance. 
Nevertheless, a higher proportion among males than females found the family tradition and 
economic considerations important as well. In rural China where the patriarchal influence 
is strong, men are usually more aware of their family obligations. Similarly, men being 
more conscious of economics stems from the fact that they take more responsibility as 
household heads or the main bread winners in the family. It is interesting to find that inter- 
generational assistance is emphasised even by people who live in single- and two- 
generation households, presented in Panel C. As for people from the multi-generation 
households, their other concerns about living costs and household conditions are 
understandable, because the benefit of coresidence is more evident in such living 
arrangements. Panel D indicates that inter-generational assistance found wide approval 
among people of different educational backgrounds. People in the high-education category 
were more conscious than others of family traditions and economic considerations. This 
suggests that modem education and traditional values are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. In living standard category, as illustrated in Panel E, people from richer families 
were more concerned about traditional values and economic benefits of coresidence. 
Family traditions were mentioned by nearly half of people from the well-to-do and wealthy 
families, the highest proportion in all groups. The cost of living, housing conditions and 
management of the household economy were also mentioned by a large number of people 
in these two groups. It is worth noting that family influence and household economy 
management have also been thought of as benefits of coresidence by a few people of the
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wealthy group. This can be explained from an opposite direction: a large, influential family 
is able to optimise the household economy, resulting in better returns or greater profits.
Inter-generational assistance and care as the dominant reason for people favouring 
coresidence is also evident from the focus-group discussions, particularly among the 
elderly participants. It seems that, in coresidence, old people were more concerned about 
the availability of physical and emotional support in case of illness or disability than 
insufficiency in economic support. Their demand for specific material support is moderate, 
usually no more than the basics of subsistence. In comparison, companionship with family 
members and the satisfaction of being able to fulfil traditional social roles in coresidence 
were highly valued.
Participant 1: When people age, they need someone to be around. Health 
permitting, few old persons sit idle at home. If not (permitting), what they want is 
just a meal.
Participant 2: Old people don’t expect children waiting at table all the time. It’s 
fine as long as they remain filial in heart and care how parents feel in hot or in cold.
Participant 3: For old people it is not easy to bring up a child. Now, they also look 
after grandchildren. When parents fall sick, it would be good if the daughter-in-law 
comes and serves a cup of tea (Focus discussion group, elderly males).
As found from the household survey, over one-quarter of respondents (28 per 
cent) did not favour young couples living continuously with their parents after marriage. 
The proportion is especially high among younger generations. In rural China, individuals 
have only limited power to choose living arrangements according to their personal 
preference or taste. The decision is commonly made by the family, or negotiated among 
family members. People’s ideal does not necessarily mean what they eventually get. 
However, it seems that, were young people given a chance, a sizeable number in the study 
area would choose separate living. In fact, the majority of married young couples in the 
study area did live in a separate residence, because parents usually only coreside with one 
of the many siblings. In the focus-group discussions, some participants also talked about 
the disadvantages of coresidence. The most frequently mentioned disadvantage is
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bufangbian (inconvenience), a typical Chinese term for lack of privacy and personal 
freedom. Other reasons include conflicts between in-laws and housework burden. This 
suggests that family division is usually caused by social reasons rather than economic 
reasons, although some domestic disputes may be attributed to economic problems in the 
first place. As for its relevance to old-age support, children living separately may mean 
fewer people available at home for physical and emotional support, but not necessarily for 
economic support.
6.4. Old-age support strategies: whom to rely on?
In spite of the inevitable effects of modernisation and the government’s social 
engineering programs over the last few decades, the family still played a central role in 
providing for the elderly in the study area. Family support, mostly in the form of 
coresidence, includes not only economic assistance to parents throughout old age, but also 
physical care and emotional relief when they become unable to survive on their own. The 
present-day elderly belong to a unique generation in China. They are not so lucky, because 
few of them were able to obtain their own old-age security through assets accumulating 
activities in their working life during the commune period. On the other hand, because 
they have on average a large number of surviving children, perhaps the largest in China’s 
modem history, they are fortunate to have a large number of potential providers, at least in 
theory. There are two more factors that facilitate the potential providers materialising their 
support obligations: their improved financial capability thanks to the recent market- 
oriented reforms, and the government’s explicit policy that promotes family support. 
Therefore, the majority of the present-day elderly can enjoy a relatively secure later life. 
As for the very few who fell into poverty because of childlessness or neglect by unfilial 
children, certain community assistance is still available.
For people now in their adult years, the security situation in their old age is less 
certain, because they have fewer children to count on for support. The current young adult 
cohorts are also unique in China’s modem history. First, the total number of this
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generation is the largest, because of the baby booms in the 1950s and 1960s. Second, it is 
the first generation whose fertility behaviour has been directly influenced or manipulated 
by government birth control policies. Third, people of this generation are not only 
experiencing but also contributing to the most drastic changes associated with 
modernisation. Their ideas, values and conduct will have profound policy implications for 
family planning and family support.
Table 6.6. Percentage distribution of respondents under 60, by expected form 
of old-age support, by selected indicators, Pingling, 1996___________________
Item Expected source of supporta Total No.
1 2 3 4
A. Age group
18-39 54.1 17.8 27.4 0.7 100.0 135
40-59 54.8 24.7 19.4 1.1 100.0 93
B. Sex
Males 54.5 22.8 21.7 1.1 100.0 189
Females 53.8 10.3 35.9 0.0 100.0 39
C. Education
Illiterate 50.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 100.0 12
Primary school 55.8 27.9 16.3 0.0 100.0 43
Junior high+ 54.3 18.5 26.0 1.2 100.0 173
D. No. of generations in household
1 44.4 44.4 11.1 0.0 100.0 9
2 56.9 19.2 23.8 0.0 100.0 130
3+ 51.7 20.2 25.8 2.2 100.0 89
E Living standard
Poor 53.8 30.8 15.4 0.0 100.0 13
Average 55.4 16.9 27.0 0.7 100.0 148
Well-to-do 52.0 24.0 24.0 0.0 100.0 50
Wealthy 52.9 35.3 5.9 5.9 100.0 17
All 54.4 20.6 24.1 0.9 100.0
No. 124 47 55 2 228
Source: Household survey data
aNote: l=Family; 2=Self-support; 3=Shared responsibility; 4=Others.
In the household survey, respondents aged under 60 were asked whence they 
expected to receive major economic support in old age. In the context of rural China, four 
categories were pre-identified: mainly the family; mainly self, including insurance
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programs; shared responsibility between the family and the community; and other sources. 
Here family support refers primarily to children’s support. As shown in Table 6.6, the 
family remains the most popular choice of support source. Over half of the respondents 
(54.4 per cent) expected the family to provide major support. The second most frequently 
mentioned option is shared responsibility between the family and the community. This is 
compatible with the government policy that in rural areas the family bears the major 
responsibility of old-age support and the community provides necessary assistance. 
Altogether, those who expected family support with community assistance accounted for 
78.5 per cent of the total. However, still a sizeable number of respondents, about one-fifth 
of the total, believed in self-support and insurance programs. In recent years, some rural 
communities in the developed coastal regions have become wealthy enough to establish 
their own pension programs. Old people in the community are entitled to a monthly 
pension benefit of 60-100 Yuan. In the study area, however, such community-based 
pension programs are currently still non-existent; but local governments have helped to 
introduce a number of old-age insurance programs on a ‘user-pay’ basis. Therefore, these 
programs can be seen as a form of self-support. Very few persons, only two of the total 
228, chose the ‘others’ category which refers primarily to the public pension benefits 
enjoyed by public servants and workers in state-owned enterprises. Rural residents are not 
covered by this program at the present stage. The two persons may work in a state-owned 
factory, and, therefore, be eligible for the pension coverage.
6.4.1. Family support and the children
In Table 6.6, the share of people who expected the family to be the main provider 
of economic support remains relatively constant, slightly higher than 50 per cent, across 
the full spectrum of groups. Although not high compared with the nearly 80 per cent of 
the present-day elderly depending on children for support (see Table 5.7), it indicates that 
family support, provided mainly by children, was still popular among the majority of 
working age adults. Here the demographic availability of children is a principal concern. 
However, the concern with old-age security did not translate to a noticeable preference for
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a large family. As discussed above, a sizeable proportion of villagers have accepted the 
idea of One-Child family, although the majority still want at least two children (Table 6.1). 
Obviously, desired fertility and current fertility are two separate concepts. For the 
respondents, there is also a difference between the ideal number of children and the 
number of children they already have. For example, of the 151 married women under 40 in 
Nanshangzhao, 139 had at least one child at the time of my fieldwork, resulting in an 
average of 2.1. In the face of a renewed effort to enforce birth control targets in the study 
area, as discussed in Chapter 3, it is unlikely that those who have two or more children 
will continue childbearing. However, it is not so sure whether or not mothers of a single­
child will proceed to additional births. Among the participants of focus-group discussions, 
one child per couple was clearly not a popular idea, but too many children were not 
preferred, either.
Participant 1: For such a large country, how come people have just one child? I 
still think it’s better to have at least two. Food is not a problem. One person does 
not consume much.
Participant 2: It depends. There should not be too many dependants (in the family). 
Now two people working can hardly support three children. Just imagine how to 
cope if you have five or six as before (Focus discussion group, elderly males).
Participant 1: Two boys are enough. If something happens, parents still have one 
left to rely on.
Participant 2: Life is short. Had you five or six children like in old times, they 
would consume all your time (Focus discussion group, young males).
Participant 1: Once you got a boy, that’s enough. Just can’t afford too many, the 
(economic) burden multiplies (Focus discussion group, young females).
Information from focus-group discussions confirms the pattern revealed in the 
survey data that most people in the study area preferred two children, providing one of 
them is a boy. It is interesting that, while expressing their disagreement with the One-Child 
idea, respondents quickly added that it was their own opinion, not an attempt to dispute 
government policies. The Party line has to be respected, at least in principle. The 
preference for the two-child family is compatible with that found by Greenhalgh (1993) in
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her study in the same district. However, there was no obvious suggestion that the ideal sex 
combination of children should be one son and one daughter.
The son preference is still strong in the study area, as illustrated in a local saying: 
yi zi ding renxin (people become assured only after a boy is bom). The predominant view 
was that sons are needed as manpower, followed by old-age support and the tradition. The 
fact that old-age security motive per se takes a secondary position in people’s fertility 
desires agrees with the observation of Bulatao (1981) that it probably does not explain 
variation among desires for small families. China is unique only because small family 
norms are largely induced by government interventions. The influence of old-age security 
considerations becomes increasingly weak when the number of children a couple can have 
is artificially limited by government policies. In fact, as an old man pointed out, old-age 
support cannot be guaranteed without sufficient able-bodied labourers at home. ‘In farm 
work, two daughters are not as good as a son’, added he. Watering farm plots was often 
mentioned during focus-group discussions as one of the major farming tasks that only 
young men can perform. As introduced in Chapter 3, over 80 per cent of the land in the 
study area is irrigated, thanks to the near-by Weihui Irrigation Canal. However, the water 
use is strictly regulated. Each village can only use the water during a specific period 
according to a schedule handed down from the management office. During this period, 
sometimes far into the night, every family has to do its best to complete the watering on 
time. Physically, women are not considered capable for the job. There are also safety 
reasons for not allowing women to go out at night.
Table 6.7. Distribution of married women under 40, by number and sex of 
children, Pingling, 1996___________________________________________
Number and sex of children1 Total
One child Two children Three children Others
b g bb gg bg gb bbb ggg bbg ggb
No. of women 20 12 21 4 15 25 1 7 4 10 20 139
Source: Secondary data collected in Nanshangzhao 
a: b=Boy; g=Girl.
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The son preference and the desire for at least two children can be detected from 
the birth records of married women under 40 in Nanshangzhao, as presented in Table 6.7. 
Among the 139 women with children, 76.9 per cent have more than one child and 83.5 per 
cent have at least one son. According to the current policy, the 12 women with girls only 
are allowed to have another try after a four-year interval. In practice, the spacing policy is 
not always strictly observed. It is likely that most of them would take the chance sooner, if 
they indeed wanted to try a second time. Once women with more than one child are taken 
into account, the proportion with at least one son reaches 89.7 per cent. Of the 65 women 
with two children, 36 gave birth to a boy first and 29 a girl first. Gender seems to have 
little influence in women’s decision to proceed from the first to the second parity. While 
21 women are happy with two boys, only four women with two girls stopped. Among 
women with three children, those who have already two girls are 3.4 times more likely 
than those with two boys to have an additional child. Four women with three girls even 
tried a fourth time. Therefore, most of the present-day young adults in the study area will 
end up in old age with at least two children as potential providers, and with at least one 
son to coreside eventually. The number of childless couples will be extremely small.
For parents expecting family support, as De Vos (1985) asserted, there is a net 
economic cost to having children and a trade-off between quantity and quality of children. 
As commonly believed by focus-group participants, the costs of raising children has 
increased sharply in recent years, particularly for education and health care. Rural primary 
schools in the study area are managed by the community and the teachers are paid by the 
government. Still, students have to pay a variety of miscellaneous fees, 70 Yuan per 
semester in 1996. High schools charge even more. In spite of the rising cost, parents still 
want their children to get as much education as possible. The enrolment rate of primary 
school children has remained 100 per cent for years. The majority of the focus-group 
participants wanted their children to finish at least junior high school, since they 
themselves are mostly junior high school graduates. The typical view is that society 
changes so fast that having no education simply does not work any longer. Nevertheless, 
boys were more likely to enjoy preferential treatments. In the case of a son, the parents are
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usually determined to support him with all their resources all the way to college, as long as 
he can pass the entrance examination. As for a girl, it is time for her to get married after 
completing junior high school. It seems that people still want to invest more in sons than 
daughters, since the economic potential of sons is generally greater than that of daughters 
who will marry out anyway. With good education, children are commonly expected to find 
a job in the cities. ‘No matter what job, it is better than staying in the village’, a young 
woman stated. The striking new emphasis on the education of children suggests that a 
shift in preferences from quantity to ‘quality’ of children is well under way in the study 
area26. It is worth noting that this spontaneous trade-off strategy among villagers is 
surprisingly consistent with the targets of the government’s family planning and education 
promotion programs in rural areas. Educated people are more likely not only to have 
sufficient means to support parents, but also to have fewer children themselves.
6.4.2. Community assistance and self-support
Figures in Table 6.6 suggest that the working age adults in the study area expected 
less financial dependency on family in old age. In the meantime, their interest in other 
alternative sources of support increased: community assistance and self-support, including 
insurance programs. At the present stage, the assistance the community can provide in the 
study area is limited, primarily to the childless elderly under the Five-Guarantee system. 
The high proportion of people expecting a shared responsibility between the family and the 
community in old-age support can be interpreted as a hope for the community to take an 
increasingly important part in providing financial assistance to families in crisis. This 
reflects to a certain extent rural people’s worries about the possible risks and uncertainties 
in the new-found family farming and market economy, with which individual families are 
hardly in a position to cope independently. As discussed previously, most of the 
institutional conditions identified by Nugent (1985) in his arguments for the old-age 
security-fertility hypothesis can still be found in the study area. In old times, parents might
26 Not only the ‘quality’ in terms of education, parents were also concerned about their chldren’s 
‘quality’ in terms of health. In Nanshangzhao, as many as 40 households have bought health insurance 
policies for their children.
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choose to have many children as ‘insurance’ for crisis management. Nowadays, in the 
presence of strong birth control programs, such a strategy becomes less applicable, if not 
totally impossible. Therefore, it is natural for people to hope the community will act as 
some sort of safety net. In fact, there were a number of welfare programs during the 
commune period, such as the Five-Guarantees system and the co-operative health care 
system. Unfortunately, most programs ceased to work after the commune broke up. The 
survey finding shows that there is a demand among villagers to restore or strengthen the 
community-based social welfare programs. In recent years, lack of funds is a major 
problem that hampers the development of such programs. At the present stage, the priority 
of local governments lies in continuous efforts to promote the rural economy and expand 
the pool for fund-raising.
The household survey indicates that about 20 per cent of the elderly currently 
support themselves with their own labour income or with limited assistance from children 
(Table 5.7). In comparison, a similar proportion among the younger generation expected 
that they would rely financially on self-support in old age. The difference is only minimal. 
This may in part stem from a conviction that financial independence is more important 
than living arrangements. Even in coresidence, the elderly can still remain independent 
financially. There are two common points made by the focus-group participants for people 
choosing self-support: uncertainty about children’s availability or willingness to provide 
support, and confidence in providing for old-age security during the working life. For 
example, the highest proportion of people expecting self-support can be found in the 
wealthy group in Panel E of Table 6.6.
Participant 1: Nobody can be sure if the children are reliable for old-age support in 
future. It is OK if they remain loyal. If not, there is social pressure. Anyway, 
nobody is certain.
Participant 2: You have already got your house built, what else (do you) worry 
about? How much can one eat in his later years? Anyway, the family plot is always 
there (Focus discussion group, young males).
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Ms. Bian (my host in Nanshangzhao): I prefer to live separately from my children.
It has nothing to do with whether I love them or not. After all, I don’t want to mix
up with them in money matters (Focus discussion group, young females).
In the study area, the family house is still the largest part of the private assets 
villagers can accumulate and inherit. That is why people keep renovating or rebuilding 
their houses, from brick to cement structures, from one-storey to two-storey buildings, 
and from outside decoration to internal design, to continuously add to the value. In a 
situation where a capital and investment market is still non-existent, a house is the most 
reliable guarantee for old-age security. Another long-term strategy of old-age security is 
to invest in the family land plot, such as by ameliorating soil quality, improving the 
irrigation system, and even converting the plot into orchards. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
land is still nominally community-owned, only to be allocated to families on a per capita 
basis. Each person in the family has the same land rights under his or her own name. Since 
the contracted plot is not sellable, people can enjoy the return of their investment for a 
relatively long period.
Previously, as discussed in Chapter 1, formal pension programs only existed in 
cities, covering mainly public servants and workers in the state-owned factories. In the 
study area, two old-age insurance programs have also been introduced in recent years: the 
Rural Social Pension Insurance Program (nongcun shehui yanglao baoxian), managed by 
a special government body, and the Happiness Old-Age Insurance Policy (xinfu 
yanglaojin baoxian), run by the People’s Insurance Company of China largely on a 
commercial basis. Nationally, the Rural Social Pension Insurance Program was established 
in 1991 to extend old-age pension coverage to farmers and workers in township 
enterprises in rural areas. In Shaanxi, according to the 1995 statistics collected from the 
Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, 80 of the total of 107 counties have launched their 
pilot projects. Farmers can choose the level of premium and benefit in accordance with 
their own conditions. The monthly contribution ranges from two to 20 Yuan, and the 
policy-holders are entitled to the benefits after reaching 60 years of age. Largely on a user- 
pays basis, the program also enjoys a number of preferential treatments from the
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government, such as tax exemption. In Pingling, a township official was nominated to take 
charge of the pilot project in the area under the leadership of the District Department of 
Civil Affairs. Six persons in Nanshangzhao have already joined the program. Most 
participants in the focus-group discussions knew something about the program, and they 
were also willing to take a policy. This indicates that people in the study area have started 
to realise the advantages of modem institutions in securing old-age support quite 
differently from the traditional ways. The reason why not many villagers had participated 
so far was uncertainty about the result, according to the prevailing opinion. People wanted 
to wait and see if the money is really worth spending. Understandably, the concept is new 
to villagers and the program itself is still in its infancy. Even officials of the relevant 
departments are not quite confident whether the insurance fund can be managed in a 
professional way under such volatile and defective market conditions. It takes time for the 
management to convince villagers that their money is well spent.
Since the introduction of the One-Child policy in the early 1980s, local 
governments have offered a number of economic incentives to couples agreeing to have 
only one child, such as better access to health care and education. In practice, such 
incentives do not look attractive enough, since few people prefer to have a single child. In 
the recent efforts to curtail high-parity births, a new two-daughter pension program was 
introduced. Influenced by the strong son preference in the study area, two-daughter 
families are thought most likely to have a third child, as illustrated in Table 6.7. To 
persuade such couples to stop at two, the program offers old-age pension benefits, 60 
Yuan per month beginning at age 60. Three parties will share the first premium instalment 
of 600 Yuan: the township government, the villagers’ committee and the couple involved. 
In Nanshangzhao, only one couple has accepted the offer and undergone sterilisation. As 
in the case of the Rural Social Pension Insurance Program, people are reluctant to join 
largely because most of them really have no way of knowing how adequate such a pension 
will be several decades hence.
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In Pingling, the township government still runs a small home for four childless old 
persons, who are too frail to survive by themselves. Owing to financial difficulties, 
however, the home is only able to provide the very basics. At the present stage, the old 
people’s home does not seem to be a preferred option for old-age support and care in the 
study area. Few focus-group participants believed that life in the home is enjoyable. Old 
people ended up there simply because they have no other options. They were in fact pitied 
by others, because living in homes is often viewed as a life failure of a person or a shame 
to the family. On the other hand, township officials had no plans to expand the home in the 
near future. As a young woman put it, the childless elderly are so few nowadays that 
officials do not bother to think about maintaining the home any longer.
6.5. Summary remarks
The old-age security-fertility hypothesis has been widely used to explain the 
existing high fertility in most developing countries. Findings from numerous local and 
cross-rvaüonal studies also prove that, to minimise the risks and uncertainties in a 
underdeveloped market economy, parents tend to rely on a large number of children as 
‘insurance’ for old-age support. In rural China, yang er fang lao (rearing children for old 
age) remains a popular ideal, because most institutional conditions that favour children as 
sources of support still exist. Children’s obligation is further strengthened by the 
traditional values such as ancestor worship and filial piety. Family support for the elderly is 
vigorously encouraged by the government through a series of legislative and 
administrative measures.
Since the late 1970s, the Chinese government has launched nationwide birth 
control campaigns in an attempt to curtail population growth, including the controversial 
One-Child policy. The policy formulation is largely based on calculations about the 
relation between macro-demographic and macro-economic growth, with little 
consideration of the possible micro-social effects on families and individuals. Moreover, 
coercive measures were usually employed in policy enforcement, before any substantial
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changes took place in institutional conditions. It seems that the two government policies, 
birth control and family support, contradict each other.
In theory, old-age security with fewer children, if not just one child, has been 
proved feasible in the situation of falling mortality and rising life expectancy. It is found in 
the study area that, under the joint influence of development and programmatic efforts, 
people’s fertility preferences have begun to change. Although such changes have little 
value for testing the old-age security-fertility hypothesis, their policy implications can not 
be underestimated. From the household survey results in the study area, it is evident that 
the small family norm in terms of ideal number of persons in a household has been widely 
accepted by villagers, particularly among people who are young, better educated and 
currently living in small households. If present ideals are going to be translated into future 
behaviour, it can be predicted that the nuclearisation of Chinese families will continue, and 
the changing family-size norms will bring fertility further down to a level much closer to 
government targets.
In terms of family structure, however, it is found that coresidence in a multi­
generation household is the most popular choice. Very few people preferred independent 
living in a single-generation household. The contradiction between the ideal number of 
persons and the ideal number of generations in a family household surprisingly mirrors the 
inconsistency of government policies between birth control and family support. To take 
advantage of the popular acceptance of small family norms and approval of multi­
generation households at the grassroots level, the government is trying to reconcile the 
inconsistency by encouraging young couples to have fewer children but still coreside with 
elderly parents.
Coresidence between parents and married children found high approval rates 
among respondents, across the full spectrum of socio-demographic groups. The most 
common reason respondents gave for favouring coresidence is inter-generational support 
and care, followed by family traditions. The elderly expected from family members not
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only economic and material support, but more importantly also physical care and 
emotional relief, particularly in sickness and disability. Obviously, coresidence as the major 
form of family support should be encouraged continuously in future.
The present-day elderly and working-age adults belong to two unique generations 
in China’s modem history. The former have fewer personal assets but more children for 
providing old-age support. The latter, by contrast, have fewer children but more 
opportunities to obtain their own old-age security. For economic support, over half of the 
younger respondents followed the traditional pattern and expected children to be their 
main providers in old age. Nevertheless, such expectations did not lead to a noticeable 
preference for large families. Because of increased policy pressure and rising economic 
burdens, most couples believed that two children are enough, providing one is a son. As a 
trade-off for quantity, parents now put special emphasis on the education of children. The 
policy implications for family planning programs are obvious: the One-Child target is not 
applicable in rural areas and should be replaced by a more practical One-Son or Two- 
Children policy, allowing for certain spacing requirements. In the meantime, a sizeable 
proportion of respondents wanted an increasing contribution from the community in 
providing necessary assistance to families to cope with the risks and uncertainties of family 
farming and a market economy. Still, as many as one-fifth of the respondents believed that 
they could arrange their old-age security with own efforts. Very few people participated in 
the insurance programs designed by the government to serve rural residents. It takes time 
for such programs to be trusted by their target clients.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. Summary of major findings
Population ageing is a world phenomenon. Much of the interest in the 
consequences of population ageing focuses on the security and support for the elderly as 
individuals and as a generation. In China, as in most developing countries, the family 
remains the principal provider of old-age support and care. This study aims at examining 
on a community basis the status and well-being of the elderly, the familial support system 
for the elderly, and the old-age security strategies of rural people in response to the two 
major government policies in rural areas: birth control and family support for the elderly, 
in the context of a functional return to family farming. Although it is unrealistic to expect a 
community study to permit conclusions about rural China as a whole, it certainly can 
provide rich insights into the topic under investigation.
In order to attain the proposed objects within limited time and financial budget, 
this study employed an integrated approach, the so-called micro-demographic community- 
study approach that combines a formal, structured survey operation with a number of 
intensive quantitative techniques. A household survey was conducted to cover a larger 
area in Pingling Township, in order to identify general patterns and trends. Observation, 
personal interviews and focus-group discussions were primarily used to inquire about 
attitudes, opinions and behaviour. Data collected by different techniques are mutually 
complementary and display a high degree of consistency. The experience from this study 
suggests that this combination is practical and cost-effective for similar studies of social 
and family change in community settings.
This study was conducted in Pingling Township and Nanshangzhao Village, a rural 
community in central Shaanxi, China. Like other places in China, the study area has 
witnessed tremendous changes over the last few decades, from the initial private land
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ownership after the Land Reform to the collectivisation under the commune system and 
further to the return to family farming under the household responsibility system. The local 
economy is now experiencing a gradual transformation from a largely self-sufficient to a 
diversified commodity economy. Although agriculture was still the dominant sector, non- 
agricultural sectors were playing an important role in absorbing surplus labour and 
generating income. Even in agricultural production, machinery and modem technology 
have become increasingly popular. However, unlike most other developing countries on a 
similar modernisation course, socio-economic changes in China are usually sudden and 
drastic, resulting primarily from the government’s direct intervention based on ideological 
concepts or macro socio-economic rationales. With little power of decision-making under 
the current political system, villagers have been subject to various social engineering 
experiments that are not necessarily always in their interest, such as the unpopular One- 
Child policy.
The social status and economic well-being of the aged population reflect to a 
certain extent the current situation of old-age security and support in rural China. In the 
study area, the present elderly generation are a unique group in the population because of 
the drastic socio-economic changes they have experienced over the last few decades: they 
suffered from poverty, war and famine and were deprived of education in their youth 
before 1949, they had limited opportunities to amass sizeable assets at their prime ages 
during the commune era, and now when the economy has been liberalised under the 
household responsibility system for making profits and getting rich, they are too old to 
take advantage of the new rules.
It is evident that the living standard of the elderly in the study area has greatly 
improved since the reform. However, this does not necessarily mean that old people 
enjoyed the same level of well-being and quality of life as younger generations. Old people 
were more likely to live in households of lower income, in poor housing conditions, and 
with no TV sets. What is worth noting is that old people were generally content with their 
present life. On the other hand, modernisation and the government’s campaigns against
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‘feudalist and superstitious’ practices have greatly eroded the power and influence of old 
people at home and in the community. In the study area, only a small number of old people 
still played an active role in the family, as household heads or major decision-makers. As 
an important indicator of status and power at home, elderly parents have lost their 
monopoly in arranging marriages for their children. This basically agrees with the 
modernisation theory that as the society becomes more modernised, the importance of old 
people is reduced. With inadequate economic security and declining status, the present- 
day elderly are likely to rely on children for support.
In the study area, as in other places in rural China, old-age support used to be 
provided by the family. Despite rapid and substantial socio-economic changes over recent 
decades, the family system of support appears still to be largely intact. This is evidenced 
by both the high levels of coresidence of elderly parents with adult children and the 
relatively common receipt of material support from children living separately. The present- 
day elderly have on average a large number of children as potential providers. Over three- 
quarters of old people were supported by adult children, primarily by sons. The elderly not 
only received support from others but also made continuous contributions to the 
household economy. Still, a sizeable proportion of old persons relied on their own 
resources, or were partly assisted by children, for living expenses. Over two-thirds of non­
resident children reported regular economic transfers to their parents. In general, the level 
of economic support the elderly received was not high, with the majority falling in the 
low-expenditure category of 50 Yuan or less per month. However, absolute poverty is not 
a major issue because old persons have land plots allocated under their names. The 
community also provides limited relief funds in cases of crisis.
In the study area, the level of economic support the elderly received was not 
necessarily closely related to the number and sex of children they have or children’s 
financial capacity. Rather, it was influenced primarily by the willingness of children to 
provide support. Inadequate support was often caused by domestic disputes between 
parents and children or among siblings. To offset the fading willingness of children to
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provide for elderly parents, the government resorts increasingly to legal and administrative 
measures to back up the family support system.
The old-age security-fertility hypothesis has been widely used to explain the 
existing high fertility in developing countries. In rural China, yang er fang lao (rearing 
children for old age) remains a popular ideal, because most institutional conditions that 
favour children as sources of support still exist. Under the joint influence of modernisation 
and programmatic efforts, people’s fertility preferences have begun to change. It is evident 
that the small-family norm has been widely accepted in the study area, particularly by 
people who were young, better educated and currently living in nuclear households. In 
terms of family structure, however, coresidence in a multi-generation household is the 
most popular choice. Very few people preferred independent living in a single-generation 
household. The inconsistency between the ideal number of persons and the ideal number 
of generations in a family household surprisingly mirrors the inconsistency of government 
policies between birth control and family support.
Coresidence between parents and married children found high approval rates 
among respondents, across the full spectrum of socio-demographic groups. The most 
common reason respondents gave for favouring coresidence is inter-generational support 
and care, followed by family traditions. The elderly expected from family members not 
only economic and material support, but more importantly also physical care and 
emotional relief, particularly in sickness and disability.
The present-day elderly and working-age adults belong to two unique generations. 
The former have fewer personal assets but more children for providing support. The latter, 
by contrast, have fewer children but more opportunities to obtain their own old-age 
security in a market-oriented economy. For economic support, over half of the younger 
respondents followed the traditional pattern and expected children to be their main 
providers in old age. Nevertheless, such expectations did not lead to a noticeable 
preference for large families. Because of increased policy pressure and rising economic
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burdens, most couples believed that two children are enough, providing that one is a son. 
As a trade-off for quantity, parents now put special emphasis on the education of children. 
In the meantime, a sizeable proportion of respondents wanted an increasing contribution 
from the community in assisting families to cope with the risks and uncertainties of family 
farming and market economy. Still, as many as one-fifth of the respondents believed that 
they could arrange their old-age security with own efforts. At the present stage, very few 
people participated in the insurance programs designed by the government to serve rural 
residents. It takes time for such programs to be trusted by their target clients.
7.2. Conclusions and discussions
The family plays the central role in the support of older people throughout the 
world. In most developing countries, family members and a network of relatives remain 
virtually the only source of support on whom rural people can rely in their old age. In 
recent years, much of the interest in old-age security focuses on the question whether the 
current family support system will endure in the face of fertility decline, population ageing, 
and other socio-economic changes associated with modernisation. Some researchers 
assume that rural conditions in developing countries will eventually improve to the extent 
that older people are able to achieve financial independence through either their higher 
earning power in recent times or the widening coverage of pension and insurance 
programs (Petri, 1982; Jones, 1993). Others believe, however, that for the foreseeable 
future the traditional system of family support is likely to remain the more efficient method 
in rural areas of developing countries. Considerable caution must be exercised in any 
attempt to impose expensive and individualistic programs from Western societies (Nugent, 
1990). Governments are recommended to adopt an integrated approach towards old-age 
support, in which family support is supplemented by public services (UN, 1994).
In China the issue of family support for the elderly is of particular concern because 
of several factors: the unprecedented pace of population ageing, the sheer multitude of the 
aged, the low level of development, the radical transformation of social and economic
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structures since the late 1970s, the lack of a universal social security system, and the 
government birth control commitment. In fact, the government requires that the support of 
the elderly in rural areas be shouldered chiefly by their families and supplemented by 
community assistance, when a unified social security system is deemed financially 
unfeasible and administratively unmanageable at the current stage of development 
(Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1995). The government policy is based largely on two 
considerations. First, a strengthened family support system is essential for maintaining the 
general well-being of the elderly, and, hence, the social stability in rural areas. Second, 
given the evident old-age support motives of high fertility, a strengthened family support 
system is also crucial to the success of family planning programs.
Generally speaking, the demographic and socio-economic consequences of 
modernisation are inevitable. Once the policy is announced, the remaining question is: how 
to guarantee the family support system continue to function effectively without putting the 
elderly’s welfare in jeopardy. As discussed in Chapter 1, Hashimoto and Kendig (1992) 
have identified four main factors at macro level that can influence family support for the 
elderly: demographic, economic, political and cultural. Understandably, the influence is 
exerted in different ways. The four factors are discussed here in such an order to reflect 
their respective relevance to future family support in rural China.
7.2.1. Demographic factors
Undoubtedly, demographic factors, such as fertility, mortality and naptiality, set 
limits for the potential availability of family support. However, unlike many of the other 
forces that are apt to affect family support, changes in kin availability can be predicted 
with relative certainty based on the current population age and sex structure. Being the 
most populous country in the world, China experienced unprecedentedly rapid population 
growth during the 1950s and 1960s, often referred to as the baby boom period. Fertility 
has only started to fall in recent years, primarily owing to the intervention of government 
birth control programs. As projections in Chapter 1 show, with sustained fertility decline
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and extended life expectancy, China will have an enormous aged population in the decades 
to come. For example, when the baby boomers begin to enter old age in 2030, 15 per cent 
of the total population of 1,500 million will be classified as aged (Table 1.1). Future 
generations of adults of working age are going to face an unprecedentedly heavy burden 
of old-age dependency.
In the family support system, kin availability directly influences the well-being of 
the elderly. Based on the 1990 census data, a number of projections on kinship and family 
formation in China have been made with microsimulation models in recent years (Yang, 
1992; Lin, 1995). Results show that owing to population momentum, although the 
dependency rate will increase at the macro-level, a crisis in the family support system at 
the micro-level is not going to occur in the near future. If fertility remains slightly above 
replacement level according to rural people’s family-size preference, the potential 
demographic capacity of the support system still looks promising. For example, the 
average number of children available to people aged 65-69 will decrease only moderately 
from 3.6 in 1990 to 2.4 in 2030. The probability of having at least a surviving son is 
relatively high, around one son for each older person. The number of childless elderly is 
extremely small, even not taking into account the adoption factor. More interestingly, the 
probability is also high for the elderly to have one surviving spouse or a surviving sibling. 
In fact, most old people at that time will have more surviving siblings than children. This 
future pattern of kin availability may lead to a shift in the family system from the support 
provided primarily by children to that provided jointly by spouse, children and siblings.
As found in this study, people’s fertility preferences have begun to change in the 
study area, under the combined influence of modernisation and programmatic efforts. The 
small family norm has been widely accepted. If present ideals are going to be translated 
into future behaviour, it can be predicted that the nuclearisation of Chinese families will 
continue, and the changing family-size norms will bring fertility further down to a level 
much closer to government targets. In terms of family support, perhaps villagers also 
realise that, because of declining mortality, fewer children are necessary to provide
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support for them in old age. That is why the old-age security motive has fallen to a 
secondary position in people’s fertility desires. On the other hand, the predominant 
preference for two-child families indicates that the government birth control program has 
reached its limit. Rural couples will try to achieve their desired family size, no matter what 
happens. The current coercive measures used by local officials to enforce the One-Child 
targets, such as heavy fines and shock campaigns, appear to be unpopular and ineffective. 
They only serve to damage the relations between the government and the masses at 
grassroots level. Findings from this study have obvious policy implications: instead of 
imposing the unrealistic One-Child targets in rural areas, the government should make 
necessary modifications to formally allow villagers to have two children, or at least one 
son, with certain spacing requirements. The de facto  policies currently applied in some 
villages are simply not reliable enough. As projections show, the resulting fertility would 
not be high, only slightly higher than the replacement level. In this way, not only could the 
government goal of reduced fertility be met, rural people’s desires for children as 
manpower in farming, potential supporters in old age, and successors in the family line 
could be satisfied.
7.2.2. Traditions and social norms
Nugent (1990) observed that in many parts of the world the co-operative solution 
of infrafamilial, intergenerational transfers and mutual support has been reinforced by the 
creation of a social norm: parents should invest in their children and the children should 
take care of their elderly parents. Once co-operative behaviour becomes accepted as the 
right thing to do, the norms may become self-enforcing. As discussed previously, in rural 
China Confucian values of filial piety and ancestor worship used to have a strong 
influence. For children to support their parents in old age was seen as a sacred duty. It is 
not surprising that such traditional norms and values are by no means safe from 
undermining by various factors associated with modernisation. Nevertheless, it is widely 
agreed that the cultural underpinning of the family support systems can show a degree of 
durability in the face of socio-economic change.
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This study finds that the tradition of familial support for the elderly has remained 
largely unchanged in the study area. Support was provided mainly in the form of 
coresidence, but material and non-material assistance was also offered by children living in 
separate residence. More importantly, three-generation stem households in general, and 
coresidence in particular, were still considered as ideal living arrangements by a great 
majority of villagers. Top consideration was given to intergenerational support and care. 
In the study area, three practical factors are likely to increase the probability of the future 
old people living with at least one adult child. First, the future elderly will be better 
established financially than their parent generation, thanks to the recent reforms that make 
assets accumulation possible. For example, most of them have already had their own 
houses built. The younger generation will in fact benefit more or longer than the older 
generation from coresidence. Second, the future providers, or the present-day children, 
will be more aware of their obligations because they have fewer siblings sharing the 
responsibility to repay parental investment. Third, there will be little chance for a newly 
wedded couple to apply for a site to build their own house, and, hence, live separately, 
since all community land has already been divided up.
For the government to promote family support for the elderly in rural areas, the 
widespread approval of coresidence and co-operation within extended families at the 
grassroots level is obviously worth encouraging and fostering. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
inadequate support is more likely to be found in the elderly living alone, and caused by 
weakened willingness of adult children to deliver, rather than real financial difficulties. 
Therefore, special consideration should be given to encourage and facilitate coresidence of 
the elderly with their families. Policies to boost children’s moral responsibility, such as the 
massive education campaigns and legislated requirements, are still necessary. Additional 
measures may include: (1) to reconfirm the elderly’s personal entitlement to contracted 
land plots; (2) to encourage the elderly to retain their household headship as long as is 
possible and practical; (3) to enforce the disinheritance provisions of the Inheritance Law
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to sanction any unfilial children; and (4) to revitalise to some extent the traditional role and 
influence of clan elders in the community.
7.2.3. The socio-economic development
In previous chapters, there was much have discussion of the influence of 
modernisation on the status of the elderly and the family support system. In the study area, 
thanks to the recent socio-economic development and structural reform, the elderly have 
experienced marked improvement in economic well-being. However, such changes are not 
substantial enough to diminish the importance of the family in providing old-age support. 
Some of the institutional conditions, identified by Nugent (1985), that make family 
support indispensable still function in the study area, such as underdeveloped capital 
markets, the absence or inefficiency of private or public old-age and disability insurance 
programs, and underdeveloped markets for the goods and services that elderly people 
consume. Needless to say, there are also risks and uncertainties resulting from natural 
causes such as disasters or crop failures, and personal reasons like illness or injury. In fact, 
there is going to be a lengthy time lag before the traditional family system can give way to 
a modem system of old-age support.
The newly introduced market-oriented reform has mixed implications to rural 
families’ welfare. There is no doubt that the return to family farming in the study area 
since the early 1980s has greatly boosted agricultural production. The diversification of 
the local economy has also raised family incomes to an unprecedented level. 
Unfortunately, however, the market economy, especially an underdeveloped market 
economy, also brings with it fluctuations and uncertainties with which individual families 
have difficulty in coping. The government may increase the family’s capacity to withstand 
possible market failures from two directions. On the one hand, the government bears the 
major responsibility to improve market conditions at the macro-level, such as a stable and 
fair market environment, better infrastructure, and extensive service networks. At the 
micro-level, each family will do its best to increase production and income, in order to
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achieve not only a higher living standard at the moment, but also a solid foundation for 
old-age security in future. On the other hand, the government should assist in the 
development of community-based welfare programs. Some of these programs, such as the 
Five-Guarantees system and the co-operative health care system, were proved successful 
during the commune period. Owing to fund shortages, most of these programs were 
privatised or stopped after the reform. As shown in this study, the expectation for the 
government to expand community-based welfare programs was high among villagers.
In family support, the co-operative health care system is of special significance, 
because the demand of old people for health care is usually high, and families with sick or 
disabled elderly dependants are more likely to fall into financial crisis. According to a 
national survey in the early 1990s, 18 per cent of the rural population could not receive 
medical treatment, and 56 per cent of those requiring hospitalisation could not afford it 
(Tian, 1991). In the study area, village clinics have all been contracted out to local doctors 
in recent years. Villagers often complained about the declining quality of health care and 
rising costs. So far, the government is yet to work out a national strategy for the future 
development of health care in rural areas.
Additional attention should be paid to the development of education in rural areas. 
As found in this study, young couples in the study area have shown high aspirations in the 
education of their children, particularly sons. This can be interpreted as a trade-off of the 
number of children for the ‘quality’ of children under the tough government birth control 
policy, although old-age security may not be the only motive. If other conditions remain 
the same, a better educated person is preferred for family support for at least two reasons. 
First, he is likely to earn a better livelihood as a skilful manager of the household economy 
or a wage earner in formal sectors, resulting in greater means to fulfil his obligations. 
Second, he is less likely to shirk his support responsibility, being better informed about 
relevant policies and laws or more mindful of personal and family reputations. 
Nevertheless, a too high aspiration is still unrealistic in the situation where only four per 
cent of young people of college age can expect to be enrolled in a higher education
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institution. The majority of rural youth have to remain on the farm anyway. Therefore, the 
curriculum of rural schools should be tailored to meet the actual need of villagers in 
developing the household economy and generating income.
7.2.4. Government policies
As Cowgill (1986) pointed out, government policies will also influence the 
redistribution of resources between families and the state in providing old-age support. As 
discussed in previous chapters, since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, the 
government has imposed numerous social engineering programs according to the state 
socialist doctrine. However, in the welfare areas, the Marxist ideals have not been 
followed seriously. In urban areas, an old-age pension scheme was introduced in the early 
1950s, but it covers only government employees and workers in the state-owned 
enterprises. In rural areas where 80 per cent of the total population live, such a program is 
still non-existent. Economic and material support for the elderly has always been 
shouldered by the family. Financial assistance to the destitute elderly from the state and the 
community is extremely limited, usually in the form of disaster relief or the Five- 
Guarantees benefits.
Since the late 1970s, the government has adopted a series of market-oriented 
reform policies that have greatly transformed China’s social and economic structures. 
Most state socialist policies were abandoned. In fact, the doctrine itself is under critical 
scrutiny; as the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping admitted: ‘We haven’t even figured 
out what is socialism, and what is Marxism! All is being probed’ (Li, 1998). The question 
is: with what to replace the previous policies? There is no straightforward answer at this 
moment, vividly reflected in a popular saying: mo zhe shitou guohe (crossing river by 
groping for stones on the riverbed). That means, the current reform, officially the 
socialism with Chinese characteristics, is likely to be yet another massive social 
engineering experiment, only without distinctive ideological flavour.
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It is widely agreed that the market-oriented reform has in recent years played a 
decisive role in promoting economic growth and raising people’s living standards in China. 
However, the reform also brings with it unwanted side-effects, such as enlarged regional 
disparity, expanding inequity and polarisation, rampant corruption, rising unemployment, 
widespread social instability and disorder, and deteriorating moral standards. On the one 
hand, the world in which people live becomes increasingly unpredictable because of the 
volatile market conditions and ambiguous government policies. On the other hand, the old 
safety net, however limited, is gradually falling apart. Even urban residents nowadays have 
to face mounting uncertainties caused by the destruction of the existing welfare system. 
The potential social crisis is so grave that some scholars have even suggested a thorough 
re-examination of the development strategy China has followed so far. In her 1998 best­
seller ‘The Pitfall of China’, He (1998) argued that the government’s legitimacy claim is 
based so far on promoting economic growth. Now, attention should be paid to the 
safeguarding of social justice and equity.
Over the last 100 years, the social security system has been proved by the 
experience of industrialised countries to be an effective ‘safety valve’ and ‘social stabiliser’ 
in the market economy. A mature economic system can only function smoothly with the 
support of a sound social security system. In recent years, scholars have completed a great 
number of feasibility studies and proposed a variety of policy recommendations for the 
development of a modem social security system in China. Although pilot projects have 
been launched in a few individual areas, the government is yet to work out an overall 
strategy. Certainly, there are mountains of practical difficulties in such a large country at 
such an uncertain time. However, the key issue is lack of a clear and firm government 
commitment. From a long-term viewpoint, such delay and indecision will entail serious 
political, economic and social consequences.
The rural population has long been disadvantaged in China’s development 
program. In fact, the capital accumulation of the country’s industrialisation over the last 
few decades was made possible largely through the exploitation of farmers. Over the last
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two decades, the improvement in people’s living standard is achieved primarily through 
their own hard work, not at the government’s mercy. At present stage, China is still ruled 
by a one-party authoritarian government. The official stand is that the ruling Communist 
Party is politically representing all the segments of the population. The fact is that, 
however, rural population in general, and the rural elderly in particular, have little 
influence in the process of policy-making, because their rights and interests are not 
properly, let alone proportionately, represented in the current political system. As a result, 
rural people’s welfare still ranks low on the government’s working agenda, and 
government outlay for developing and assisting rural welfare programs is limited.
Obviously, it is unrealistic under the current circumstance to call for a major and 
immediate overhaul of the existing political establishment, so that people of every interest 
group in the society can have their voice heard at the top decision-making level. 
Democratisation remains a long-term goal of China’s political reform. Nevertheless, recent 
pilot projects of village election and self-government have already made encouraging 
progress at the lowest grass-root level (Kelliher, 1997). The policy of village self- 
government signals a significant shift in the existing policy by allowing villagers to freely 
elect their own government and granting the village government a defined sphere of 
autonomous activities. There is an urgent need for the Government to institutionalise and 
consolidate this new system, and extend it gradually to the township and county level. 
Rural people will therefore have a greater say in the decision-making on issues closely 
related to their interest and well-being. Given the rising concern about old-age security 
among villagers, it can be expected that social security and old-age support programs will 
receive due attention and funding from local self-governments.
As discussed in Chapter I, scholars do not recommend developing countries to 
follow the Western model and introduce a formal old-age support system under the 
current socio-economic circumstance. In China, it is also a government policy to ask the 
family and community to shoulder the major responsibility of old-age support and care. 
However, even though the Government has no imminent plan to introduce a formal old-
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age support system in rural areas, it should make early efforts to formulate a unified 
strategy for the development of a social security system, for the country as a whole, and 
back it up by relevant legislation and laws. In rural areas, preferential policies and special 
funds are required to support the existing community programs, so that they can be 
gradually expanded and upgraded to provide a wider range of services and benefits. 
Hopefully in the near future a social security system with Chinese characteristics can be 
established hand in hand with a market economy with Chinese characteristics, as the 
government planned ((Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1995).
7.3. Implications for future research
In most rural areas of developing countries, family support is still very important. 
It provides income and assistance to parents throughout old age and also acts as a final 
security net for the elderly when they became unable to survive on their own. However, in 
the face of sustained fertility decline, rising life expectancy and changing socio-economic 
conditions, the future of the support system for the elderly is uncertain. There is a special 
need for intensive research on the nature and extent to which changes in familial support 
occur as well as their implications for the elderly’s welfare and government intervention 
policies. As Knodel and Debavalya (1992) pointed out, impressionistic accounts of the 
elderly and their circumstances, or those based mainly on ideological and theoretical 
views, can be quite misleading if not verified by actual data.
Owing to budget constraints, this study was confined to a rural community in 
central Shaanxi, China. Although efforts were made to select a fieldwork site that 
represents the average situation, the findings of this study can hardly permit conclusions 
about rural China as a whole. For example, it is found the small-family norm has already 
been accepted by the majority of villagers, and the old-age security motive was not high 
on people’s fertility desires. However, other studies found that rural people still prefer 
large families, particularly in poor areas (Chen and Mu, 1996). Budget permitting, it is 
strongly recommended that a similar study should be conducted in a broader area. In the
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household survey of this study, the strength of family support was measured by the 
conventional indicators of the frequency of coresidence and of contact within the family. 
According to Goldstein and Ku (1993), such indicators are not sufficient to capture the 
effect of other influencing factors, such as the degree of obligation and affection bound in 
custom and social processes. Therefore, further classification of the relationship between 
family coresidence and family support is important. The nature of support received by the 
elderly varies from one family to another. As found in this study, while some old people 
were provided with only the minimum, others received cash and quality foods. Some were 
totally dependent while others were allowed to control resources. Therefore, a general 
description of the family as still the central support for the elderly reveals little about their 
actual situation or well-being. Future research on this topic will have to disaggregate 
family support into more efficacious categories. Finally, as repeatedly stressed in this 
thesis, the current situation of the elderly in rural China is largely shaped by previous 
social engineering programs imposed by an authoritarian government from above. The 
effect of such programs is not going to fade in the foreseeable future. It will make an 
interesting comparative study if data are available from other developing countries, where 
modernisation takes a more ‘natural’ course.
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APPENDIX 1. Household survey questionnaire (a concise translation 
of the Chinese version)
A. Characteristics of coresident family members:
1. Code number;
2. Household headship or the relationship to the household head;
3. Sex: male, female;
4. Age;
5. Educational status: illiterate/semi-literate, primary, junior high, senior high, college;
6. Marital status: never married, currently married, separated, divorced, widowed;
7. Working status: adults working, adults not working, retired, student, children;
8. Number of surviving children.
B. Characteristics of non-resident immediate family members:
1. Code number;
2. Relationship to the household head: parents, children;
3. Age;
4. Marriage status;
5. Residence: same village, same township, same county, others;
6. Frequency of contact: almost daily, 1-3 times per week, 1-3 time per month, others;
7. Economic relations to the household head: providing support, receiving support, 
others.
C. Family characteristics:
1. Living standard: poor, average, well-to-do, wealthy;
2. Housing conditions: concrete structures, others;
3. Possession of TV sets: colour, black-white, no;
4. Major decision-maker in the household: Purchasing household durables;
5. Major decision-maker in the household: Managing household economy;
6. Support for the elderly family members: self support, self and children, mainly sons, 
mainly daughters, all children, others;
7. Average monthly expenditure on each elderly persons: <50 Yuan, 50-100 Yuan, >100 
Yuan.
D. Old age security expectations:
1. Ideal number of persons in household;
2. Ideal number of generations in household;
3. Should young people still coreside with elderly parents after marriage?
4. Reasons for coresidence: family tradition, inter-generational assistance and care, 
family influence, minimising living cost, housing conditions, management of the 
household economy, others;
5. Future support source: family, self-support, shared responsibility between the family 
and the community, others.
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APPENDIX 2. Guideline for focus-group discussions
A. The role and status of the elderly
1. What special roles the elderly are playing in family and in the village? Are there any 
differences between old men and old women?
2. How to describe the status of the elderly today, compared with other younger age 
groups?
3. Should people show respect for the elderly?
4. What is the role of the elderly in children’s marriage arrangement?
5. Are the elderly happy about their current status?
B. Living arrangements of the elderly:
1. How do the elderly prefer to live nowadays?
2. If elderly parents have several children, whom do they prefer to live with? Are there 
any difference between old men and old women?
C. Experiences of old-age support :
1. What kind of support (economic, emotional or physical) do the elderly expect from 
children?
2. If children’s support is expected, in what form (coresidence, monetary, materials, or 
labour)?
3. Do the expectations differ according to the characteristics of the children (age, sex, 
birth order, marital status, residence, financial conditions or personal character)?
4. Do the support received by the elderly in reality differ according to the characteristics 
of the elderly person (age, sex, marital status, health status or character)?
5. Are there any changes in people’s living standard in recent years? Who receive better 
treatment at home, the elderly or young children?
6. Is the support the elderly received sufficient in general? If not, are there any 
solutions? And how can the solutions be reached (through mediation of village 
cadres, government intervention or lawsuits)? Are there old people who are neglected 
by their children?
7. What is the general attitude of adult children toward supporting their elderly parents? 
If there are any changes, what are the causal factors (socio-economic development, 
government policy, rising income and living standard, education and novel ideas, 
migration)?
8. What help do the elderly generally receive from sources other than children 
(relatives, neighbours, community, and government)? How does the Five-Guarantees 
system work in the community?
D. Economic activities of the elderly:
1. Do most elderly work in the village, in what form?
2. Do they work because they want to or because they have to?
3. Do the elderly coreside with their children contribute to the household? How and to 
what extent? Do old people give more than they receive?
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E. Strategies for economic security in old age:
1. What is people’s general idea of the future development in old-age support in rural 
areas? Should one prepare anything ahead of time for his own old-age security in 
absence of a government sponsored pension program? Have you ever given it a 
serious thought?
2. Should children continuously provide for their elderly parents? Or the elderly have to 
look after themselves? Or community and the state also have a role to play?
3. If you expect your children to provide for you in old age, is it still a good idea to 
have as many children as possible? Given the current family planning policy, rural 
couples are allowed to have only one child, or two children at most. Will this affect 
your old-age security in future?
4. When it comes to securing your old-age support, does the gender of your children 
play a special role? Is a son more reliable than a daughter?
5. Considering the family planning policy, how to ensure that a small number of 
children can provide sufficient support? In terms of financial security, what education 
and occupation do you expect your children to pursue in future?
6. If you expect your children to provide for you in old age, will you still coreside with 
them, or choose to live separately?
7. If you do not expect your children to provide for you in old age, what is the solution?
8. Are you interested in the old-age insurance programs provided by the local 
government and insurance companies?
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APPENDIX 3. The Old-Age Support Contract
(Authorised by the District Committee on Ageing, Qingdu District, Xianyang City)
Considering relevant provisions of the Constitution, the Marriage Law, the Civil 
Law, the Law of Succession and the Regulations Regarding Protection of the Elderly’s 
Legal Rights and Interests,
Considering the traditional Chinese virtues of respecting, valuing and supporting 
the elderly,
Considering the government policy of providing the elderly with sufficient 
support to meet their financial, physical and emotional needs,
Both parties of this contract have reached the following agreement on old age 
support through consultation, to ensure the elderly enjoying a happy and healthy life in 
later years:
A. Material support: (Food, clothing, other daily necessities, and medicine)
B: Emotional support: (Harmonious family relations, entertainment)
Supplementary articles:
1. This contract is a legally binding document that both parties must comply with till the 
natural termination of the support relation.
2. Modifications of the contract are valid only when they are made by both parties 
through consultation, endorsed by the supervisory agency and verified by the notary 
office.
3. There are four copies of this contract, to be kept by the supported, the supporter, the 
supervisory agency and the notary office, separately.
Signature:
The Supported:
The Supporter:
The Supervisory Agency: (Village/Township Association of the Elderly)
Date:
Fulfilment Record:
Verification of the Notary Office:
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